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Preface
Bargaining is important on all levels of social interaction from the small quarrels among
friends and family to the important negotiations between states. The costs of its impasse
can be substantial, consider for example, the amounts spent privately and publicly on civil
litigation or the costs of strike and lockout. Understanding why and when bargaining fails is
thus one of the major concerns in social sciences. This dissertation analyses bargaining from
two very distinct angles. The first two chapters deal with strategic behaviour in bilateral
bargaining situations. There, I analyse bargaining breakdown when two individuals bargain
over the division of a fixed surplus. I depart from the neo-classical assumption of pure self-
interest and provide a theoretical framework and empirical evidence for a self-serving bias
in fairness perceptions. Contrary, the third chapter investigates, under standard behavioural
assumptions, how the success of multinational bargaining over the provision of a global
public good is aﬀected by a compulsory minimum number of participating countries. It
characterises the optimal minimum number depending on the model parameters and presents
some comparative statics results.
Each economic model and therewith its predictive power is based on specific behavioural
assumptions. For decades, economists used to postulate that agents behave in a purely self-
interested way, taking only their own material well-being into consideration. This seems a
very restrictive assumption and economists have not always been thinking like this. In “The
Theory of Moral Sentiments” (1759, chapter 1), Adam Smith acknowledges that
“How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his
nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary
to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it.”
Economists recently started to reassess the fundamental behavioural assumption of pure self-
interest and its implications. At the forefront were experimental economists who questioned
whether the predictions of the neo-classical assumption of pure self-interest would be compat-
ible with behaviour in laboratory experiments. In the last two, three decades, experimental
economists have conducted a vast variety of experimental studies. Not surprisingly, these
studies find that a large fraction of the agents do not behave as predicted by self-interest.
For an extensive summary on the experimental findings, see chapter 2 in Camerer (2003).
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These findings inspired microeconomic theorists to find behavioural assumptions that can
explain the observed patterns in a rigorous and clear manner. By now, various approaches
exist that model the experimental evidence. All of these models embed social comparison
processes in preferences and are thus commonly referred to as other-regarding preferences. A
comprehensive survey of the literature can be found in Fehr and Schmidt (2003). These new
behavioural models see many economic phenomena from a diﬀerent angle and oﬀer solutions
to longlasting puzzles in a novel and intriguingly intuitive way. For example, in the field
of contract theory, it is diﬃcult to explain why many contracts seem to be deliberately left
incomplete. The theory of incentives suggests that it is best to attach the remuneration for
a specific task closely to observable measures of eﬀort. Concerns for fairness and reciprocity
might render the standard incentive contract less attractive and improve the workings of
incomplete contracts relying on the goodwill of each party, see Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt
(2001). Other-regarding preferences also allowed economists to take a fresh look at other
decision situations like incentives in teams, ownership structures or the provision of public
goods.
In this light, the first chapter proposes a new approach to bilateral bargaining break-
down. It examines the connection of bargaining breakdown and self-serving biases in fairness
perceptions. There is strong empirical evidence that people exhibit self-serving biases con-
cerning their fairness judgements in bargaining situations with asymmetric outside options.
Moreover, the psychological literature suggests that such a self-serving bias can be a driving
force of bargaining impasse. I provide a theoretical framework for analysing the behaviour of
self-servingly biased agents in simple bargaining situations. I build on the notion of inequity
aversion and extend it to incorporate self-serving biases due to asymmetric outside options.
To take account of agents’ ignorance concerning their biases, I distinguish between sophisti-
cated and naive agents. That is, those agents who understand their bias and those who do
not. Then, I apply this framework to analyse the behaviour of naive and sophisticated biased
agents in ultimatum and investment games. For ultimatum bargaining with complete infor-
mation, I find that bargaining can only break down if biased proposers are not aware of their
self-serving bias. In the incomplete information case, the propensity of bargaining breakdown
is higher with naive than with sophisticated agents. In the investment game, a self-serving
bias leads to reduced participation, but naiveté about the bias increases participation.
Behavioural assumptions drive the predictions of any economic model. It is thus of
great importance to verify our underlying assumptions. One way of doing this is to examine
behaviour of individuals in a decision situation in the laboratory, thus eliminating most of the
exogenous variation to the situation. Comparing the accuracy of the predictions of diﬀerent
behavioural assumptions gives an indication which assumption fits the decision situation
better. The second chapter thus explores whether the predictions generated for self-servingly
biased agents fit experimental data better than other behavioural assumptions. To this
aim, I run a standard ultimatum experiment with varying asymmetric outside options. The
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focus of the second chapter is thus on bilateral bargaining breakdown from the experimental
perspective. I find that oﬀers and minimal acceptable oﬀers increase/ decrease with an
increase in the outside option of the responder/ proposer. The evolution of oﬀers and minimal
acceptable oﬀers is not compatible with the predictions generated by the assumption of purely
self-interested agents. However, it is consistent with inequity averse agents with and without
a self-serving bias. Furthermore, I find that rejection rates increase with the introduction
of asymmetry. Neither pure self-interest, nor inequity aversion can explain this increase.
However, as shown in the first chapter, a self-serving bias in the assessment of fairness can
induce bargaining breakdown in the presence of asymmetries. The evidence found is in line
with the theoretical predictions from chapter one. Moreover, I find that the propensity to
oﬀer/ demand the equal split of the pie decreases rapidly with the introduction of a small
asymmetry. This holds in particular, when the proposer is endowed with the larger outside
option implying that the power to propose is bundled with the advantage in terms of outside
options. It further supports the hypothesis that agents change their perception of the fair
oﬀer or demand. Apart from the main analysis, I find evidence that subjects might get biased
by the nature of the previous decision situations. This is an interesting eﬀect as it suggests
that subjects do not regard each situation independently, but that in particular situations
they are influenced by previous decision circumstances.
In the third chapter, I switch perspective. Instead of examining bargaining between indi-
viduals, the focus is now on outcomes when many countries negotiate together. International
agreements for the provision of global public goods gather more and more political and eco-
nomic importance. Throughout the years the number of international agreements of any
sort has been increasing. In many of the agreements, the provision of some public good is
determined, mostly related to biodiversity and other environmental issues, human rights and
the rules of warfare and arms control. Among the most prominent agreements of the late
20th century are the Kyoto Protocol regulating emissions of carbondioxides and the installa-
tion of an international criminal court. The provision of global public goods as regulated in
such agreements is of great importance to present and future generations around the world.
However, there is no mechanism to oblige sovereign states to participate and comply with
the agreements. In case of the Kyoto Protocol, it has long been doubtful whether suﬃciently
many countries would join the agreement to render it legally binding for all participating
countries. Only in 2004, seven years after the Conference of Kyoto, did Russia promise its
ratification restoring the protocol to life.
Hence, it is important to understand the features of the bargaining process that hinder
or enhance the chances of a successful agreement. The third chapter analyses the role of
ratification quotas in multilateral agreements on the provision of a transnational public good.
The setting is applied to the example of emission reduction. The general idea is the trade-oﬀ
that the higher is the quota, the lower is the level of emissions in case the agreement comes into
force, but the higher is also the risk of failure. I propose a three stage international bargaining
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game where countries first determine a ratification quota. Then, they decide whether to
ratify and finally they decide on the emission of a global pollutant. With countries rather
than individuals being the participants of the bargaining process, I adopt the behavioural
assumption of pure self-interest. In a setting with incomplete information, two country types
and a binary contribution to the provision, I examine the diﬀerences between simultaneous
and sequential ratification. When the benefits from emission of both types are smaller than
the social costs, the outcome in the simultaneous case is essentially identical to the sequential
case. The optimal quota is 100% and achieves the first best. With the high type’s benefits
exceeding the social costs, I find that the optimal quota is as small as possible, if ratification
is simultaneous. In the sequential ratification case, I cannot determine the optimal quota.
However, I find that the aggregate expected surplus decreases with respect to the simultaneous
case.
Each of the following chapters is a self-contained paper with its own introduction and
appendix. This implies that each chapter can be read independently of the other two.
Chapter 1
Self-Serving Biases in Bargaining:
Explaining Impasse
1.1 Introduction
There is a large body of experimental literature, both in psychology and economics, that
finds self-serving biases in judgements of fairness. This literature suggests that self-serving
biases are a driving force of bargaining impasse. It is evident that bargaining is important
on all levels of social interaction from the small quarrels among friends and family to the big
negotiations between states. The costs of its impasse can be substantial, consider for example,
the amounts spent privately and publicly on civil litigation or the costs of strike and lockout.
Understanding why bargaining fails in some cases is thus one of the major concerns in social
sciences. A self-serving bias settles itself in a notion of fairness that, mostly unconsciously,
tends to favour an agent. It is intuitive that in a situation where agents have diﬀerent
notions of fairness and moreover, are not aware of these diﬀerences, bargaining might fail.
In the economics literature, there has been no attempt, so far, to model self-serving biases
theoretically and to explore its impact on bargaining breakdown. This paper tries to do this
by extending the notion of inequity aversion in the presence of asymmetric outside options
and applying it to ultimatum bargaining and investment games.
For a self-serving bias to occur, the psychological literature suggests that “there needs
to be some form of asymmetry in how the negotiation environment is viewed”, Babcock and
Loewenstein (1997, p. 119). In real life, one hardly finds a perfectly symmetric negotiation
environment. In particular, most situations are characterised by asymmetric outside options.
These occur, for example, in wage bargaining where the employer might have the choice be-
tween several diﬀerent candidates whereas the employee’s outside option is unemployment.
Yet similarly, asymmetric outside options are present when countries negotiate emission tar-
gets of a global pollutant, those damaging eﬀects vary across countries. Furthermore, there
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is a close link between outside options and individual wealth levels. Asymmetry in terms of
outside options plays a prominent role and is maybe the most natural case triggering self-
serving biases. This paper therefore focuses on self-serving biases induced by asymmetric
outside options.
Economists usually analyse bargaining games with the neo-classical assumption of purely
self-interested agents. However, experimental evidence suggests that a large fraction of agents
do not behave as classical economic theory predicts. Simple set-ups such as dictator, ulti-
matum or investment games, suggest that subjects compare their payoﬀ with the other par-
ticipants’ payoﬀs. For an extensive summary on the experimental findings, see chapter 2 in
Camerer (2003). There exist various approaches to model the experimental evidence. All
of these models embed social comparison processes in preferences. A comprehensive survey
of the literature can be found in Fehr and Schmidt (2003). Here, I follow the approach of
inequity aversion by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) where agents dislike income inequity.1 Com-
paring monetary payoﬀs, agents base their judgement as to whether an outcome is considered
as equitable on a reference allocation. Fehr and Schmidt argue that in a symmetric setting
a natural reference outcome is one which attributes the same monetary payoﬀ to all agents
(Equal Split). With the introduction of asymmetric outside options this reasoning is no longer
applicable. The Equal Split is just one among many other possible reference allocations like,
for example, Split the Diﬀerence which advocates an equal split of the entire cake minus the
sum of outside options. On which of the various reference allocations an agent is likely to
base her fairness judgement is an empirical question. Yet, a self-serving bias would imply
that with asymmetric outside options agents adopt a fairness perception that favours them
in monetary terms.
The extension I propose allows inequity averse agents to base their decision on reference
allocations diﬀerent from the Equal Split. I render the reference allocation of the agents
linearly dependent on the diﬀerence in outside options between two agents. The strength
with which this diﬀerence influences the reference point can vary across agents. It serves
as a measure of the extent to which the fairness perception favours the agent. According to
Dahl and Ransom (1999, p. 703), agents that are self-servingly biased “...subconsciously alter
their fundamental views about what is fair in a way that benefits their interests”. Hence, a
self-serving bias is characterised by two features: First, it settles itself in a notion of fairness
that tends to favour the agent, i.e. that leaves the agent with a relatively big monetary
payoﬀ. Second, agents are not aware of their self-serving biases. I separate these two features
of self-serving biases to analyse the influence of each component separately. An agent is
biased, if she has a reference allocation that attributes a larger allotment to her than the
reference allocation of her partner agent. To capture the second feature of a self-serving bias,
namely that people are ignorant about the bias, I distinguish between sophisticated agents
1 Inequity aversion provides a simple and sparse representation of the comparison processes that neverthe-
less captures a lot of the experimental findings.
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who understand that their fairness notion favours themselves, and naive agents who have no
such understanding.
Within this extended framework of inequity aversion, I analyse ultimatum bargaining and
stylised investment games. These simple bargaining games deliver the ingredients to more
sophisticated negotiation environments. It is thus interesting to understand in a first step
how self-serving biases work in these simple settings. In an ultimatum game, a proposer
and a responder bargain over the division of a fixed pie. The proposer announces a division
which the responder can accept or reject. If he accepts, the pie is divided according to
the proposed rule. If he rejects, each player gets an outside option, known to both agents.
With purely self-interested agents, as well as with standard inequity averse agents, there will
be no bargaining breakdown. With the mere introduction of diﬀering evaluations of what
allocation is fair, this does not change. As long as the proposer knows the fairness perception
of the other agent, she prefers to oﬀer a share that the responder is willing to accept rather
than to get her outside option. Accordingly, as long as the biased agents are aware of their
bias, agents reach an agreement. If instead the proposer is biased and naive, then there
are circumstances where the bargain breaks down. The reasoning is straightforward. The
respondent is willing to accept any oﬀer that is above a certain threshold. The threshold level
depends on the fairness perception of the respondent. Sophisticated and biased proposers
predict the threshold correctly, while some naive and biased proposers underestimate it.
Therefore, whenever a naive proposer oﬀers the underestimated threshold level in equilibrium,
the bargain fails.
In a simple version of the investment game, one agent decides whether she wants to
invest her outside option and participate in a dictator game. If she decides to participate,
the other agent then determines how to split a fixed surplus; otherwise both receive their
outside option. Dictators, whose reference allocation favours themselves more, tend to give
less to the recipient. If their fairness perception is suﬃciently extreme, the first agent refuses
to participate. However, if this agent is naive, her participation becomes more likely. In
many employment contexts, agents are at least temporarily locked into a relationship where
one agent cannot influence how a task or burden is shared between herself and her superior.
The superior can take decisions that could be perceived as very unfair by the other employee.
If the employee would have foreseen the unfair behaviour of the superior, she might have
abstained from the job beforehand and might have taken up her outside option.
Related to the present paper is Konow (2000). He presents a model that incorporates,
in addition to standard material utility, a genuine value of fairness intertwined with an
incentive to change beliefs about the fairness concept. He postulates that there is an objective
fairness concept from which agents voluntary deviate to favour themselves. In contrast, the
present paper takes the belief about the fairness concept as given and analyses how this
belief induces bargaining breakdown. Another related paper by ? suggests that self-servingly
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biased agents have entered a tough state of mind vis-a-vis someone else. ? characterise a class
of bargaining mechanisms under which a population evolves that exhibits some moderate
degree of toughness. They identify the underlying trade-oﬀ that toughness decreases the
average probability of a bargain, but improves the terms of trade. In contrast, this paper
examines how toughness influences behaviour on each bargaining stage. Finally, Frohlich,
Oppenheimer, and Kurki (2004) extend equity aversion in a way similar to our extension.
They introduce the concept of “just deserts” in the context of dictator games with preceding
production. There, agents suﬀer when their inputs to the surplus are larger/ smaller than
their final shares. The dictator faces a trade-oﬀ between material payoﬀs, equality and just
deserts. However, their extension of inequity aversion diﬀers substantially in that they assume
that diﬀerent norms are conflicting with each other. In their model, agents trade-oﬀ disutility
from inequality with disutility from a deviation to just deserts. Whereas the present model
postulates that agents adhere to one norm which depends on the context of the situation.
In the next section, I propose an extension of inequity aversion that incorporates het-
erogeneity in fairness perceptions and self-serving biases. The framework is first applied to
ultimatum bargaining games in section 1.3 and then to investment games with asymmet-
ric outside options in section 1.4. Section 1.5 discusses experimental evidence. Section 1.6
concludes and suggests further paths of research.
1.2 An extension of inequity averse preferences
Inequity averse agents compare their monetary payoﬀ with the payoﬀ of members of a specific
reference group. Within this reference group they dislike outcomes that they perceive as
unequal or unfair. That is, they derive negative utility of a deviation from their reference
allocation. The reference allocation of an agent with respect to another agent is defined by
the pair of payoﬀs that she considers to be equal or fair. The utility of an agent depends
on the reference allocation as well as the reference group. Both these determinants are
considered exogenous in the model of Fehr and Schmidt. They argue that in an experiment
all participants form the reference group. Furthermore, they postulate that in symmetric
situations a natural reference allocation is one in which each agent gets the same payoﬀ, the
Equal Split.2 Other consequentialist models like Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Charness
and Rabin (2002) also postulate the Equal Split as reference allocation. Once asymmetry
is introduced, there is no reason to believe that the Equal Split is the natural reference
allocation. The asymmetry may lead to various reference allocations.3
2A study by Hennig-Schmidt (2002) finds that in symmetric ultimatum games the only allocation that
is perceived as fair by both agents is the allocation were each agent gets an equal amount. She conducted a
video experiment where groups of individuals decided about a distributional task. During the group discussion
preceding the decision, in the symmetric ultimatum game only the Equal Split was mentioned as a fair outcome.
3An experiment by Messick and Sentis (1979) divided subjects into two groups. One group was told
that they should imagine they had worked 7 hours and were to receive a certain amount of money for that.
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In simple bargaining situations such as the ultimatum game, the mere allocation of roles
introduces asymmetry that can induce a self-serving bias.4 More powerful sources of asym-
metry in bargaining environments, however, are asymmetric payoﬀ possibilities or diﬀering
outside options for the agents. The present paper models self-serving biases due to asymmet-
ric outside options. Diﬀerent outside options are an important source of asymmetry. They
are present, for example, in situations where an employer and a worker bargain over the
worker’s wage. But there are a lot of other day-to-day examples where people with diﬀerent
outside options have to decide about the distribution of a surplus. Furthermore, there is a
resemblance between outside options and individual wealth levels in terms of their impact
on fairness judgements. In their fairness statements, agents can be and often are guided by
considerations concerning the diﬀerence in individual wealth levels. Even though individual
wealth levels are not “destroyed” if the parties successfully bargain with each other, relative
wealth levels might nevertheless determine the reference allocation in the bargaining situa-
tion. In this sense, part of the analysis can be transferred to self-serving biases induced by
diﬀerent wealth levels. Apart from this apparent omnipresence, asymmetric outside options
are relatively easy to capture. First, it is an easily observable characteristic of the bargaining
situation. Second, it can be measured quantitatively. Last, outside options can be altered in
experimental set-ups and thus the predictions of the theory should be testable.
An easy and straightforward way of incorporating outside options into fairness consid-
erations is to render the reference allocation linearly dependent on the diﬀerence in outside
options. The reference allocation then has to obey
xi − xj = γi (ωi − ωj) ∀i 6= j (1.1)
where xi represents the monetary payoﬀ of agent i, ωi her outside option and γi measures the
extent to which the reference allocation favours the agent. This representation has the prop-
erty that whenever we consider agents in a symmetric environment, the reference allocation
is the Equal Split, independent of γi.
Suppose two agents i, j can jointly generate a fixed surplus, which I normalise to 1 and
which is strictly larger than the sum of the outside options 1 > ωi + ωj . The reference
Subjects of the other group were told to imagine they had worked for 10 hours on the same task. All subjects
were asked to state the fair payment for the ones that had worked for 10 hours. There were two prominent
concepts of fairness, one that induced the same hourly wage and one that induced the same overall payment.
Among the group of subjects who was told to have worked 7 hours the fraction of subject regarding the same
total payment as fair was significantly larger than the fraction in the second group. Another experiment by
Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoﬀ, and Camerer (1995) allocated the roles of prosecutor and defendant in a
juridical case to diﬀerent individuals. They find that parties with the same information about the case come to
diﬀerent conclusions about what settlement is fair depending on their allocated roles. These are two examples
of experiments finding several comcepts of fairness in asymmetric situations and furthermore, a self-serving
bias in the assessment of the fair outcome.
4Proposers view themselves in a relatively more powerful role and therefore believe that they deserve more
than their opponents. The respondents in contrast think that the distribution of roles should not aﬀect the
division of the cake, see Hoﬀman, McCabe, Shachat, and Smith (1994).
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allocation of agent i is uniquely determined by equation (1.1) and the restriction that xj =
1− xi. Denote the pair of payoﬀs that solves these equations by³
x
f
i (γi) , x
f
j (γi)
´
=
µ
1 + γi (ωi − ωj)
2
,
1− γi (ωi − ωj)
2
¶
,
where the superscript f stands for fair. There are several outstanding reference allocations.
The most prominent being the allocation where both agents receive equal monetary payoﬀs
(Equal Split). This would imply a fairness parameter γi of zero. A reference allocation that
splits the diﬀerence between the surplus both agents can jointly generate and the sum of the
outside options ωi + ωj (Split the Diﬀerence) implies a parameter γi of one. Furthermore,
a parameter of γi =
1
ωi+ωj
represents a reference allocation that divides the entire cake
proportionate to the agents’ outside options (Proportional Split). Still, one could think of
any other value of γi constituting a reference allocation.
5 In the case where agent i has the
larger outside option, ωi > ωj , the parameter range of γi can be reduced to
h
− 1
ωi−ωj ,
1
ωi−ωj
i
.
The upper value signifies a reference point where agents consider it fair that agent i gets the
entire pie and the lower value where agent j gets everything.6 Incorporating this approach
in the representation of inequity aversion yields preferences of the form
ui (x) = xi − αi
1
n− 1
X
j 6=i
max {xj − xi − γi (ωj − ωi) , 0}
−βi
1
n− 1
X
j 6=i
max {xi − xj − γi (ωi − ωj) , 0}
with αi ≥ βi ≥ 0 and βi < 1. The utility parameters αi resp. βi measure the loss for agent i
resulting from a deviation to her disadvantage resp. advantage from her reference point.
The reference allocation of a self-servingly biased person attributes a relatively big mon-
etary allotment to herself. Moreover, it is often the case that a biased person believes her
reference allocation to be impartial. I split up the notion of self-serving biasedness into these
two components: (i) the bias itself and (ii) the belief about the bias.
Definition 1 An agent i is self-servingly biased with respect to another agent j if a higher
monetary payoﬀ is attributed to herself by her own reference allocation than by the reference
allocation of agent j, i.e. xfi (γi) > x
f
i
¡
γj
¢
.
5 In experiments by Hennig-Schmidt (2002) where subjects played in groups and were allowed to discuss
their decisions, Equal Split, Split the Diﬀerence and Proportional Split have been frequently characterised as
fair allocations. A few other divisions of the cake were also paraphrased as fair, but much less often.
6Suppose an agent considers it to be fair that she gets the entire surplus. One could ask in which ways
this agent is diﬀerent from an agent who is purely self-interested. Contrary to the pure self-interest agent,
the inequity averse agent engages in social comparison processes, regardless of the fact that she considers it
fair to receive the entire pie. Thus, she nearly always suﬀers from disadvantageous inequity aversion. As a
consequence, behavioural predictions are diﬀerent, in general, from the predictions derived for the self-interest
agent.
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This implies that the agent with the relatively large outside option is self-servingly biased
if she has a relatively large fairness parameter γi. Conversely, an agent with the relatively
small outside option is self-servingly biased if she has a relatively small γi. Consider for
example the two specific reference allocations of Equal Split and Split the Diﬀerence. Agents
are self-servingly biased if the agent with the relatively large outside option regards Split the
Diﬀerence as a fair outcome, while the agent with the relatively small outside option considers
the Equal Split fair. This relativistic view of biasedness might sound unfamiliar. One might
argue that whenever an agent considers it to be equitable that she gets the entire surplus
herself, she is self-servingly biased. However, biasedness requires a point of comparison. There
is no such exogenous “objective” comparison available in the context of bilateral bargaining.
Therefore, biasedness is defined here in comparison to the reference allocation of the other
agent. To rule out cases where an agent allocates less to herself than the opponent does, I
restrict the parameter range such that γj ∈
h
− 1
ωi−ωj , γi
i
for ωi ≥ ωj . The agent with the
relatively small outside option is thus bound to have a smaller fairness parameter than her
opponent.
I distinguish between those agents who are aware of diﬀering fairness notions among
individuals and those who are not. In analogy to O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), I call an
agent naive who thinks her reference allocation is impartial. A naive agent assumes therefore
that the other agent has the same fairness parameter as herself. In contrast, a sophisticated
agent knows that her reference allocation diﬀers from the one of her opponents. Moreover,
she knows the exact fairness parameter of the other agent.7 Denote the belief of agent i about
the fairness parameter of agent j by bγij .
Definition 2 Agent i is naive if she believes that agent j’s fairness parameter is the same
as hers, that is bγij = γi. Agent i is sophisticated if her belief about agent j’s fairness
parameter is correct, that is bγij = γj.
In the presence of naive agents the solution concepts of subgame perfection and Bayesian
perfection become problematic as beliefs might not be correct in equilibrium. I therefore
employ the concept of “perception perfect strategies” introduced by O’Donoghue and Rabin
(2001) in the context of hyperbolic discounting. This concept merely requires that agents
choose an action that maximises their payoﬀ according to their beliefs. But it does not
require, as the concept of subgame perfection or Bayesian perfection, that agents’ beliefs are
correct in equilibrium.8 Denote with Ui
¡
si
¡
γi, bγij¢¢ the (expected) utility of agent i resulting
from the strategy si ∈ Ai where Ai signifies the strategy space for agent i.
7 If we allow sophisticated agents to be uncertain about the exact value of the fairness parameter of the
other agent, we get partial sophistication. The case with perfect sophisticates and perfect naives can be
regarded as a benchmark.
8 In the dynamic context of time inconsistency, the solution concept of perception-perfection requires that
beliefs be dynamically consistent. This implies that agents believe their future actions to be optimal in any
period and that action plans do not change across periods.
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Definition 3 The strategy sppi
¡
γi, bγij¢ is perception-perfect for a ¡γi, bγij¢-agent if and only
if sppi
¡
γi, bγij¢ ∈ argmaxsi Ui ¡si ¡γi, bγij¢¢.
The belief of a sophisticated agent is correct. Therefore, the perception perfect equilibrium
coincides with the subgame perfect equilibrium resp. the Bayesian perfect equilibrium.
In the next sections, I analyse the behaviour of self-servingly biased inequity averse agents
in ultimatum bargaining as well as simple investment games. In particular, I focus on the
behaviour of self-servingly biased agents who are naive.
1.3 Ultimatum game
In an ultimatum game, a proposer and a responder bargain over the division of a fixed surplus
of one.9 The proposer (P ) announces a division of the surplus (1− s, s) where s denotes the
share oﬀered to the responder. The responder (R) in turn accepts or rejects the proposal.
If he accepts, then the surplus is divided according to the proposed rule. If he rejects, each
player gets her or his outside option denoted by ωi ≥ 0 for i = P,R. Both agents know the
outside options of either player.
In the subgame perfect equilibrium under the assumption of purely self-interested agents,
the proposer oﬀers a division of the surplus of (1− ωR, ωR) which is accepted by the re-
spondent. Contrary, with inequity averse agents, the equilibrium oﬀer depends upon the
characteristics of the utility functions of the proposer as well as the responder. For the
case of no outside options, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) characterise the equilibrium of the ul-
timatum bargaining with inequity averse agents. With complete information concerning the
utility parameters αR and βR, the equilibrium oﬀer of an inequity averse proposer depends
on the extent to which she suﬀers from advantageous inequity, that is situations in which she
gets more than the responder. Proposers that suﬀer heavily from inequity to their advantage
oﬀer a relatively large share to the responder. However, they never go as far as to oﬀer him
more than half the pie. Conversely, proposers that do not suﬀer much from advantageous
inequity, find it profitable to oﬀer a share as small as possible such that the responder is just
willing to accept. In equilibrium, proposers oﬀer
s



= 12 if βP >
1
2
∈
£
s, 12
¤
if βP =
1
2
= s if βP <
1
2
where s = αR1+2αR represents the minimum share the respondent is willing to accept. The
model with inequity aversion predicts that the proposed shares for the responder are positive
even if the outside option for the responder is zero.
9 In what follows, I denote the first player as female and the second player as male.
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With the introduction of asymmetric outside options, it might occur that the minimum
oﬀer the responder is willing to accept s exceeds the equal share of 12 . This occurs if the
value of the outside option to the responder exceeds the equal share of a half. In this case,
the proposer oﬀers the minimum oﬀer irrespective of her inequity aversion. In contrast to the
case with symmetric outside options, asymmetry can therefore induce that the equilibrium
outcome no longer depends on the inequity aversion of the proposer. The equilibrium oﬀer
of the proposer in the presence of positive, (a)symmetric outside options is
s



= max{s, 12} if βP > 12
∈
£
s,max{s, 12}
¤
if βP =
1
2
= s if βP <
1
2
where s = αR+ωR−αRmax{ωP−ωR,0}−βRmax{ωR−ωP ,0}1+2αR .
10 An increase in the outside option for
the responder increases the minimum share he is willing to accept. However, an increase in
the outside option of the proposer might decrease or increase the minimum acceptable share
depending on the diﬀerence in outside options of the proposer and the responder. Note that
in case of symmetric outside options, the minimum share simplifies to s = αR+ωR1+2αR ≤
1
2 as
ωR = ωP ≤ 12 .
The focus of this paper is to study the behaviour and potential bargaining breakdown in
equilibrium, when the reference allocations of agents diﬀer from the Equal Split. In particu-
lar, I am interested in the impact of heterogeneity in reference allocations and of ignorance
concerning this heterogeneity. Before analysing the equilibrium of the general case, I explain
the workings of a self-serving bias with the help of a simple example in the next section.
1.3.1 An example
Suppose the proposer has got no outside option and the responder’s outside option is positive,
ωR > ωP = 0. Consider the two conflicting reference allocations of Equal Split and Split the
Diﬀerence. A biased proposer believes that the Equal Split
¡
1
2 ,
1
2
¢
is fair, while a biased
responder adopts Split the Diﬀerence
¡
1−ωR
2 ,
1+ωR
2
¢
as reference allocation. The fairness
parameter of the proposer resp. the responder is γP = 0 resp. γR = 1. The mere introduction
of a self-serving bias in reference allocations does not result in a breakdown of the bargaining.
A sophisticated biased proposer is always willing to divide the pie such that the respondent is
at least as well oﬀ as with his outside option. The eﬃciency gain resulting from the bargain
is large enough to compensate for deviations from the reference allocation.
To see this, I compute the maximum share the proposer is willing to oﬀer (MTO - Maxi-
mum Tolerable Oﬀer, denoted by s) and the minimum share the responder is willing to accept
10 In section 1.3.2, we show that, even if the minimum share is larger than the equal share, the proposer
always prefers to oﬀer a share the responder is willing to accept rather than staying with her outside option.
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(MAO - Minimum Acceptable Oﬀer, denoted by s). These shares render the proposer resp.
the responder indiﬀerent between their outside option and the division of the pie. In our
example, the value of the outside option to the responder is uR (0, ωR) = ωR and a division
(1− s, s) of the cake which is disadvantageous to him, i.e. s ≤ 1+ωR2 , results in a value of
uR (1− s, s) = s− αR (1− 2s+ ωR). The responder’s MAO is thus sγR=1 =
(1+αR)ωR+αR
1+2αR
.
The proposer values the outside option with uP (0, ωR) = −αPωR. She derives a utility
of uP (1− s, s) = 1− s− αP (2s− 1) of a disadvantageous division (1− s, s) of the pie, with
s ≥ 12 . Hence she is better oﬀ with a division of the pie as long as the share for the respondent
does not exceed the MTO of sγP=0 =
1+αP (1+ωR)
1+2αP
. The MTO sγP=0 is strictly bigger than the
MAO sγR=1. The bargain therefore never fails to take place. The reason being that agents
also dislike inequity when they stay with their outside option. The proposer thus suﬀers from
inequity aversion in case of the breakdown of the bargain. This increases the share she is
maximally willing to give to the responder. In section 1.3.2, I show that this holds in general.
If, however, the proposer is biased and naive about the bias, then the bargain is likely
to fail. The naive and biased proposer thinks that the responder shares the same reference
allocation with γP = 0. She employs this fairness parameter to compute the MAO. Hence,
she believes the MAO to be the same as in the standard case with simple inequity aversion
s?γPR=0 =
(1−βR)ωR+αR
1+2αR
. This level is strictly smaller than the actual MAO, i.e. sγR=1 >
s?γPR=0. If the proposer’s suﬀerance from advantageous inequity is suﬃciently small, i.e.
βP <
1
2 , then, in equilibrium, the proposer is going to propose the smallest share to the
responder. Therefore, she proposes a share that is below the minimum share the responder
is willing to accept and the bargain fails.
The next section extends this result to more general notions of fairness and derives the
equilibrium for the case of incomplete information concerning the utility parameters αR and
βR.
1.3.2 General case
The introduction of asymmetric outside options has several implication for the equilibrium
of the ultimatum game with inequity averse agents. On the one hand, asymmetry in outside
options can increase the MAO such that it exceeds the fair share of the pie. On the other
hand, the asymmetry might lead to a self-serving bias.
In the framework of Fehr and Schmidt, we have already seen that in some cases, namely
when the utility of the outside option to the responder is larger than the utility of the fair
share, the MAO exceeds the fair share. In these cases, the proposer simply oﬀers the MAO
regardless of her level of suﬀerance due to advantageous inequity aversion. For the general
case of heterogenous reference allocations, Lemma 1 shows that the responder’s MAO is larger
than the share the proposer considers to be fair for the responder if and only if the utility
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the responder receives from the outside option constellation is larger than the utility derived
from the fair share. Denote the fair allocation of agent i depending on the fairness parameter
γi by
¡
1− sf (γi) , sf (γi)
¢
=
³
1+γi(ωP−ωR)
2 ,
1−γi(ωP−ωR)
2
´
and the MAO depending on the
fairness parameter γR by s (γR).
Lemma 1 The MAO of the responder is larger than the fair share of the proposer, s (γR) >
sf (γP ), if and only if uR (ωR, ωP ) > uR
¡
sf (γP ) , 1− sf (γP )
¢
.
Proof. The MAO s (γR) is a disadvantageous share for the responder such that he is
indiﬀerent between the outside option and that share. It is thus determined by uR (ωR, ωP ) =
uR (s (γR) , 1− s (γR)). The responder’s utility of a share s that is to his disadvantage is given
by uR (s, 1− s) = s−αR (1− 2s− γR (ωP − ωR)), which is strictly increasing in the share s.
The fair share sf (γP ) that the proposer attributes to the responder is weakly disadvantageous
to the responder. If proposer and responder share the same reference allocation, then the fair
share is not disadvantageous. Otherwise, if agents are biased, the fair share of the proposer
by definition attributes less to the responder than the fair share of the responder, hence it is
disadvantageous. Therefore,
uR (ωR, ωP )− uR
³
sf (γP ) , 1− sf (γP )
´
> 0
⇔
³
s (γR)− sf (γP )
´
(1 + 2αR) > 0
⇔ s (γR) > sf (γP ) .
With a self-serving bias the number of cases, where the MAO exceeds the fair share
sf (γP ), increases compared to the case where both agents share the same reference allocation.
Suppose both agents held the same reference allocation. Now, if the proposer is becoming
biased, the fair share she attributes to the responder decreases in comparison, this is the
very definition of a biased agent. Therefore, for the responder, the utility of the fair share
uR
³
s
f
P , 1− s
f
P
´
is, in more cases, smaller than the utility of the outside option to him
uR (ωR, ωP ).
In case the MAO is larger than the fair share, we have to ensure that the proposer wants
to oﬀer more than her fair share to the responder. The eﬃciency gain from a bargain has to be
suﬃciently large as to compensate the proposer for the loss resulting from the disadvantageous
deviation from her reference allocation. Lemma 2 establishes that the proposer is better oﬀ
if she oﬀers the MAO to the responder than if she is left with her outside option. In case the
MAO exceeds the fair share, the proposer therefore prefers to oﬀer the MAO, than to be left
with her outside option.
Lemma 2 The MAO s (γR) of the responder is smaller than the MTO s (γP ) of the proposer.
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Proof. Suppose agents are biased such that γi ≥ 1, γj ≤ 1 for ωi > ωj . This includes the
case where each agent considers it fair that she or he gets the entire surplus. The MTO and
the MAO can then be calculated as
uP (1− s, s) = 1− s− αP (2s− 1− γP (ωR − ωP ))
= ωP − αP (1− γP ) (ωR − ωP ) = uP (ωP , ωR)
s =
αP + 1− ωP − αP (ωP − ωR)
1 + 2αP
, (1.2)
and
uR (s, 1− s) = s− αR (1− 2s− γR (ωP − ωR))
= ωR − αR (1− γR) (ωP − ωR) = uR (ωR, ωP )
s =
αR + ωR + αR (ωR − ωP )
1 + 2αR
. (1.3)
Algebraic transformations show that the MAO is smaller than the MTO if the sum of the
outside options is smaller than the entire pie:
s ≤ s↔ ωR + ωP ≤ 1,
see Appendix 1.A for further detail.
If agents become less partial as either γi decreases or γj increases (with γi ≥ γj), the
MTO weakly increases or the MAO weakly decreases, see Appendix 1.A for further detail.
To get some intuition, consider the following example. Let the outside option of the
proposer be half the pie, ωP = 12 , while the responder has no postive outside option, ωR = 0.
Further assume that the proposer’s reference allocation is such that she gets the entire pie
and the reference allocation of the responder is the Equal Split. Now, if the proposer suﬀers
a lot from disadvantageous inequity, i.e. αP is very large, one might think that she is not
willing to deviate much from her reference allocation and is willing to give only a very small
amount to the responder, ε. The responder with a high αR might prefer to stay with the
outside option constellation
¡
1
2 , 0
¢
rather than accept the devision (1− ε, ε) as he suﬀers less
from inequity aversion under the outside options. Why is this reasoning not correct? The
proposer does not only suﬀer from inequity aversion when the bargain takes place and she
gets less than the entire pie, but also when both agents get their outside options. In both
situations, proposers with a very high αP suﬀer a lot. Hence to avoid the suﬀering in the
outside option constellation, she is willing to propose an oﬀer that is substantially smaller
than she thinks to be fair.
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The result is robust to the following modification of the model. Suppose a participation
decision precedes the game. Participation implying that agents forego the possibility to earn
their outside option. In this version of the game, agents receive nothing in case they do not
agree on a division of the surplus, just as in the standard case. However, the decision to pass
on the outside option might still influence their perception of the fair allocation. As long
as it influences the reference allocation whenever the bargain takes place as well as when it
breaks down, the above result stays valid. For example, suppose that the outside option of the
responder is bigger than the outside option of the proposer, ωR ≥ ωP and that both agents are
biased such that γP ≤ 0 and γR ≥ 0. Then the utility for the responder in case the bargain
breaks down and the agents do not get anything is given by uR (0) = −αRγR (ωR − ωP ).
His MAO is therefore s = αR1+2αR <
1
2 , just as in the case with no positive outside options.
Analogously, the utility for the proposer is uP (0) = −αPγP (ωP − ωR) and her MTO is thus
s = 1+αP1+2αP >
1
2 , again as in the case of no outside options. The bargain takes place precisely
because both players suﬀer from inequity aversion also in the case when the bargain breaks
down. Thus, all the following results also hold for this slightly modified version.
The MAO could only exceed the MTO if the fair allocation depends on the diﬀerence in
outside options in case the bargain takes place, but not when it breaks down. Hence, only
when agents have diﬀerent reference allocations in these two cases, the proposer might not
be willing to oﬀer the MAO.
The following proposition characterises the equilibrium of the ultimatum bargaining with
sophisticated proposers, that is proposers who understand that they are biased.
Proposition 1 In perception perfect equilibrium, if uR (ωR, ωP ) ≤ uR
¡
sf (γP ) , 1− sf (γP )
¢
,
a sophisticated proposer oﬀers a share
s∗



= sf (γP ) βP >
1
2
∈
£
s (γR) , s
f (γP )
¤
βP =
1
2
= s (γR) βP <
1
2
.
Otherwise, she proposes s∗ = s (γR). The responder accepts the oﬀer.
Proof. If uR (ωR, ωP ) ≤ uR
¡
sf (γP ) , 1− sf (γP )
¢
, the MAO s (γR) is smaller than the fair
share sf (γP ). The rest of the proof is analogous to the proof of proposition 1 in Fehr and
Schmidt (1999).
If instead uR (ωR, ωP ) > uR
¡
sf (γP ) , 1− sf (γP )
¢
, the MAO s (γR) exceeds the fair share
sf (γP ). The proposer’s utility of an oﬀer above the fair share s ≥ sf (γP ) is given by
uP (s) = 1− s− αP (2s− 1− γP (ωR − ωP )) which is strictly decreasing in s. The proposer
therefore never oﬀers a share bigger than the MAO. By definition, the responder only accepts
oﬀers above the MAO. Lemma 2 shows that the proposer always prefers to oﬀer the MAO
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than to get her outside option. Therefore, in equilibrium the proposer oﬀers exactly the
MAO.
Proposition 1 implies that a self-serving bias as such does not generate a bargaining
breakdown. The proposer is always willing to render the responder at least indiﬀerent be-
tween his outside option and the proposed share.11 Note that the beliefs of sophisticated
agents are correct and the perception perfect equilibrium coincides with the subgame perfect
equilibrium.
To what extent do the results change if the proposer is biased and naive? Naive agents
believe that other agents share the reference allocation with them. In the example, we have
already seen that naiveté about the self-serving bias can lead to an oﬀer that is not acceptable
for the responder. The naive proposer underestimates the MAO. If she comes to propose the
underestimated MAO in perception perfect equilibrium, the responder rejects the oﬀer and
the bargain breaks down.
Lemma 3 states the conditions under which naive and biased proposers predict the MAO
to be strictly smaller than the actual MAO. Whether the naive proposer accurately predicts
the MAO depends crucially on whether her fairness parameter is bigger or smaller than
one. Remember that a fairness parameter of one implies the reference allocation of Split
the Diﬀerence. With Split the Diﬀerence, the agent does not suﬀer from inequity in the
outside option constellation. For illustrational purposes assume that the outside option of
the responder is larger than of the proposer, just as in the example presented in section
1.3.1. As soon as the fairness parameter of the responder exceeds one, the responder suﬀers
from disadvantageous inequity in the outside option constellation, even though he has got
the larger outside option. The responder thus suﬀers in the same way from disadvantageous
inequity, both, in the outside option constellation and when he gets his MAO. Therefore
his MAO is independent of the fairness parameter as can be seen in (1.3). Contrary, if the
fairness parameter of the responder is below the threshold of one, the responder suﬀers from
advantageous inequity in the outside option constellation and from disadvantageous inequity
when he gets his MAO. Therefore the MAO depends on the fairness parameter.
Now, a naive proposer thinks that her fairness perception is impartial and is thus shared
by the responder. The belief about the MAO is based upon the fairness parameter of the
proposer. Consider again the case where the outside option of the responder is larger than
that of the proposer. The naive proposer predicts that the MAO is independent of the fairness
parameter if her fairness parameter exceeds one, γP ≥ 1. Otherwise the prediction depends
upon the particular fairness parameter of the proposer. A wrong prediction can only occur
when the proposer predicts that the MAO depends on the fairness parameter. In case she
11Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) propose the self-serving bias as source of bargaining impasse. They
hypothese that a self-serving bias might eliminate the contract zone, that is the set of agreements that both
sides prefer to their reservation value. The above argument shows that, within the framework of extended
inequity aversion, a self-serving bias does not eliminate the contract zone in an ultimatum game.
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predicts the MAO to be independent of the parameter, we know her fairness parameter is
above one. The bias of the agents implies that the parameter of the responder is even bigger
and therefore also bigger than one. Hence, the MAO is correctly predicted. However, if the
proposer predicts the MAO to be dependent on the fairness parameter, the bias implies that
she underestimates the actual MAO. The following lemma generalises this argument.
Lemma 3 A naive and biased proposer believes the MAO to be smaller than the actual MAO,
s (γP ) < s (γR) if and only if
1) ωP < ωR and γP < 1, or
2) ωP > ωR and γP > 1.
The proof of Lemma 3 is relegated to Appendix 1.A. Given the conditions of Lemma
3, a naive and biased proposer underestimates the MAO, i.e. s (γP ) < s (γR). Therefore, if
she oﬀers the predicted MAO in perception perfect equilibrium, her oﬀer is too low and is
rejected by the responder. The following proposition summarises the conditions for bargaining
breakdown.
Proposition 2 Under the conditions of Lemma 3, a naive and biased proposer causes a
breakdown (with positive probability) if
1) uR (ωR, ωP ) > uR
¡
sf (γP ) , 1− sf (γP )
¢
or
2) uR (ωR, ωP ) ≤ uR
¡
sf (γP ) , 1− sf (γP )
¢
and βP <
1
2 (βP =
1
2).
Proof. In equilibrium, the respondent accepts any oﬀer above the true MAO s (γR). Under
the conditions of Lemma 3, a naive and biased proposer predicts the MAO to be too small,
that is s (γP ) < s (γR). If the utility of the outside option of the responder is larger than the
utility of the fair share, uR (ωR, ωP ) > uR
¡
sf (γP ) , 1− sf (γP )
¢
, the MAO s (γR) is larger
than the fair share of the proposer sf (γP ). In perception perfect equilibrium, the maximally
oﬀered share is given by max
©
sf (γP ) , s (γP )
ª
, see Proposition 1. This is smaller than the
actual MAO s (γR) and the bargain breaks down.
Otherwise, if the utility of the outside option of the responder is smaller than the utility
of the fair share, uR (ωR, ωP ) < uR
¡
sf (γP ) , 1− sf (γP )
¢
, the MAO is smaller than the fair
share the proposer attributes to the responder, s (γR) ≤ sf (γP ). The proposer oﬀers a share
s∗



= sf (γP ) if βP >
1
2
∈
£
s (γP ) , s
f (γP )
¤
if βP =
1
2
= s (γP ) if βP <
1
2
in perception perfect equilibrium. Therefore, if the
parameter of advantageous inequity is smaller than 12 , the equilibrium share is smaller than
the minimal share and the bargain breaks down. With a parameter βP =
1
2 , the bargain
breaks down with positive probability.
Proposition 2 characterises the circumstances under which there is bargaining breakdown
with complete information concerning the parameters of the responder’s utility function αR
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and βR. The analysis stresses that both characteristics of a self-serving bias are crucial for
breakdown, namely, the bias as well as the ignorance of it.
On the one hand, the introduction of asymmetric outside options can increase the MAO
such that it exceeds the fair share of the pie, on the other, the asymmetry might lead to a
self-serving bias. There is no built-in mechanism that makes a self-serving bias more likely
if the diﬀerence in outside options becomes more pronounced. The conditions of Lemma 3
do not get more or less restrictive if the diﬀerence in outside options increases. We therefore
do not expect more bargaining breakdown because of self-serving biases when the diﬀerence
in outside options increases. However, the increase in the diﬀerence of outside options might
increase the likelihood of the case where the MAO exceeds the fair share and thus the like-
lihood of a bargaining breakdown. Remember, in case the MAO exceeds the fair share and
the proposer underestimates the MAO, the bargain fails irrespective of βP . However, the
influence of an increase in the diﬀerence of outside options is indeterminate and depends on
the parameters of the utility function. Nevertheless, even if the increase in asymmetry leads
to more cases where the MAO exceeds the fair share, as agents do not underestimate more
often the MAO, I expect the likelihood of bargaining breakdown to increase only by little.
So far, I analysed the perception perfect equilibrium given that the proposer knows the
willingness of the responder to deviate from his reference allocation. Now, suppose the
proposer does not know the parameters of the responder’s utility, but believes that the para-
meter of disadvantageous αR and advantageous βR inequity are distributed according to the
joint cumulative distribution functions Fα,β (αR, βR) on the support [α, α]×
£
β, β
¤
.12 Denote
s (bγPR)max = maxαR,βR s (αR, βR|bγPR) and s (bγPR)min = minαR,βR s (αR, βR|bγPR).
Proposition 3 With (αR, βR) ∼ Fα,β [α, α]×
£
β, β
¤
, the proposer oﬀers
s∗ (βP ) ∈



£
sf (γP ) ,max
©
sf (γP ) , s (bγPR)maxª¤ if βP > 12£
min
©
s (bγPR)max , sf (γP )ª ,max©s (bγPR)max , sf (γP )ª¤ if βP = 12h
s (bγPR)min , s (bγPR)maxi if βP < 12
in the perception perfect equilibrium.
Proof. This follows from Propositions 1, 2 and the proof of Proposition 1 in Fehr and
Schmidt (1999).
The perception perfect equilibrium diﬀers for sophisticated and naive proposers in essen-
tially two features. First, the oﬀered shares and second, the resulting propensity of bargaining
breakdown. The share sophisticated proposers oﬀer is weakly bigger than the share oﬀered
by a naive agent. Proposers face a trade-oﬀ between costs and the probability of acceptance.
12Note that the lower limits on the supports are bigger or equal to zero, α, β ≥ 0, and that the upper limit
on the support of advantageous inequity is smaller or equal to one, i.e. β ≤ 1.
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With increasing shares, the probability of acceptance increases as well as the associated costs
to the proposer. Naive proposers assess the reference allocation of the responder wrongly.
They believe the responder shares the reference allocation with themselves. We have seen
that, under the conditions of Lemma 3, this leads to a wrong prediction of the MAO in the
complete information case. For a given parameter pair (αR, βR), the prediction of the MAO
is smaller than the true MAO. This implies that the assessment of the probability of accep-
tance of a share s is bigger than the actual probability. Thus, naive proposers oﬀer less than
sophisticated proposers in perception perfect equilibrium. Given that the share a sophisti-
cated proposer oﬀers exceeds the share of a naive proposer, the probability of bargaining
breakdown increases for a naive proposer. The following proposition summarises these two
characteristics of the perception perfect equilibrium with incomplete information.
Proposition 4 With incomplete information, a naive proposer oﬀers (weakly) less and the
probability of bargaining breakdown is (weakly) higher than with a sophisticated proposer.
Proof. The maximisation problem of the proposer is characterised by
argmaxs (uP (1− s, s)− uP (ωP , ωR)) prob (s ≥ s (bγPR)) + uP (ωP , ωR). Note that the prob-
ability is the estimated probability of acceptance of the share s. Lemma 2 tells us that the
proposer is always better oﬀ proposing the MAO than with her outside option. The diﬀerence
between the utility of the bargain with share s and the outside option is thus always positive,
uP (1− s, s)− uP (ωP , ωR) ≥ 0 and weakly decreasing in s on the interval of the equilibrium
share s∗.
The maximisation problem is characterised by the trade-oﬀ between a higher probability
of acceptance and the associated costs. If the conditions of Lemma 3 are met, the naive
proposer underestimates the MAO. Thus she believes the probability of acceptance of share
s to be too high. The maximisation calculus thus results in a lower share for these proposers.
As shown above the share of a sophisticated proposer is weakly bigger than the share of a
naive, ss ≥ sn, where the subscripts s, n denote sophisticated and naive. The probability of
bargaining breakdown equals the probability of acceptance of a share. Thus the probability
of breakdown is smaller with a sophisticated proposer, prob (s ≥ sn) ≥ prob (s ≥ ss).
The probability of a bargaining breakdown is higher if the proposer is naive than if she
is sophisticated. The intuition for this result is straightforward. Naive and sophisticated
proposers face uncertainty concerning the parameters that determine the loss resulting from
a deviation from the responder’s reference allocation. The decision how much of the pie
to oﬀer to the responder is thus based on expectations. In some cases, the proposed share
is going to be too low for the responder to accept it. This is one source of bargaining
breakdown which is identical for a naive and a sophisticated proposer. If the naive proposers
share the belief about the responder’s reference allocation with the sophisticated, they face
the same propensity of bargaining breakdown out of uncertainty. However, generally the
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naive proposers do not share beliefs with sophisticated. Their belief about the responder’s
reference allocation is based on their own assessment of fairness. We have seen that this
can lead to an oﬀer that is below the actual MAO in the complete information case and a
generally smaller oﬀer than the oﬀer of a sophisticated agent in the incomplete information
case. This is an additional source of bargaining breakdown. Consequently, the probability of
acceptance and therefore the probability of bargaining breakdown is larger with naive than
with sophisticated proposers.
The model predicts that asymmetry compared to symmetry in outside options increases
the probability of rejection. This contrasts with the predictions of the theory of inequity
aversion by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), where agents, by assumption, share the same reference
allocation of Equal Split and thus cannot fall prey to a self-serving bias. Fehr and Schmidt
predict no diﬀerence in rejection rates across ultimatum games with symmetric and asymmet-
ric outside options. This diﬀerence in predictions provides a test that discriminates between
the theory of Fehr and Schmidt that does not allow for a self-serving bias and the enriched
version presented in this model.
1.4 Investment game
The standard investment, or trust game as in Kreps (1990) or Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe
(1995) is a two stage game. In the first stage, the recipient (R) decides which fraction of
her initial endowment (ωR) she sends to the second player. In the second stage, this amount
gets multiplied by a positive number, typically strictly bigger than 1. Player 2, the dictator
(D), then determines how to split this (enlarged) amount between himself and the recipient.
Both players receive payoﬀs according to the division of the dictator and the recipient gets
additionally the residual of her initial endowment. I simplify this set-up slightly by forcing
the recipient to either invest her entire initial endowment or nothing.13 The investment of
the recipient could then be read as a simple participation decision, the initial endowment as
an outside option. If the recipient participates in the dictator game, then both players enter
the second stage in which the dictator decides on the distribution of a fixed surplus of one.
Payoﬀs are determined according to the division proposed by the dictator. Otherwise, if the
recipient does not participate, both agents receive their outside option, ωi ≥ 0 for i = D,R
which is known to both agents.14
Under the assumption of pure self-interest, the dictator allocates the entire surplus to
13This is equivalent to the representation of the game by Van Huyck, Battalio, and Walters (1995). In
their model, the agent either invests her entire endowment or nothing due to the linearity of the agent’s utility
function.
14This version of the game is equivalent to a game where the participation decision of the recipient as well
as of the dictator is modelled. The participation decision of the dictator is trivial. As he decides at the second
stage on the distribution of payoﬀs, he is able to make himself at least as well oﬀ as in the outside option
constellation. He therefore always participates.
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himself. Thus, the recipient in the first stage (weakly) prefers to refrain from participation
and to receive her outside option ωR ≥ 0. Analysing the game under the assumption of
inequity averse agents as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999), with Equal Split as the reference
allocation of both agents, generates the following prediction: The dictator either gives half
of the surplus to the recipient, if he is suﬃciently inequity averse (i.e. βD >
1
2), or otherwise
keeps the entire surplus to himself. A recipient paired with a dictator who does not suﬀer
much from inequity, βD <
1
2 , refrains from participation. As the dictator is going to keep the
entire surplus, the inequality increases in the dictator game. Moreover, the monetary payoﬀ
weakly decreases. The recipient is thus strictly worse oﬀ participating. However, a recipient
encountering a dictator who suﬀers suﬃciently from inequity aversion, βD >
1
2 , receives half
of the surplus which is the fair outcome for both agents. In this case the recipient prefers
to participate, given that her outside option is not excessively large. As long as her outside
option is smaller than half the surplus, she is evidently better oﬀ participating. However, if
the outside option is bigger than half the surplus, there are some cases where the recipient
prefers the outside option constellation.15 In comparison to the case with solely self-interested
agents, inequity aversion increases participation.
We have seen that standard inequity averse dictators, who base their decision on the
Equal Split norm, are not influenced in their decision by the constellation of outside options.
How much the recipient in relation to the dictator invested beforehand is irrelevant for their
decision of how to split the surplus. Yet, intuitively, the size of relative investment might
influence the dictator’s decision. Allowing the reference allocation to be diﬀerent from the
Equal Split implies that the fair share depends on the diﬀerence in outside options. Analo-
gously to the case with an Equal Split norm, the dictator gives the share she perceives as fair
to the recipient if she is suﬃciently inequity averse. With the fair share depending on the
outside options, the distribution of surplus in the dictator game stage depends on the con-
stellation of outside options. Let s denote the share allocated by the dictator to the recipient.
Lemma 4 characterises the behaviour of the dictator.
Lemma 4 The optimal strategy of the dictator is
s



= 1−γD(ωD−ωR)2 if βD >
1
2
∈
h
0, 1−γD(ωD−ωR)2
i
if βD =
1
2
0 if βD <
1
2
.
Proof. It is obvious that it is never optimal for the dictator to oﬀer more than she considers
the fair share for the responder. For s ≤ sf (γD) the utility function of the dictator is given
by uD (s) = 1− s− βDmax {1− 2s− γD (ωD − ωR) , 0}. If βD < 12 , the utility is decreasing
15Whenever the outside option of the recipient is larger than half the surplus, ωR > 12 the recipient is
relatively better oﬀ in monetary terms in the outside option constellation, ωR > ωD. She thus prefers to
participate as long as 1
2
> ωR − βR (ωR − ωD)↔ ωR <
1−2βRωD
2(1−βR)
. See Appendix 1.B for further detail.
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in the share s. It is hence maximal for s = 0. If instead βD >
1
2 , the utility is increasing in
the share s. It is optimal to allocate the fair share sf (γD) =
1−γD(ωD−ωR)
2 to the recipient.
For βD =
1
2 , the utility of the dictator is constant over the interval between 0 and s
f (γD),
the dictator is thus indiﬀerent between any of these oﬀers.
The fair share depends on the fairness parameter of the dictator γD. As soon as the
reference allocation deviates from the Equal Split the outside option constellation matters.
Turning to the participation decision of the recipient, we see that the behaviour crucially
depends on which kind of dictator the recipients encounter. Before we analyse the behaviour
of the recipients in general, let us consider an example. Suppose the dictator has no positive
outside option and that the responder’s outside option is positive. Furthermore, assume that
the reference allocation of the recipient is Split the Diﬀerence γR = 1 and of the dictator
Equal Split γD = 0. Encountering a dictator whose parameter of advantageous inequity is
small, βD <
1
2 , the recipient is not going to participate. The utility of her outside option is
strictly positive, while the utility of participating and earning nothing is negative. A recipient
who is paired with a suﬃciently inequity averse dictator, might however participate in the
second stage of the game. A sophisticated recipient who understands that the reference
allocation of the dictator is Equal Split rather than Split the Diﬀerence participates as long
as ωR ≤ 12(1+αR) = eωR (αR). Note that for recipients who suﬀer heavily from disadvantageous
inequity the threshold level eωR is small. Furthermore, participation of recipients with large
outside options is less likely than participation of recipients with smaller outside options.
Contrary, a naive recipient believes the dictator shares the same reference allocation
with her. She thus expects to receive more than half the pie from a
¡
βD >
1
2
¢
-dictator,
namely s = 1+ωR2 . She thus participates regardless of her outside option as the utility
of the outside option u (ωR, 0) = ωR is strictly smaller than the utility of the fair share
u
¡
1+ωR
2 ,
1−ωR
2
¢
= 1+ωR2 . In the investment game, naiveté therefore enhances participation in
comparison to sophistication.
More generally, recipients participate if their utility from the outside option constellation
is smaller than the utility of the share they receive from the dictator, that is if uR (ω) ≤
uR (s, 1− s). Whenever the recipient is paired with a dictator who does not suﬀer much
from inequity, that is βD <
1
2 , the share the dictator sends back is zero. Participation is
thus very unlikely to occur. There are some extreme reference allocations that render the
recipient willing to participate even in this case. This occurs if the agent believes that the
dictator deserves most of the pie, see Appendix 1.B for further detail. The decision of the
recipient exclusively depends on her own reference allocation, as the dictator sends back
nothing irrespective of his own reference allocation. Diﬀering reference allocations thus do
not generate any eﬀect. Whether the recipient is naive or sophisticated is irrelevant to her
behaviour.
Conversely, if the recipient is paired with a
¡
βD >
1
2
¢
-dictator, the share that is sent back
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equals the share the dictator believes to be fair. Participation occurs if
uR (ω) ≤ uR
³
sf (γD) , 1− sf (γD)
´
.16 (1.4)
The share the dictator allocates to the recipient depends on his own reference allocation. As
agents might be biased, the fair share for the recipient from the point of view of the dictator is
(weakly) smaller than from the point of view of the recipient. Thus, the recipient suﬀers from
(weakly) disadvantageous inequity whenever the surplus is divided according to the dictator,
uR
¡
sf (γD) , 1− sf (γD)
¢
= sf (γD) − αR (γD − γR) (ωD − ωR). This representation of the
left hand side of inequality (1.4) illustrates that the larger the self-serving bias, the less likely
it becomes that the recipient participates.17 Suppose the outside option of the dictator is
larger than of the recipient. Biasedness implies that the fairness parameter of the dictator is
(weakly) larger than the fairness parameter of the recipient, γD ≥ γR. For a given fairness
parameter of the recipient, if biasedness augments by increasing γD, the utility of the dictator
game outcome decreases for the recipient. Thus inequality (1.4) is less likely to be satisfied
and the sophisticated recipient is less likely to participate.
In this situation, the belief about the reference allocation of the dictator influences the
behaviour of the recipient. There are cases where the sophisticated recipient refrains from par-
ticipation because she correctly believes that the fairness parameter of the dictator strongly
favours the dictator. The fair share he sends back is thus small and the recipient prefers
her outside option. A naive recipient however believes that the dictator shares the reference
allocation with her. She thus believes that the fair share he sends back is going to be larger
rendering her participation more likely.
In the investment game naiveté plays a somehow converse role to the ultimatum game.
In the latter game, naiveté induced bargaining breakdown. That is, one agent preferred
his outside option to the outcome of the bargaining game. Conversely, in the investment
game naiveté induces larger participation of the recipients, meaning that one agent turns her
outside option down.
The impact of self-serving biases on the behaviour of recipients is however unclear. On
the one hand, the self-serving bias reduces participation, on the other hand naiveté increases
it. Therefore, it seems hard to test the theory in terms of the behaviour of recipients.
Furthermore, allowing for heterogeneity in reference allocations implies that the share sent
back by the dictator can depend on the outside options of both agents. The particular way
it depends on the outside options, however, is determined by the specific fairness parameter
γD. Thus, there is unfortunately no unambiguous prediction that could be tested.
16For a more rigorous analysis of recipient behaviour, see Appendix 1.B.
17Appendix 1.B shows that there are parameter configurations where the recipient refrains from participa-
tion.
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1.5 Evidence
This section investigates whether we can find evidence in the experimental economics lit-
erature that can be explained by the presented theory of self-serving biases in asymmetric
bargaining environments. There are some experiments on ultimatum bargaining that intro-
duce asymmetry in outside options. In an experiment by Knez and Camerer (1995), proposer
and responder have positive and asymmetric outside option. The proposer’s outside option
amounts to 30% of a $10-pie, while the respondents are divided into two groups. The first
half of the responders (R1) gets a smaller outside option than the proposers, namely 20%
of the pie, and the second half of the responders (R2) gets a higher option of 40%. Oﬀers
to the responder with the small outside option are significantly lower than to the responder
with the high outside option. Moreover, MAO of the R1 responder are significantly lower
than of the R2 responder. This impact of the outside options on oﬀers and MAO can be
explained with inequity averse agents. Furthermore, Knez and Camerer (1995) find that
rejection rates are around 45%-48%. This is much higher than the rejection rates found for
two player ultimatum games with no outside options which are around 20%, see tables on
pages 53-55 in Camerer (2003). A likely cause for the increase in the rejection rate is the
introduction of asymmetric outside options. The remaining experimental set-up is identi-
cal to other ultimatum bargaining experiments in western countries. If agents are inequity
averse with symmetric reference allocations as postulated in Fehr and Schmidt (1999), then
rejection rates should not be influenced by the introduction of asymmetric outside options.
However, the existence of self-servingly biased agents can account for part of the additional
ineﬃciencies. As we have seen, naive proposers underestimate the MAO and are thus likely
to propose a share that is not acceptable for the responder. Hence, the bargain breaks down
more frequently than in the case where agents are sophisticated about their bias or where
they are not biased at all.
Unfortunately, the experimental set-up does not allow to distinguish whether the mere
introduction of outside options has caused rejection rates to increase or whether the attached
asymmetry of outside options is the driving force. Economic theory predicts that the in-
troduction of symmetric outside options does not cause rejection rates to increase. A game
with positive symmetric outside options is equivalent to a game where the pie is reduced by
the sum of the outside options. Nevertheless, there might be some cognitive processes that
render the game with positive symmetric outside options diﬀerent to a game with no outside
options and therefore breakdown might occur more frequently than with no outside options.
In the ultimatum experiments by Buchan, Croson, and Johnson (2004) and Schmitt
(2004), solely one of the two players is endowed with a positive outside option. Both studies
find that oﬀers and MAO decrease with a higher outside option of the proposer. Moreover,
both studies find high rejection rates. Schmitt finds that rejection rates are 50% in the treat-
ments where proposers have the positive outside option and around 30-40% in the treatments
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with positive outside options for the responders. The experiment by Buchan, Croson, and
Johnson is run in the US and Japan. For the US, the rejection rate in the condition with a
positive outside option for the proposer is significantly larger than in the condition with no
positive outside option for either player, whereas there is no significant diﬀerence in Japan.18
Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2001) present an experiment on a reduced ultimatum game
with a positive outside option for the respondent. There, the proposer can choose between
a split which gives herself 8 and the responder 12 and a split where she gets 5 and the
proposer gets 15. Whenever the responder rejects the oﬀer, the proposer goes home with
nothing and the responder gets his outside option of 10. They argue that: “Since both oﬀers
give the responder a higher payoﬀ than the proposer they cannot be viewed as unfair from
the responder respectively. Thus resistance to unfairness cannot explain rejections in this
game.” They observe that 24% of the responders reject the 8/12 oﬀer, while only 4% reject
the 5/15 oﬀer with the diﬀerence being significant at the 1%-level. They take this result
as a case for the presence of spitefulness which they define as the willingness to sanction in
order to increase the payoﬀ diﬀerence between two agents. As the 8/12 oﬀer decreases the
payoﬀ diﬀerence in comparison to the 0/10 outcome, spiteful subjects reject the 8/12 oﬀer.
In contrast the 5/15 oﬀer does not change the payoﬀ diﬀerence and therefore spitefulness
cannot be a reason for rejection.
The evidence from this experiment can also be explained by self-serving biases in the
perception of the fair allocation. If the proposer thinks that both subjects unanimously
believe that the 8/12 split is the closest to a fair outcome, she proposes this split. But she
could be coupled with a responder that is convinced that splitting the diﬀerence between
the pie and his outside option is fair and is therefore going to reject the inequitable share of
8/12. This provides another explanation to why the rejection of the 8/12 oﬀer is significantly
higher than the 5/15 oﬀer. Which of these explanations suits the case better is yet to be
determined.
Moreover Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2001) present the results of a baseline reduced
ultimatum game where the responder does not have any outside option. The possible oﬀers
are analogously 8/2 and 5/5. If the responder rejects, then none of the subjects gets any
monetary payoﬀ. They report a rejection rate of the 8/2 split of 56.3%. This is much above
the rejection rate of the 8/12 oﬀer in the game with outside options. This finding is also
consistent with the above theory. Suppose an individual rejects the 8/2 split in the game
without an outside option for the responder. Confronted with the 8/12 split in the game
with the outside option, the same individual might be willing to accept this split. The reason
is that the minimal oﬀer the individual is willing to accept in the setting with the outside
option is bigger than the minimal oﬀer in the setting with no outside option. However, it
is not increased by as much as the entire outside option. Hence, potentially more subjects
18Buchan, Croson, and Johnson do not report rejection rates. I thus compute these for each of their
treatments using their original data set.
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reject the 8/2 oﬀer than the 8/12 oﬀer.
In the case of the investment game, the predictions of the model presented in this paper
are not clear-cut and therefore diﬃcult to verify.19 Apart from that, the evidence found in the
literature also partly contradicts each other. To my knowledge, there are two experimental
studies on investment games that vary the initial endowment of the recipient or investor
systematically. Given that the first agent invests, Van Huyck, Battalio, and Walters (1995)
find that most of the dictators either keep the entire surplus or send back a fraction of the
surplus that exceeds the endowment invested by the first agent. This implies in particular that
the amount send back by the dictator varies with the endowment of the investor. Contrary,
Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) do not find any correlation between the fraction of the surplus
send back and the size of the outside option. There are two main diﬀerences between the
two studies. First, in the study by Van Huyck, Battalio, and Walters investors are allowed
to invest any fraction of their endowment, while in Dufwenberg and Gneezy they can only
invest everything or nothing. Second, Dufwenberg and Gneezy use the strategy method to
obtain more information on dictator behaviour, while the other study does not. In both
studies investment decreases with the size of the outside option. This is compatible with
the predictions of the behaviour of an inequity averse investor, with and without self-serving
bias.
1.6 Conclusion
There is strong empirical evidence that in bargaining situations with asymmetric outside
options people exhibit self-serving biases concerning their fairness judgements and that these
self-serving biases are a driving force of bargaining impasse. This paper provides a theoretical
framework for analysing the behaviour of self-servingly biased agents in simple bargaining
situations. I build on the notion of inequity aversion and extend it to incorporate self-
serving biases due to asymmetric outside options. I distinguish between sophisticated and
naive agents, that is, those agents who understand their bias and those who do not. I then
apply the framework to analyse the behaviour of naive and sophisticated biased agents in
ultimatum and investment games. For ultimatum bargaining with complete information, I
find that bargaining can only break down, if biased proposers are not aware of their self-
serving bias. In the incomplete information case, the propensity of bargaining breakdown is
19Keep in mind that the investment game is composed of two stages with the second stage being strategically
identical to the dictator game. In dictator games, one agent decides on the division of the surplus. Empirical
evidence suggests that the behaviour of agents in dictator type games is not entirely captured by inequity
aversion. The prediction with inequity averse agents is that the dictator either keeps the entire pie to himself
or sends the fair share to the recipient; the fair share supposedly being half of the pie. For example, in the
dictator experiment by Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, and Sefton (1994) around 20% of the dictators oﬀered half
the pie and another 20% kept all the surplus to themselves, the rest of the oﬀers being distributed in between
these oﬀers with a mean oﬀer of 25% of the surplus. Similar results are reported by Frohlich and Oppenheimer
(2001).
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higher with naive than with sophisticated agents. In the investment game, a self-serving bias
leads to reduced participation, but naiveté about the bias increases participation.
So far, the framework only incorporates one prominent form of asymmetry due to outside
options. One path of further research could be to think of incorporating other forms of asym-
metries in bargaining games that might bias the perception of fairness, such as asymmetric
payoﬀ possibilities. Kagel, Kim, and Moser (1996) have run ultimatum experiments with
asymmetric payoﬀ possibilities. Players bargain over the distribution of chips with diﬀerent
exchange rates and diﬀerent information concerning these rates. If both players are fully in-
formed and proposers have higher exchange rates, conflicting fairness norms seem to develop.
This is reflected in unusually high rejection rates.
Appendix
1.A Proofs
Details to the proof of Lemma 2 Lemma 2 states that the amount the proposer is
maximally willing to give (MTO) exceeds the acceptance threshold of the responder (MAO).
To prove this, we have to show that even in case of the most extreme biasedness, i.e. γi ≥ 1,
γj ≤ 1 for ωi > ωj , the MAO is smaller than the MTO. Suppose γi ≥ 1, γj ≤ 1 for ωi > ωj .
Then the MTO and MAO are given by (1.2) and (1.3). The following calculations show that
the MAO is smaller than the MTO:
s =
ωR + αR − αR (ωP − ωR)
(1 + 2αR)
≤ 1 + αP − ωP + αP (ωR − ωP )
(1 + 2αP )
= s
↔ ωR (1 + 2αP ) + αR (1 + 2αP )− αR (1 + 2αP ) (ωP − ωR)
≤ 1 + 2αR + αP (1 + 2αR)− ωP (1 + 2αR) + αP (1 + 2αR) (ωR − ωP )
↔ (ωR + ωP ) (1 + αR + αP ) ≤ 1 + αR + αP .
Next, I show that the MTO given by (1.2) is the smallest MTO and that the MAO given by
(1.3) is the largest MAO. Generally, the MTO is computed as s = αP+1−ωP1+2αP +
αP γP (ωR−ωP )
1+2αP
+
αP max{(1−γP )(ωR−ωP ),0}
1+2αP
+ βP max{−(1−γP )(ωR−ωP ),0}(1+2αP ) . The minimum of the MTO occurs at
smin =
(
s (γP ≥ 1) if ωP > ωR
s (γP ≤ 1) else
)
= αP+1−ωP+αP (ωR−ωP )1+2αP . Similarly, the MAO can be ex-
pressed as s = ωR+αR−αRγR(ωP−ωR)1+2αR −
αRmax{(1−γR)(ωP−ωR),0}
1+2αR
− βRmax{(1−γR)(ωR−ωP ),0}1+2αR . The
maximum of the MAO occurs at smax =
(
s (γR ≤ 1) if ωP > ωR
s (γR ≥ 1) else
)
= αR+ωR+αR(ωR−ωP )1+2αR .
Thus MTO exceeds the MAO. ¥
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Proof of Lemma 3 Lemma 3 establishes the conditions under which a biased and naive
proposer underestimates the MAO. The belief of the naive proposer concerning the MAO is
given by
s (γP ) =



αR+ωR+αR(ωR−ωP )
1+2αR
if ωR > ωP and γP ≥ 1
or ωR < ωP and γP ≤ 1
αR+ωR+((αR+βR)γP−βR)(ωR−ωP )
1+2αR
else
.
1) Suppose s (γP ) < s (γR) and neither condition 1) nor 2) are satisfied. Then, if ωR > ωP
(ωR < ωP ) the fairness parameter of the proposer is γP ≥ 1 (γP ≤ 1). As the proposer is bi-
ased, the true fairness parameter of the responder is larger (smaller) than the parameter of the
proposer, γR > γP ≥ 1 (γR < γP ≤ 1). Thus both, the true MAO and the belief of the pro-
poser about the MAO, are independent of the fairness parameter, s (γi) =
αR+ωR+αR(ωR−ωP )
1+2αR
for i = P,R. Hence the assumption of s (γP ) < s (γR) is violated.
2) Now, suppose condition 1) (or 2)) is satisfied, ωR > ωP and γP < 1 (or ωR < ωP and
γP < 1). Then the belief of the proposer is s (γP ) =
αR+ωR+((αR+βR)γP−βR)(ωR−ωP )
1+2αR
and we
have to show that this is smaller than the true MAO, s (γR). As the proposer is biased, it holds
that γR > γP (resp. γR < γP ). If the true MAO is s (γR) =
αR+ωR+((αR+βR)γR−βR)(ωR−ωP )
1+2αR
,
then s (γR) > s (γP ) as the MAO is increasing (decreasing) in the fairness parameter. If the
true MAO is s (γR) =
αR+ωR+αR(ωR−ωP )
1+2αR
, then s (γR) > s (γP ) as γP > 1 (γP < 1). ¥
1.B Recipient Behaviour in Investment Games
Recipients participate as long as the value of the outside option is less than the value of the
division of the surplus. If the dictator keeps the entire surplus to herself, the diﬀerence in
payoﬀs can only increase when participating. However, there might be some recipients that
believe that an increase in the diﬀerence in payoﬀs is fair. These recipients might be willing to
sacrifice their outside option to get closer to their fair allocation. Yet, most of the recipients
refrain from participation.
A
¡
βD <
1
2
¢
-dictator keeps the entire surplus to herself. The utility of participa-
tion to the recipient is thus uR (0, 1) = −αR (1− γR (ωD − ωR)). Furthermore, she
values her outside option at uR (ωD, ωR) = ωR − αRmax {(ωD − ωR) (1− γR) , 0} −
βRmax {(ωR − ωD) (1− γR) , 0}. Now, if the recipient suﬀers from disadvantageous inequity
in the outside option constellation, that is, if (ωD − ωR) (1− γR) ≥ 0, she always refuses to
participate as
ωR − αR (ωD − ωR) (1− γR) > −αR (1− γR (ωD − ωR))
↔ ωR > −αR (1− (ωD − ωR)) .
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Otherwise the recipient refuses to participates if
ωR − βR (ωR − ωD) (1− γR) > −αR (1− γR (ωD − ωR))
γR (ωD − ωR) <
ωR + αR + βR (ωD − ωR)
(αR + βR)
. (1.5)
The above result implies that only recipients that have extreme attitudes towards fair alloca-
tions participate in a game that leaves them with no share of the surplus. Suppose the outside
option of the recipient is larger than of the dictator. Then the reference allocation is the more
favourable to the recipient, the larger is γR. Condition (1.5) implies that the recipient partic-
ipates if her fairness parameter is suﬃciently small. That is, if γR ≤
ωR+αR+βR(ωD−ωR)
(αR+βR)(ωD−ωR)
(< 0).
This translates to a reference allocation attributing most of the surplus to the other party,
although the recipient herself has the larger outside option. Hence, we expect most recipients
to refuse participation.
Contrary, recipients who are paired with a dictator that sends the share he consid-
ers as fair, participate more frequently. In this case, participation is only prevented if
the dictator’s reference allocation favours himself very much. To see this, consider that a
recipient paired with a
¡
βD >
1
2
¢
-dictator receives the share sf (γD). Her utility is thus
uR
¡
sf (γD) , 1− sf (γD)
¢
= sf (γD)− αR (γD − γR) (ωD − ωR). If the recipient suﬀers from
disadvantageous inequity in the outside option constellation, that is, if (ωD − ωR) (1− γR) ≥
0, she participates as long as
γD (ωD − ωR) ≤
1− 2ωR + 2αR (ωD − ωR)
(1 + αR)
. (1.6)
This condition reads: If the reference allocation of the dictator is suﬃciently favourable to
himself, the recipient is not going to participate. Note that there are some values of γD
for which condition (1.6) is not satisfied and the recipient does not participate. Suppose
ωD > ωR, then the parameter range on γD is
h
− 1
ωD−ωR ,
1
ωD−ωR
i
. To see that there are some
parameter constellations that do not satisfy the condition we have to establish that
γD ≤
1− 2ωR + 2αR (ωD − ωR)
(1 + αR) (ωD − ωR)
<
1
ωD − ωR
↔ αR (2 (ωD − ωR)− 1) < 2ωR.
Whenever the diﬀerence in outside options is smaller than 12 the left hand side becomes
negative, while the right hand side is positive. Hence, there are some values of γD where
the recipient does not participate. Note that condition (1.6) hinges solely on the fairness
parameter of the dictator as the recipient suﬀers from disadvantageous inequity in the same
way in both situations, the dictator outcome and the outside option.
If the recipient suﬀers from advantageous inequity in the outside option constellation,
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that is, if (ωD − ωR) (1− γR) ≤ 0, she participates as long as
ωR − βR (ωR − ωD) (1− γR) ≤
1− γD (ωD − ωR)
2
− αR (γD − γR) (ωD − ωR) .
This implies that the more biased agents are, the less likely participation of the recipient
becomes.
Chapter 2
Asymmetric Outside Options in
Ultimatum Bargaining: An
Experiment∗
2.1 Introduction
Individual decision making is at the core of economic theory. Under specific behavioural
assumptions, economic models predict the outcomes of decision situations and derive pol-
icy implications based on these predictions. Hence, it is of great importance to verify our
underlying assumptions. This paper is concerned with individual behaviour in the strategic
environment of bilateral bargaining with asymmetric outside options. We try to understand
how oﬀers and demands evolve with increasing asymmetry in an ultimatum game experiment.
In particular, we are interested in the eﬀect of asymmetric outside options on bargaining
breakdown.
There is experimental evidence that agents fall prey to a self-serving bias in fairness per-
ception in the presence of asymmetry. Furthermore, this bias might be a major source of
bargaining breakdown. Typically, the experiments concerned with self-serving biases and
bargaining breakdown are conducted under a rich experimental framework. For example,
Messick and Sentis (1979) place their experiment in a work place environment where sub-
jects have to state the fair wage of diﬀerent groups of workers. In another experiment by
Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoﬀ, and Camerer (1995), subjects find themselves in the roles
of prosecutor and defendant in a juridical case. The question there concerns the fair settle-
ment. In contrast, the present paper deals with the question whether asymmetry changes
behaviour and leads to increasing bargaining breakdown in one of the simplest bargaining
environments, the ultimatum bargaining game. In the ultimatum bargaining game, two sub-
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Heike Hennig-Schmidt from the University of Bonn.
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jects have to agree on how to divide a fixed pie. The first subject, the proposer, can suggest
a division of the pie whereas the second subject, the responder, can either accept or reject
the division. This structure is the backbone of most bargaining behaviour and one of the
simplest frameworks in which we can analyse the role of asymmetry. We introduce asymme-
try through outside options into the bargaining. Outside options are an important source of
asymmetry. In reality, asymmetric outside options are widespread. They are present when
children bargain with their parents over a certain privilege, when an employer and a job
seeker discuss wages, or when countries negotiate their contribution to some global public
good. Furthermore, outside options can be measured quantitatively and thus can be easily
varied in an experiment.
The main focus of this paper is to analyse the impact of varying outside options on
the behaviour of subjects, and in particular the impact on the breakdown of the bargain-
ing. There are a couple of ultimatum game experiments that introduce asymmetry through
outside options or diﬀerent payoﬀ possibilities (see the next section for an overview of the
literature). However, none of these vary the asymmetry systematically. For the experiments
that introduce outside options, it is typical to study the diﬀerence between two particular
outside option constellations only. This paper contributes to the literature in that it sys-
tematically increases the outside option of one of the players. We can therefore investigate
the evolution of behaviour with increasing outside options. In particular, we can also study
whether a small amount of asymmetry is already suﬃcient to induce a shift in behaviour
or whether significant changes are triggered by large asymmetries only. However, this study
does not claim to investigate in detail the underlying causes for the changes in behaviour.
In particular, it cannot single out whether subjects are self-servingly biased in their fairness
perceptions due to diﬀerent outside options.
We conduct an ultimatum game experiment where subjects are repeatedly confronted
with decision situations that diﬀer systematically with respect to the outside options of both
players involved. We use the strategy method in each situation to extract the minimum
acceptable oﬀer (MAO) for the responder. Between the decision situations, subjects do not
get any feedback on any of the previous situations. We run two treatments. In the first
treatment, the outside option of the responder is nearly always larger than the outside option
of the proposer. In the second treatment, the reverse holds.
We find that oﬀers and MAO increase with increasing outside options of the responder
and decrease with increasing outside options of the proposer. Furthermore, the probability
of bargaining breakdown increases with increasing asymmetry, irrespective as to whether
the asymmetry is to the advantage of the proposer or the responder. This finding suggests
that, even in this relatively simple setting, there might exist a self-serving bias in fairness
perception. Additionally to oﬀers, MAO and rejections, we analyse the propensity to oﬀer or
demand an equal split. We find that the introduction of a small outside option is suﬃcient to
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decrease the propensity of equal splits. This holds in particular, when the outside option is
on the side of the proposer implying that the power to propose is bundled with the advantage
in terms of outside options. Moreover, we find evidence that subjects might get biased by
the nature of the previous decision situations. It seems that subjects change their behaviour
when they realise that repeatedly the outside option is on the side of the responder. In
this case, the proposer oﬀers significantly less in a situation where the asymmetry in outside
options slips away whereas the responder asks significantly more. We do not find such an
eﬀect when the proposer has repeatedly the larger outside option. This is an interesting eﬀect
as it suggests that subjects do not regard each situation independently, but that in particular
situations they are influenced by previous decision circumstances.
Next, we give an overview of the related experimental literature. Section 2.3 explains
the design of the experiment in detail. We then turn to the data analysis. We start in
section 2.4.1 with an across treatment analysis which is followed in section 2.4.2 by a within
treatment analysis. Section 2.5 first compares our results to the results of a similar study. It
then discusses some of the design features of the experiment. In the last section, we conclude.
2.2 Literature
The standard ultimatum game certainly is the game most intensely studied in economic
experiments, besides possibly the prisoner’s dilemma game. Results are regular and robust.
Average oﬀers are 30-40% of the pie, modal and median oﬀers are 40-50%, more than half of
the oﬀers below 20% are rejected, oﬀers below 10% and oﬀers above 50% are rare, and the
overall rejection rate is around 20%, see pages 50-55 in Camerer (2003).
Asymmetry, however, has rarely been investigated in the ultimatum game paradigm.
An early study is the paper by Knez and Camerer (1995). They introduce positive and
asymmetric outside options for both players. In two diﬀerent treatments, responders have
outside options of 20% and 40% of a $10 pie, whereas proposers always have an outside
option of 30%. Knez and Camerer use the strategy method where responders state their
minimal acceptable oﬀer (MAO). On average, proposers send 38% (42.5%) of the pie in the
low (high) outside option condition whereas responders demand 42.7% (49.6%) on average.
The paper reports surprisingly high rejection rates of around 45-48% compared to a much
lower percentage in other studies. Knez and Camerer attribute this finding to the ambiguity
in fairness perceptions. Players might “... self-servingly disagree about what constitutes a
fair oﬀer” (p. 66).
Buchan, Croson, and Johnson (2004) study an asymmetric ultimatum game experiment
run in the USA and Japan. The outside option of the proposer is either 20% of a 1000 token
pie (worth $10 in the US and U2000 in Japan) in the high power condition or zero in the low
power condition. The responder’s outside option is always zero. After 10 rounds of ultima-
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tum bargaining with diﬀerent anonymous partners, subjects completed a post-experimental
questionnaire asking for their belief on the fair oﬀer/demand. Proposers in both cultures oﬀer
significantly less in the high power condition. In the US, oﬀers, averaged over the 10 rounds,
decrease from around 45% to 40% in the high power condition. In Japan, the oﬀers decrease
from 51% to 46%. American responders demand less in the high power condition (average
MAO of 33%) than in the control condition (average MAO of 38%). Contrary, Japanese
responders demand significantly more in the high power condition (average MAO of 44%)
than in the control condition (average MAO of 39%). Except for Japanese proposers, actual
oﬀers/demands are significantly correlated with subjects’ beliefs on “fair” oﬀers/demands.
Buchan, Croson, and Johnson do not report rejection rates, we thus compute these for each
of their treatments.20 For behaviour in the first round, we find that the rejection rates are
relatively high in both conditions, around 40% in the no power condition and 40-55% in the
high power condition. For the US, the rejection rate in the high power condition is signif-
icantly larger than in the no power condition, whereas there is no significant diﬀerence in
Japan.21
The study by Schmitt (2004) investigates an ultimatum game with varying asymmetric
chip valuations, asymmetric outside options and informational settings. Agents bargain over
a 100 token pie where the conversion rate is either $0.10 or $0.30 per token, the outside option
is either $2 or nothing and agents are either entirely informed about the conversion rate and
outside option of their opponent or they only know that her/his conversion rate and outside
option diﬀer from their own. Schmitt finds that oﬀers are higher when responders rather
than proposers are endowed with the positive outside option. In the first round, the average
oﬀer is 53 (26.4) chips in the treatment with the high (low) conversion rate for the proposer
and the high outside option for the responder, whereas the average oﬀer is 26.4 (17.4) chips
in the treatment with high (low) conversion rate for the proposer and positive outside option
for the proposer. Similarly to Knez and Camerer (1995), rejection rates are very high. In the
first round, they are 50% in the treatments where proposer have the positive outside option
and around 30-40% in the treatments with positive outside options for the responders.22
Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2001) present an experiment on a reduced ultimatum game
with an outside option for the respondent. There, the proposer can choose between a split
which gives herself 8 and the responder 12 and a split where she gets 5 and the responder
gets 15. Whenever the responder rejects the oﬀer, the proposer goes home with nothing and
the responder gets an outside option of 10. The authors observe that 24% of the responders
20We use the original data set, sent to us by Buchan, Croson, and Johnson. To calculate the rejection
rates, we match each proposer oﬀer with each responder demand in each round. We find that rejection rates
decrease over the 10 rounds.
21Note that Buchan, Croson, and Johnson frame the ultimatum bargaining in a buyer-seller context giving
richer context to the game than most other studies summarised here.
22Unlike the other studies cited, Schmitt does not use the strategy method. In her experiment, responders
have to cicle whether they accept a particular oﬀer made to them by their matched proposer.
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reject the 8/12 oﬀer while only 4% reject the 5/15 oﬀer with the diﬀerence being significant
at the 1%-level. They take this result as a case for the presence of spitefulness which they
define as the willingness to sanction in order to increase the payoﬀ diﬀerence between two
agents.
All ultimatum game experiments, cited above, introduce outside options. However, each
of them studies the behaviour in two particular outside option settings only. Moreover, the
characteristics of these settings are similar. The (positive) outside options of both players
are relatively small, ranging from approximately 7% to 40% of the pie, only in the study
by Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2001) does the responder have an outside option of 50% of
the pie. Accordingly, the diﬀerence in outside options is small, spreading from 7% to 20%
of the pie, with the exception of 50% in the Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher paper. In contrast,
the present study varies outside options systematically from no outside option to an outside
option of 72% of the pie. The minimum diﬀerence in outside options is no diﬀerence at all
and the maximum is 72% of the pie.
Finally, we report on a study by Güth, Huck, and Müller (2001). They conduct three
reduced ultimatum games where the proposers chose between a “fair” and an “unfair” oﬀer.
The unfair oﬀer attributes 85% of the pie to the proposer. The three games vary with respect
to the fair allocation. In the first version, the alternative to the unfair oﬀer is to split the pie
exactly equally. In the second version, the alternative is slightly tipped to the favour of the
responder, he gets 55%, whereas in the third version the proposer gets the more favourable
share of 55%. Güth, Huck, and Müller find that proposers are less likely to make a fair
oﬀer if the equal split is replaced by a nearly equal split. Responders reject unfair oﬀers less
frequently if the nearly equal split is tipped to the side of the proposer.
2.3 Experimental design
In the ultimatum bargaining game, a proposer and a responder bargain over the division of
a fixed pie. The proposer (P ) announces a division of the pie. The responder (R) in turn
accepts or rejects the proposal.23 If he accepts, the pie is divided according to the proposed
allocation. If he rejects, each player gets her or his outside option denoted by ωi ≥ 0 for
i = P,R. Both agents know the outside options of either player.
We conducted an ultimatum bargaining game with symmetric and asymmetric outside
options. Subjects had to divide a pie of 22 tokens, the experimental currency. We chose a
pie size of 22 tokens to enable the choice of diﬀerent fairness norms and to separate between
the equal split and the prominent choice of 10 tokens. Participants were confronted with 11
constellations, each diﬀering in players’ outside options. The roles of the players remained
the same throughout the experiment and each subject played with the same partner in all
23 In what follows, we denote the proposer as female and the responder as male.
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constellations. Players did not get any feedback in between the constellations. As the order
of play might influence the behaviour of each individual, we chose to randomise the order in
which subjects faced the diﬀerent constellations to mitigate order eﬀects at the group level.
In each constellation, the proposer had to chose one of the 23 possible (integer) partitions
of the pie by clicking on a particular partition. Simultaneously, the responder selected the
partition that provided him with his minimal acceptable oﬀer (MAO). Before making their
decisions, players were informed about each other’s outside option on a separate screen.
Appendix 2.C shows an example of the screens for the responder.24 Players did not learn
about their partner’s choice in any situation. After all 11 choices, subjects were informed
about the finally chosen constellation which was C5 in both treatments. They were reminded
of the outside options and their own decision in C5. They were told the choice of their
counterpart and their earnings.
We run two treatments. In treatment 1 (T1), the responder almost always got a higher
outside option, whereas in treatment T2 (T2), the situation was reversed. Table 2.1 gives an
account of all 11 constellations. The constellations of outside options were chosen to study
the influence of increasing asymmetry on agents’ behaviour. Furthermore, C9 and C11 are
chosen to enable a comparison with the study by Knez and Camerer (1995).
Table 2.1: Description of treatments
treatment 1 (T1) treatment 2 (T2)
proposer responder proposer responder
constellation outside option outside option outside option outside option
C1 0 0 0 0
C2 0 2 2 0
C3 0 4 4 0
C4 0 6 6 0
C5 0 8 8 0
C6 0 10 10 0
C7 0 12 12 0
C8 0 16 16 0
C9 6 4 4 6
C10 6 6 6 6
C11 6 8 8 6
Remark: Outside options denoted in tokens
Instructions regarding the experimental protocol were provided at the outset of each
session. The translation can be found in Appendix 2.C. We took great care to ensure that
24We do not request our subjects to decide for all constellations on one screen, but rather present them
each constellation on a diﬀerent screen. We chose this presentation for two reasons: Firstly, we wanted to
present all possible divisions of the pie on the screen in a clearly arranged format. We thus provided a table
with rows for each division of the pie. Subjects could then click the division they wanted to propose or accept.
Secondly, we intended to stress the diﬀerences between the diﬀerent constellations. Therefore we chose to
present a screen in between each round describing the outside option situation in the following round.
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participants understood the game and the incentives, since we wanted to measure subjects’
preferences as accurately as possible. Therefore, after subjects had read the instructions,
they had to answer several computerised control questions that tested their understanding
of the decision situation. We did not proceed until all subjects had answered all questions
correctly. Thus, we can safely assume that people understood the game and the incentives.
For the control questions, we refer to Appendix 2.C.
The experiment was run in BonnEconLab, the Laboratory of Experimental Economics
at Bonn University, in May and June 2004. We conducted 4 sessions with 20 subjects each,
two sessions for each treatment. We thus base our analysis on 20 independent observations
on proposers and responders in each treatment. Subjects were recruited by the online re-
cruiting system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) promising a monetary reward for participation in
a decision-making task. In each session, subjects were randomly allocated to the cubicles,
where they took their decisions in complete anonymity from the other participants. The
random allocation to cubicles also determined subjects’ roles as proposers or responders. All
participants were fully informed on all features of the experimental design and the procedures.
The experiment was programmed using the software Z-Tree (Fischbacher, 1999).
Sessions lasted for about one hour. The exchange rate of the experimental currency
was €0.6 per token. On average subjects earned €8.80 including a show-up fee of €4. The
lowest payoﬀ was €4, the highest €18. The main characteristics of the composition of the
80 participants are displayed in Table 2.2. There is no major diﬀerence in terms of gender,
age and nationality across treatments. Note that only a small fraction of about 20% of the
participants in each treatment are economics students.
Table 2.2: Composition of treatments
T1 T2
sex 18 (F)/22(M) 20(F)/20(M)
mean age 24.85 23.50
economics major 22.50% 20.00%
knowledge in microeconomics* 32.50 % 35.00%
German nationality 92.50% 100.00%
*: includes students taking economics as a minor
2.4 Results
We first report major descriptive statistics of experimental behaviour, see Table 2.3 and Table
2.4. Columns 2 and 3 show the outside option of the proposer and the responder. Column
4 displays proposers’ mean oﬀer for each outside option constellation in both treatments.
Column 5 shows responders’ mean MAO. Standard deviations are given in brackets. Column
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6 displays the rejection rate measured by matching each oﬀer with each MAO while column
7 reports the “empirical” rejection rate which results from the pair actually matched in the
experiment.25 A remarkable first finding is that mean oﬀers are generally lower than mean
MAO. Considering each constellation separately, mean MAO exceed mean oﬀers in 55% of
all constellations in T1 and in 91% of all constellations in T2. Furthermore, we find rejection
rates ranging from 25% to 46% in T1, and from 23% to 68% in T2. Average rejection rates
are 39% in T1 and 52% in T2.
The remainder of this section is organised as follows. First, we investigate whether the two
treatments are readily comparable. To this aim, we compare the symmetric constellations
C1 and C10 across treatments. Second, we turn to the main focus of the experiment, the
evolution of oﬀers and MAO with asymmetric outside options.
2.4.1 Across treatment analysis
We start our analysis by comparing outcomes across the two treatments. In particular, we
ask the question whether there is a treatment eﬀect, i.e. whether the diﬀerent experimental
environments have an eﬀect on behaviour. We explore this issue by looking at constellations
that are identical in both treatments, i.e. the symmetric constellations C1 and C10. This
crosscheck of the experimental design is necessary to analyse whether the randomisation of
the order of constellations eliminates significant order eﬀects or whether there is some path
dependence in the outcomes.
In this part of the analysis, we do not assume that subjects have particular preferences.
We rather argue that most standard preference representations in economics do not consider
that the history of play might matter for behaviour. In each constellation, subjects are
expected to decide independently of previous constellations. This leads to the prediction that
no diﬀerences in behaviour occur in situations that are identical across the two treatments.
Moreover, as we did not give any feedback on the outcomes of previous decisions, we can rule
out a classical learning eﬀect. Additionally, we ensured that subjects are familiar with the
nature of the decision situations before we started the experiment. Thus, there should be no
eﬀect of stronger familiarity with the decision task.
Hypothesis 0: In symmetric constellations, there exists no diﬀerence in behaviour across
treatments.
Constellations C1 and C10 respectively are identical decision problems for both players
in both treatments. The only diﬀerences stem from the history of play preceding the con-
stellation. The history diﬀers in the number of previous decision problems the player had to
25These two rates diﬀer slightly from each other, as shown in tables 2.3 and 2.4. However, subjects did not
get any feedback during the 11 constellations and, thus, did not have any chance of learning. Therefore, the
diﬀerence is not substantial. Unless stated otherwise, we use the rejection rate resulting from matching each
oﬀer with each MAO.
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Table 2.3: T1 - Average oﬀers and MAO’s by constellation
constellation prop resp mean oﬀer mean MAO rejection emp. rejection
C1 0 0 8.10 (4.12) 9.85 (1.60) 37.00% 35.00%
C2 0 2 10.35 (4.90) 9.35 (4.13) 35.75% 40.00%
C3 0 4 9.70 (2.94) 10.95 (3.15) 42.50% 45.00%
C4 0 6 10.40 (2.44) 10.60 (3.28) 40.75% 45.00%
C5 0 8 11.45 (2.91) 11.60 (2.62) 45.50% 60.00%
C6 0 10 12.10 (1.89) 11.75 (2.67) 25.00% 35.00%
C7 0 12 13.10 (3.54) 12.85 (4.09) 40.50% 40.00%
C8 0 16 15.80 (3.38) 15.95 (3.38) 43.50% 50.00%
C9 6 4 9.35 (2.99) 9.15 (2.89) 37.25% 45.00%
C10 6 6 9.45 (1.93) 10.35 (2.01) 46.25% 55.00%
C11 6 8 10.40 (1.43) 10.25 (1.45) 35.25% 40.00%
all - - 10.93 (3.66) 11.15 (3.44) 39.02% 45.00%
Note: Standard deviations in brackets
Table 2.4: T2 - Average oﬀers and MAO’s by constellation
constellation prop resp mean oﬀer mean MAO rejection emp. rejection
C1 0 0 10.10 (2.85) 10.55 (3.44) 23.25% 25.00%
C2 2 0 8.15 (4.16) 10.45 (4.42) 50.50% 50.00%
C3 4 0 6.80 (4.16) 8.35 (3.94) 54.25% 55.00%
C4 6 0 7.35 (4.77) 9.45 (3.36) 64.25% 65.00%
C5 8 0 6.55 (4.72) 8.50 (3.00) 62.25% 55.00%
C6 10 0 6.30 (4.80) 7.75 (2.99) 60.50% 60.00%
C7 12 0 4.20 (3.32) 6.45 (2.67) 67.75% 60.00%
C8 16 0 3.60 (2.84) 5.15 (4.90) 56.75% 60.00%
C9 4 6 11.05 (2.04) 10.75 (2.78) 47.00% 60.00%
C10 6 6 9.75 (1.99) 10.00 (2.58) 37.00% 30.00%
C11 8 6 9.20 (1.85) 9.95 (1.85) 52.00% 50.00%
all - - 7.55 (4.18) 8.85 (3.68) 52.32% 51.82%
Note: Standard deviations in brackets
Asymmetric Outside Options in Ultimatum Bargaining 42
face until constellation C1 or C10 turned up and from diﬀerences in the outside options of
previous decision situations. We can thus test the above hypothesis by comparing the distri-
bution of oﬀers and MAO in constellations C1 and C10 across treatments. The upper half
of Table 2.5 compares oﬀers and MAO in identical constellations over treatments. Columns
2 and 3 give the mean oﬀers, columns 4 and 5 the mean MAO in C1 and C10 respectively.
Row 3 displays significance levels for comparisons across treatments using the two-sample
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test. The lower half of Table 2.5 compares the propensity to oﬀer/
demand an equal split in the two symmetric constellations C1 and C10 over treatments. The
equal split represents a subclass of oﬀers and MAO, which is frequently chosen. We thus
decided to analyse equal splits separately. Columns 2 and 3 give the percentages of equal
splits in oﬀers and columns 4 and 5 the percentages of equal splits in MAO. Row 7 displays
significance levels for comparisons across treatments using the χ2-test.
Table 2.5: Test results in symmetric constellations
Mean Oﬀer Mean MAO
C1 C10 C1 C10
T1 8.10 9.45 9.85 10.35
sign.a) **(.0426) n.s. n.s. n.s.
T2 10.10 9.75 10.55 10.00
Equal Splits in oﬀers Equal Splits in MAO
C1 C10 C1 C10
T1 60% 45% 50% 40%
sign.b) **(.028) n.s. n.s. n.s.
T2 90% 60% 55% 50%
***, **, * significant at the 1-, 5-, 10-% level, n.s.: not significanta) : Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test (two-tailed), b) : χ2 -test
p-values given in brackets
We do not find a significant diﬀerence in responder behaviour across treatments. In C1
as well as in C10, MAO do not vary significantly between T1 and T2. The percentage of
equal splits in MAO does not vary significantly either. Proposer behaviour is ambivalent
though. In C10, we find no significant diﬀerence in mean oﬀers or the propensity of equal
splits in oﬀers. Contrary in C1, mean oﬀers are significantly higher in T2 as compared to
T1. Further, we find that in C1 proposers oﬀer the equal split significantly more often in T2
than in T1. The results on proposer behaviour contradict the hypothesis of no diﬀerence in
identical situations.
Further analysis suggests that the eﬀect in proposer behaviour is due to the order in which
subjects are confronted with constellations. We sequentially excluded observations where C1
came up during the last round, the second last round, the third last round and so on. It
turns out that when we drop those observations where C1 occurred in the last and second
last round in either treatment, the diﬀerence in oﬀers is no longer significant. This procedure
involves dropping 9 out of 40 observations. This suggests that the order of play does matter in
the symmetric constellation C1. To explore the diﬀerences in treatments further, we examine
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how the order of play influences behaviour within each treatment. To this aim, we classify
C1-oﬀers depending on whether C1 turned up early or not. We construct a dummy variable
indicating whether C1 came up in the first 6 rounds or afterwards. By means of a Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test, we then compare early to late C1-oﬀers. In treatment T1, we find that
oﬀers are significantly higher (p = 6.66%) when C1 shows up early than when it shows up
late. In contrast, in treatment T2 we find no such eﬀect.
Even though we do not find any significant diﬀerence in responder behaviour across the
two treatments, we check whether we can find a similar eﬀect of the order of play within
treatments. To this aim, we classify C1-MAO depending on whether C1 turns up early or
not. A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test finds significantly smaller MAO (p = 1.7%) when C1
turns up early in treatment T1. In treatment T2, however, there is no order eﬀect on MAO.
As already reported, we do not find any significant diﬀerence in responder behaviour in C1
across treatments. This suggests that the impact of the order of play on responder behaviour
exists, but is less strong than the impact on proposer behaviour.
The eﬀect in T1 is robust to a variation of the definition of early and late. If we define
early as during the first 5 rounds, then oﬀers are significantly higher with p = 4.87% and
MAO are significantly smaller with p = 1.7%. Furthermore, we do not find any eﬀect in
T2. Apart from constellation C1 in T1 , there is no robust early-late eﬀect in any other
constellation on neither oﬀers nor MAO. This suggests that the C1 constellation is special
in treatment T1 and that in all other constellations, there is no strong eﬀect of the order of
play. In the following, we refer to the eﬀect caused by the fact that C1 occurs early or late
in the order of play as the order eﬀect. Due to the order eﬀect, we have to be careful in
the within treatment analysis when comparing outcomes of the C1 constellation with other
constellations in T1.
Summary 1 In the symmetric constellation C1, proposers oﬀer significantly less in T1 than
in T2, moreover the propensity to oﬀer an equal split is significantly smaller in T1 than in
T2. There is evidence that this diﬀerence is induced by the order of play. It seems that sub-
jects do not consider each constellation independently and that history matters, even though
participants do not learn about any of their partners’ decisions.
According to the above analysis, behaviour changes depending on whether C1 turns up
early or late. For the remainder of the paper, we assume that this is the case. We thus
assume that in T1, subjects actually respond to an early C1 situation diﬀerently than to
a late C1 situation. This seems the simplest behavioural model that is consistent with the
findings. Furthermore, the following simple story fits the behavioural model. In the course
of the experiment, proposers in treatment T1 realise that they almost always have the lower
outside option. This might lead them to act aggressively when the symmetric C1 constellation
turns up late. They might want to take advantage of the fact that the imbalance slips away in
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the C1 constellation with no outside options. Moreover, in T1, responders are almost always
endowed with the higher outside option. Early on in the experiment, responders might not
have realised that they are often in a powerful position. As they do not feel that strong
yet, they might ask less when C1 turns up early than when it turns up late. Contrary, in
treatment T2, the order of play does not seem to have a strong eﬀect on the behaviour in the
symmetric situation C1. This might be due to the following diﬀerence in the two treatments.
In the ultimatum game, the right to propose a division of the pie induces an asymmetry
in bargaining power between the two players. In treatment T1, this bargaining power is
counteracted by the high outside options of the responder, whereas in T2, it is reinforced by
the high outside option of the proposer herself. This diﬀerence in treatments might induce
the diﬀerence in behaviour discussed above.
However, with our experimental data, we cannot detect what exactly causes the diﬀerence
in proposer and responder behaviour in C1 in treatment T1. For example, instead of C1
occurring early or late being the cause for the change in behaviour, it could be that only if
C8 has been one of the previous decision situations, did proposers change their behaviour in
C1. We cannot discover a pattern like that. However, if this is the behavioural pattern, then
classifying subjects into groups that got the C1 early or late seems a good approximation;
the later C1 turns up in the order of play, the larger is the probability that C8 has turned
up as one of the previous screens.
Next, we turn to analyse the impact of outside options on oﬀers, MAO, rejection rates
and equal splits.
2.4.2 Within treatment analysis
Up to now, we have compared behaviour across treatments. We now turn to the main focus
of the study, the analysis of the variation in behaviour due to variation in the outside options.
This requires comparing outcomes within treatments.
In general, diﬀerent behavioural assumptions generate diﬀerent model predictions. We
analyse the strategic interaction with two opposing behavioural assumptions in mind. Self-
interested agents who care for their own material well-being only and inequity averse agents
who dislike outcomes they perceive as unequal or unfair. Experimental evidence suggests that
a large fraction of agents reveals other-regarding behaviour. We chose to contrast the pure
self-interest model with the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model of inequity aversion, a particular
model of other-regarding preferences, for two reasons: Firstly, inequity aversion has proven
to be able to predict subjects’ behaviour well in a variety of diﬀerent experiments. Secondly,
the Fehr and Schmidt model generates specific predictions as to the change in behaviour with
varying outside options.
In the subgame-perfect equilibrium under the assumption of purely self-interested agents,
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the proposer oﬀers the responder his outside option ωR (or the outside option plus one unit
of the experimental currency). This oﬀer is accepted by the responder. In treatment T1 with
increasing outside options of the responder, the assumption of self-interest thus implies that
we should observe a one by one increase in the proposer’s oﬀer as well as in the responder’s
demand in constellations C1 to C8 and C9 to C11. In constellations C1 to C8 in treatment
T2, however, the outside option of the responder remains zero. We should thus observe no
change in behaviour of either player across the constellations.
We now turn to the predictions of the Fehr and Schmidt model. Inequity aversion is rep-
resented in the linear utility function ui (x) = xi − αimax {xj − xi, 0}− βimax {xi − xj , 0},
where xi,j represents monetary payoﬀs for agents i and j respectively. The utility parameters
αi resp. βi measure agent i’s utility loss caused by a deviation from the equal split to her dis-
advantage resp. advantage, with αi ≥ βi ≥ 0 and βi < 1.26 The inequity averse responder is
willing to accept any oﬀer above the threshold s = 22αR+ωR−αRmax{ωP−ωR,0}−βRmax{ωR−ωP ,0}1+2αR ,
the MAO. With complete information on the utility parameters αR, βR, the equilibrium oﬀer
of an inequity averse proposer is given by
s



= max{s, 11} if βP > 12
∈ [s,max{s, 11}] if βP = 12
= s if βP <
1
2
.27
With incomplete information concerning the utility parameters αR, βR, the equilibrium oﬀer
depends on the joint distribution of the parameters. In comparison to the pure self-interest
model, the model with inequity aversion predicts oﬀers to be positive irrespective of agents’
outside options. Furthermore, a positive outside option for the responder increases the MAO.
A positive outside option for the proposer reduces or increases the MAO depending on the
diﬀerence in outside options. Note that in treatment T1, ωR is (nearly) always positive,
whereas in treatment T2, the reverse holds. Thus, the MAO of an inequity averse responder
should increase with his own outside option ωR by
1−βR
1+2αR
(≤ 1) in treatment T1 and should
decrease with the outside option of the proposer ωP by
αR
1+2αR
¡
≤ 12
¢
in treatment T2.
Concerning responder behaviour, we can reject the assumption of self-interested agents
if we observe responders (i) demanding more than their outside option, (ii) increasing their
demand by less than the increase in their outside option and (iii) decreasing their demand
26One might argue that the outside option of an agent represents a kind of safe lower bound of income to
the agent and that with increasing fixed income from the experiment, the attitude towards risk of the agent
might change. This could influence the behaviour during the experiment. The linearity of the utility function,
implying risk neutrality, excludes behavioural eﬀects of this sort. We henceforth abstract from risk eﬀects.
We analyse behaviour with respect to this lower bound in Appendix 2.B. We find that some agents do not
seem to regard the outside options as bounds.
27See proposition 1 in Kohnz (2004). The equilibrium oﬀer looks slightly more complicated than in Fehr
and Schmidt (1999). Introducing a positive outside option for the responder aﬀects his MAO. With the outside
option of the responder high enough, the MAO might be larger than half the pie. This matters in constellations
C7 and C8. The equilibrium abstracts from the issue of a smallest currency unit in the experimental setting.
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if the outside option of the proposer increases. With regard to proposer behaviour, it is
more diﬃcult to assert the adequate behavioural assumption. First of all, in an experiment,
the proposer does not know the utility parameters αR, βR of the responder. Furthermore,
the proposer’s behaviour might be motivated by concerns for the other player’s payoﬀ or he
might act strategically when oﬀering more than the responder’s outside option, understanding
that the responder dislikes inequity. Even when the MAO exceeds the equal split, a purely
self-interested proposer prefers to oﬀer the MAO over a bargaining breakdown, see Kohnz
(2004). It is hard to disentangle the strategic motive from the inequity concerns in an
ultimatum game. However, in the presence of self-interested proposers who merely anticipate
the inequity aversion of the responder, we expect the impact of positive outside options on
oﬀers and MAO to be identical. Contrary, with genuinely inequity averse proposers, we expect
the impact of outside options on oﬀers to be less strong than on MAO. Outside options do
not change the behaviour of proposers who oﬀer the fair allocation of half the pie. However,
they do influence those proposers who are not very inequity averse, βP <
1
2 , and oﬀer the
MAO. Thus, overall, the influence should be less pronounced for proposers.
To investigate the impact of outside options on oﬀers and MAO, we run an OLS regression
with clustered error terms to account for the dependence of observations resulting from the
repeated decisions of each individual.28 The results are reported in Table 2.6. Columns 2/
4 and 3/ 5 report the results of the estimation for oﬀers and MAO respectively. Note, that
the regression includes constellations C1 to C8 only, because in these constellations we have
a systematic increase in outside options of responders/ proposers, respectively. We report on
similar results of an analysis around the symmetric constellation C10 with positive outside
options for both players in Appendix 2.A.
As proposer behaviour in the symmetric constellation C1 is significantly diﬀerent, we
chose to run separate estimations for each treatment. We include dummy variables for each
constellation capturing the impact of outside options on the behaviour of subjects. We chose
a dummy variable representation over a linear or quadratic form, because it does not restrict
the impact of outside options on oﬀers and MAO to a particular functional form. Within
that specification, we test the linear hypothesis that all dummies lie on a straight line. For all
four regressions presented in Table 2.6, we find that the linear hypothesis can be rejected on
a 1% significance level using the Wald test.29 Additionally, the regression contains a dummy
variable “C1 late” that indicates whether constellation C1 turns up early or late in the order
of play. The dummy is 1 for C1 observations that turn up late in the order of play, where we
define late, analogously to section 2.4.1, as during the last 5 rounds.30 In treatment T1, we
28For information on heteroskedasticity, see chapter 12 in Greene (2000).
29For example in treatment T2, the null hypothesis is that the coeﬃcient of the “T2 Outside option P2”
dummy equals twice the coeﬃcient of the “T2 Outside option P4” dummy and trice the coeﬃcient of the “T2
Outside option P6” dummy and so on.
30The results are robust to a variation of the definition of late as during the last 6 rounds. See Appendix
2.A for further detail on the robustness results.
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Table 2.6: OLS regression with clustered errors on oﬀers and MAO
T1 T2
oﬀer MAO oﬀer MAO
late -3.134* 1.689*** 1.857 -.699
(1.556) (.535) (1.364) (1.551)
T2 Outside option P2 -1.114 -.450
(1.024) (1.124)
T2 Outside option P4 -2.464** -2.550
(1.043) (1.491)
T2 Outside option P6 -1.914 -1.450
(1.413) (1.194)
T2 Outside option P8 -2.714** -2.400**
(1.090) (1.123)
T2 Outside option P10 -2.964*** -3.150**
(1.016) (1.207)
T2 Outside option P12 -5.064*** -4.450***
(1.252) (1.178)
T2 Outside option P16 -5.664*** -5.750***
(1.513) (1.729)
T1 Outside option R2 .213 .091
(1.164) (.994)
T1 Outside option R4 -.437 1.691**
(1.075) (.770)
T1 Outside option R6 .263 1.341
(.742) (.879)
T1 Outside option R8 1.313 2.341***
(.945) (.647)
T1 Outside option R10 1.963** 2.491***
(.824) (.685)
T1 Outside option R12 2.963*** 3.591***
(.961) (1.058)
T1 Outside option R16 5.663*** 6.691***
(1.027) (.866)
age -.0145 .049 -.088* -.198
(.037) (.209) (.049) (.221)
sex -.062 -.139 .787 .201
(.813) (.926) (1.626) (.890)
micro .124 -.988 -.466 -.553
(.915) (.870) (1.390) (.848)
game -.369 .033 .194 .356
(.774) (.567) (1.393) (1.108)
constant 6.128** 8.843** 14.639** 13.621**
no. of observations 160 160 160 160
R2 0.4458 0.3045 0.2588 0.2230
***,**, * : significantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1, 5, 10% level resp.
standard deviation given in brackets, estimation includes constellations C1-C8
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Figure 2.1: Plotted dummy coeﬃcients
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find that the coeﬃcient of “C1 late” is significantly diﬀerent from zero for the oﬀer- as well as
the MAO-regression. Oﬀers in C1 decrease by approximately 3.1 tokens when they turn up
late in comparison to early, whereas MAO in C1 increase by approximately 1.7 tokens. This
confirms the earlier result of an order eﬀect, namely that the order of play influences behaviour
of both players in C1. Conversely, in treatment T2, the coeﬃcients in both regressions are not
significantly diﬀerent from zero which is also consistent with the previous finding. As further
explanatory variables we include age, gender, knowledge in microeconomics and game theory.
The gender dummy “sex” is 1 if the subject is male. None of these variables is significant in
any estimation, apart from age in the oﬀer estimation of treatment T2.
The coeﬃcients on the outside option dummies indicate how oﬀers or MAO in a particular
constellation change in comparison to oﬀers/ MAO in the early symmetric constellation C1
with no outside option for either player. For example, the third row of Table 2.6 indicates
that, in T2, oﬀers decrease by approximately 1.1 tokens when the outside option of the
proposer is 2 tokens in comparison to the constellation where both players have no outside
option and this constellation turns up early in the order of play. Figure 2.1 illustrates the
estimated coeﬃcients of the dummy variables. The x-axis depicts the diﬀerence in outside
options and the y-axis presents the coeﬃcients. It visualises that from an outside option of 4
tokens onwards an increase in the outside option in T1 (T2) increases (decreases) oﬀers and
MAO approximately linearily.
Hypothesis 1: The outside option of the proposer does not influence behaviour of
neither proposer nor responder.
As Table 2.6 shows, oﬀers as well as MAO decrease with an increase of the outside option
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of the proposer. All coeﬃcients of the dummy variables in T2 are negative and the absolute
values of the coeﬃcients increase with increasing outside options of the proposer. However,
not all coeﬃcients are significant. Smaller outside options have no statistically significant
impact, while larger outside options have a strong impact on both oﬀers and MAO. The
hypothesis of no influence can thus be rejected.
Hypothesis 2: The outside option of the responder increases the oﬀer as well as the
MAO one by one.
In T1, oﬀers as well as MAO increase when the outside option of the responder increases.
Apart from the impact of an outside option of 4 tokens on oﬀers, all dummy variables have
a positive sign, as expected and coeﬃcients increase with increasing outside options of the
responder. Coeﬃcients on larger outside options are significant whereas coeﬃcients on most
smaller outside options are not. Thus, again we do not find an impact for smaller outside
options while we do for larger outside options. An increase on a one by one basis would
imply that coeﬃcients are close to the level of the positive outside option, meaning that, for
example, the coeﬃcient for the dummy “Outside option R8” should be close to 8. As all the
coeﬃcients are relatively small, the hypothesis of a one by one increase can be rejected.
We expect that proposers, who act strategically rather than out of the concern for others,
change their behaviour according to the reaction of responders to outside options. Conversely,
genuinely inequity averse proposers respond less than self-interested proposers as some of
them oﬀer the fair share regardless of the outside options. We thus expect an overall eﬀect
of outside options that is less strong for proposers than for responders.
Hypothesis 3: The impact of outside options is identical on MAO and oﬀers.
In treatment T1, the coeﬃcients of the outside option dummies are generally larger for
the MAO regression than the oﬀer regression. This indicates a less pronounced impact on
oﬀers than on MAO when the outside option of the responder increases. In T2, there is no
such clear trend. Some of the coeﬃcients in the MAO regression are smaller than in the oﬀer
regression, some are larger. However, to test the hypothesis rigorously, we have to compare
confidence intervals for the coeﬃcients. A confidence interval specifies the bounds within
which the true coeﬃcient lies with a certain probability. If the confidence intervals given a
certain probability level do not overlap, than we can reject the hypothesis that the impact
of outside options is identical on oﬀers and MAO with that probability. Considering the
95% confidence intervals, we find that these overlap considerably. We can thus not reject the
hypothesis of identical impacts.
Next, we turn to the impact of outside options on rejection rates. Under the assumption
of self-interest, the proposer knows the MAO of the responder, being the responder’s outside
option, and there is no bargaining breakdown at all. Tables 2.3 and 2.4 illustrate, however,
that a considerable fraction of bargains do fail. Inequity aversion under incomplete infor-
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Figure 2.2: Rejection rates
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mation predicts some bargaining failure in equilibrium. However, ineﬃciencies should not
increase with an increasing diﬀerence in outside options. Remember that the experimental
subjects knew the outside option of either party before deciding in a particular constellation.
Hypothesis 4: Outside options do not influence rejection rates.
Figure 2.2 shows the development of rejection rates with outside options. The x-axis de-
picts the diﬀerence in outside options within constellations. The y-axis shows the percentage
of rejections. The results of treatment T1 (T2) can be found in the left (right) panel. In T2,
the introduction of outside options clearly increases rejection rates, both the rejection rate
that measures behaviour by matching each oﬀer with each MAO as well as the “empirical”
rejection rate computed on the basis of the actual match of proposer and responder in the
experiment. For T1, results are not that clear-cut.
To further examine the impact of outside options on the propensity of bargaining break-
down, we run a logit estimation, whose results are reported in Table 2.7.31 The binary
dependent variable is one if bargaining breaks down in a particular match of proposer and
responder. For the logit regression, we match each proposer with each responder. Obser-
vations are not independent because each player decides several times and each player is
matched with all 20 possible partners. To account for the problem of dependent observa-
tions, we include a set of dummy variables, one for each player. Again, we run two separate
31 In a logit estimation, the coeﬃcients can only be interpretated in terms of the sign, not in terms of the
magnitude. The marginal eﬀect of regressor xi is computed as f (X0β)βi where βi represents the regression
coeﬃcient of regressor xi and f (·) is the density function of the logistic distribution. In Table 2.7, we report
the marginal eﬀect evaluated at the mean of each regressor xi. For further information, see chapter 19 in
Greene (2000).
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regressions, one for each treatment.32 To tackle the order eﬀect, we include dummies that
indicate whether C1 turned up early or late. As both players influence the rejection in a
particular match of subjects, we construct three dummies to account for the four possible
combinations: Constellation C1 can turn up early for both players, it can turn up early for
the proposer and late for the responder or vice versa, and last, it can turn up late for both
players. We include a dummy for each of the last three combinations and leave out the first
combination where both players encounter C1 early. The dummy “C1: early P late R” (“C1:
late P early R”) is 1 when the constellation C1 turns up early (late) for the proposer and late
(early) for the responder, whereas “C1: late P late R” is 1 when C1 turns up late for both
players. Late is again defined as during the last 5 rounds.33 In the regression for treatment
T1, the marginal eﬀects of all three order dummies are positive, and only the first marginal
eﬀect is not significant. This implies that whenever the C1 constellation turns up late for the
proposer the probability of a rejection is increased. This is consistent with the fact that oﬀers
decrease when C1 turns up late in comparison to early, as a decreased oﬀer implies a higher
probability of bargaining breakdown given the same distribution of MAO. Furthermore, the
marginal eﬀect of the second dummy where constellation C1 turns up early for the responder
is smaller than the marginal eﬀect of the third dummy where C1 turns up late for the re-
sponder. This is also consistent as MAO increase significantly when C1 turns up late instead
of early. However, this eﬀect does not seem strong enough on its own. We therefore do not
observe a significant increase in the rejection probability when the proposer encounters C1
early and the responder late as compared to C1 turning up early for both players. In T2,
the marginal eﬀects of all three order dummies are significantly negative implying that the
probability of a rejection decreases when the C1 constellation turns up late instead of early
for either player. Even though the change in oﬀers and MAO are not significant, Table 2.6
shows the coeﬃcients on “C1 late” have the correct sign implying that the oﬀer increases and
the MAO decreases when C1 turns up late. By matching each proposer with each responder
in the rejection regression, this eﬀect is strengthened. This results in a significant impact of
the order dummies. So the fact that in T2 the marginal eﬀects of the order dummies are
significantly negative is also consistent with previous findings.
The estimation results clearly reject the null hypothesis of no influence of the outside
options on rejections. All dummy variables have positive marginal eﬀects and are significant
on the 1% or 5% level, apart from the introduction of a small outside option of 2 tokens in
T2 which is significant at the 10% level only. This indicates that a positive outside option for
the proposer or responder increases the probability of a rejection. This is in line with earlier
experiments that find unusually high rejection rates in the presence of asymmetries, see for
example Knez and Camerer (1995) and Kagel, Kim, and Moser (1996).
32The estimation includes constellation C1-C8. For a similar analysis around the constellation C10, see
Appendix 2.A.
33For robustness results with respect to the definition of late, see Appendix 2.A.
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Table 2.7: Logit estimation on rejections
T1 T2
C1: early P late R .127 (.140) -.199** (.090)
C1: late P early R .435*** (.073) -.424*** (.056)
C1: late P late R .523*** (.057) -.544*** (.026)
Outside option P2 .124* (.066)
Outside option P4 .177*** (.061)
Outside option P6 .302*** (.048)
Outside option P8 .279*** (.051)
Outside option P10 .258*** (.053)
Outside option P12 .340*** (.043)
Outside option P16 .211*** (.058)
Outside option R2 .352*** (.082)
Outside option R4 .432*** (.073)
Outside option R6 .413*** (.076)
Outside option R8 .464*** (.069)
Outside option R10 .193** (.091)
Outside option R12 .410*** (.076)
Outside option R16 .443*** (.072)
no. of observations 3200 3200
loglikelihood -1661.930 -1401.655
Pseudo R2 0.2224 0.3636
***,**, * : significantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1, 5, 10% level resp.
reports marginal eﬀects evaluated at the mean
standard deviation given in brackets, estimation includes constellations C1-C8
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Psychological experiments suggest that with the introduction of asymmetry in the bar-
gaining environment various fairness perceptions emerge, see Babcock and Loewenstein
(1997). The same study (p. 111) states that “self-serving assessments of fairness are likely
to occur in morally ambiguous settings in which there are competing “focal points” - that is,
settlements that could plausibly be viewed as fair.” Thus, the introduction of asymmetry in
outside options might enable the emergence of various conflicting fairness perceptions. Sub-
jects choose diﬀerent reference points for measuring inequity, which might be diﬀerent from
the equal split. In an extended framework of inequity aversion that allows to measure inequity
aversion according to diﬀerent reference points, Kohnz (2004) shows that with self-servingly
biased subjects, bargaining failure increases if we introduce asymmetry in outside options.
The data from the present experiment is thus consistent with the theoretical predictions of
inequity aversion allowing for a self-serving bias in fairness perceptions.
Summary 2 Inequity aversion explains the evolution of oﬀers and MAO with outside op-
tions well. The analysis suggests that the probability of bargaining breakdown increases with
increasing asymmetry in terms of outside options. This pattern cannot be explained by sim-
ple inequality aversion. However, it is consistent with the extended framework of inequity
aversion that allows for a self-serving bias.
Additional insights can be gained by examining the propensities to oﬀer or demand an
equal split of the pie, i.e. 11 out of the 22 tokens. The equal split is a crucial variable in the
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) theory of inequity aversion being the reference point for measuring
inequity. In the standard ultimatum game, the equal split has been found to be the modal
oﬀer in most experiments, see Table 2.2 in Camerer (2003). We conjecture that, due to a
self-serving bias, the equal split loses importance in asymmetric constellations.
Hypothesis 5: Asymmetric outside options do not aﬀect the propensity to oﬀer or de-
mand equal splits.
Figure 2.3 shows the evolution of equal splits in oﬀers and MAO in both treatments. The
x-axis depicts the diﬀerence in outside options in constellations, while the y-axis shows the
percentage of equal splits. The results of treatment T1 can be found in the left panel. We see
that the percentages of equal splits in oﬀers diﬀer between 60% in C1 and 0% in C7, whereas
the percentages of equal splits in MAO diﬀer between 55% in C6 and 10% in C8. The right
panel of Figure 2.3 illustrates the results of treatment T2 where percentages in oﬀers (MAO)
vary between 90% (55%) in C1 and 0% (5%) in C8. In both treatments, the percentages of
equal splits in oﬀers and MAO move very much in line.
We find that in treatment T1, the equal split is the modal oﬀer, whenever the responder’s
outside option is smaller than 11 tokens (C1-C6 and C9-C11). In T2, the equal split remains
the mode in the two symmetric constellations C1 and C10. Yet, it ceases to be the modal oﬀer
in all asymmetric constellations, except for constellation C2 which is only weakly asymmetric.
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Figure 2.3: Equal Splits
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The propensity to oﬀer or demand an equal split clearly decreases when the outside
option of the proposer is increased. The right panel of Figure 2.3 visualises this. It shows in
particular that the introduction of a small asymmetry induces a strong reaction in oﬀers and
MAO. In treatment T2, the decrease in equal split oﬀers from 90% in C1 to 35% in C2 is very
pronounced. According to the Binomial test, this change is highly significant, see Table 2.8.34
Note that the diﬀerence in outside options increases by only 2 tokens, i.e. 9 percent of the
pie. Responders behave similarly. They demand the equal split less often. The percentage
decreases from 55% to 20% with the change being significant at the 1% level.
Table 2.8: Percentages of Equal Splits in oﬀers and MAO
proposers C1 sign. C2 C9 sign. C10 sign. C11
T1 60% **(.035) 30% 35% n.s. 45% n.s. 40%
T2 90% ***(.001) 35% 30% **(.044) 60% **(.011) 15%
responders C1 sign. C2 C9 sign. C10 sign. C11
T1 50% n.s. 35% 30% n.s. 40% n.s. 30%
T2 55% ***(.008) 20% 30% n.s. 50% **(.031) 25%
Binomial Test: ***, **, * significant at the 1-, 5-, 10-% level, n.s.: not significant
p-values given in brackets
The reaction to an increase in the outside option of the responder is less clear-cut. Still,
both proposer and responder oﬀer/demand the equal split less frequently when little asym-
metry is present. In T1, the propensity to oﬀer (demand) an equal split falls from 60% (50%)
34The total number of changes is smaller than 10, we thus use the Binomial test. For more information,
see the Appendix 2.D on statistical tests.
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in C1 to 30% (35%) in C2. The drop in equal split oﬀers is significant at the 5% level, see
Table 2.8. However, Figure 2.3 shows that as the outside option of the responder increases
further, the percentage of equal split oﬀers and demands remains constant/ increases until
the outside option of the responder is larger than the equal split. Thus the equal split does
not seem to lose much importance in treatment T1. One explanation for this eﬀect could be
that in treatment T1 two forces of asymmetry work in opposing directions. On the one hand,
the proposer has a higher bargaining power than the responder. On the other hand, the
responder gains weight through higher outside options. These opposing forces might render
the emergence of a reference allocation other than the equal split diﬃcult as compared to
treatment T2 which units the two forces on the side of the proposer.
C10 is another symmetric situation where both agents are endowed with an outside option
of 6 tokens. C9 and C11 vary around this symmetric situation by giving a slightly higher
outside option to the proposer or responder. Table 2.8 shows the percentages of equal splits in
all of these constellations. The equal splits are most frequent in C10, as expected. Percentages
decrease when asymmetry is introduced in C9 and C11. This finding supports the hypothesis
that small asymmetries can decrease the propensity to propose or demand an equal split.
However, the diﬀerences are significant solely in treatment T2. This supports again the
conjecture that in treatment T2 the bundling of forces on the side of the proposer drives
oﬀers and MAO away from the equal split as compared to T1.
The results in equal splits can be seen in line with the results of Güth, Huck, and Müller
(2001).35 They find that proposers are less likely to make a fair oﬀer if the equal split is
replaced by a nearly equal split. Responders meanwhile reject unfair oﬀers less frequently if
the nearly equal split is tipped to the side of the proposer. In our study, in particular the
latter finding can be related to the fact that the drop in equal splits is more pronounced in
the second than in the first treatment. One possible explanation in both experiments is that
responders resign to the fact that they are in the unfavourable position, not having much
bargaining power and additionally being weak in terms of outside options.
Summary 3 Small asymmetries (significantly) reduce the propensity to oﬀer an equal split.
The reaction is more pronounced whenever asymmetry works in favour of the proposer than
of the responder.
2.5 Discussion
As pointed out, there are only a few ultimatum experiments that introduce outside options
into the bargaining setting. Our results are fairly comparable to the results of Knez and
Camerer (1995), who introduce positive outside options for both players. Proposers have an
35For a detailed description of their experimental design, see the literature overview in section 2.2.
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outside option of 30% of a $10-pie. Responders are split into two groups. One group has
an outside option of 20% and the other group of 40%. In our experiment, this is roughly
comparable to constellations 9 and 11 of treatment T1, where the proposer has an outside
option of 27% and the responder of either 18% or 36%. Simply comparing means of oﬀers
and MAO highlights that mostly behaviour seems similar. In the experiment by Knez and
Camerer, responders demanded on average a share of 42.7% when they had an outside option
of 20% whereas subjects in our experiment demanded 41.6%. So they demanded slightly less
with a slightly smaller outside option. With an outside option of 40% in Knez and Camerer,
responders asked on average 49.6%, where our subjects asked for 46.6%, again slightly less.
Behaviour of proposers seem to diﬀer a little more. Their oﬀers average 38% (42.5%) in
the experiment by Knez and Camerer (in our experiment) when paired with a responder
that receives a smaller outside option. However, when paired with the responder of the high
outside option type oﬀers seem to be rather comparable, with a mean of 46.6% (47.3%) in
Knez and Camerer (in our experiment). Rejection rates in both studies are high at 45%
(37.25%) when the proposer has the higher outside option and 48% (35.25%) otherwise.36
Next, we discuss some features of our experimental design. First, we elaborate upon the
fact that our subjects do not have a chance to learn and second, we discuss the influence of
the strategy method upon the results.
2.5.1 No learning
We deliberately decided against using a repeated environment with feedback inbetween rep-
etitions. To our opinion, one shot designs are best to understand the nature of preferences,
particularly in such simple environments as ultimatum games. Analysing behaviour in a
repeated framework is complicated by, above all, learning eﬀects. However, we are not inter-
ested in analysing the particular learning pattern, but rather want to understand subjects’
initial preferences. The focus of our study is to examine the preference of agents absent any
strategic reasoning resulting from the repetition of events.
We took great care in making sure that our subjects did understand the implications of
their decisions. After the instructions had been read out to them by one of the experimenters,
they had plenty of time to re-read them again. Only after no one had any questions concerning
the rules of the game did we start the computers. Subjects’ first task was to answer a couple
of computerised control questions ensuring that they did actually understand the nature of
the task. A typical control question consisted of the description of the outcome of a particular
constellation (which was diﬀerent from all constellations in both treatments) and the request
to fill in the payoﬀ allocation of that outcome. This, in particular, ensured that subjects did
understand the role of outside options. For the exact translation of the control questions,
see Appendix 2.C. We proceeded with the decision part of the experiment only when every
36Knez and Camerer measure rejection rates also by matching each oﬀer with each MAO.
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subject had answered the control questions correctly. The introductory part took about 20
to 25 minutes.
2.5.2 Strategy method
In each constellation, we apply the strategy method introduced by Selten (1967)) to elicit
information on responder behaviour in those information sets that are not reached in the
experiment. Instead of reacting to a particular oﬀer by the proposer, responders report the
minimum oﬀer they are still willing to accept, the MAO.37 This does not only provide more
information on responder behaviour, but also renders a design with no feedback for both
players feasible.
Roth (1995) points out that the strategy method may suﬀer from several shortcomings
that might induce participants to behave diﬀerently than under the non-strategy method.
In particular, with the strategy method participants are required to make several decisions
simultaneously. The representation of the game might appear to be more complex and incen-
tives to think carefully about the decision at each contingency might get diluted. Moreover,
events that do occur appear to be more real or vivid, emotions might therefore influence
participants less when deciding under the strategy method. In case there exists an eﬀect of
the strategy method on the behaviour of responders, we expect this eﬀect to increase the
acceptance threshold of oﬀers in the ultimatum game; responders under the strategy method
do not feel the immediate loss when they decide which oﬀers to reject whereas responders in
the sequential mode do.
In the sequential mode, the equilibrium is (essentially) unique. Given pure self-interest,
the responder accepts any oﬀer larger than his outside option and the proposer oﬀers exactly
the outside option of the responder. The inequity averse responder accepts any oﬀer above the
mimimum acceptable oﬀer. With complete information, the equilibrium oﬀer of the inequity
averse proposer is either the fair share or the minimum acceptable oﬀer, depending on the
degree of advantageous inequity aversion of the proposer. In contrast, the strategy method
gives rise to a multiplicity of equilibria. With pure self-interest, any demand above the outside
option of the responder can be sustained in equilibrium; and with inequity aversion, any share
above the MAO and below the share that the proposer is maximally willing to send can be
the equilibrium share. However, the discussed equilibrium remains special as it marks the
equilibrium with the minimum payoﬀ for the responder among all equilibrium payoﬀs.
Experimental results are inconclusive as to the behavioural eﬀects of simultaneous versus
sequential choices. Brandts and Charness (2000), Cason and Mui (1998) and Oxoby and
McLeish (2004) do not find a significant diﬀerence in behaviour whereas Brosig, Weimann,
37 If we take for granted that all oﬀers higher than the MAO are accepted as well, subjects give a complete
strategy vector for the game. For an overview on experimental studies reporting non-monotone strategies, see
Hennig-Schmidt and Yang (2004).
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and Yang (2003) and Güth, Huck, and Müller (2001) do.38 Given our research questions,
however, the strategy method is a necessary tool for our study. Whether it has an eﬀect on
the behaviour of responders or not, does not really aﬀect the analysis of our data as long
as the eﬀect is similar across constellations within treatments and across both treatments.
However, when comparing our results to other ultimatum experiments, that do not use the
strategy method, one should keep in mind that our rejection rates might be slightly higher
due to the strategy method.
2.6 Conclusion
In our ultimatum game experiment, we find that oﬀers and MAO increase (decrease) with
increasing outside options of the responder (proposer). Furthermore, with increasing asym-
metry the probability that the bargaining breaks down increases. It does not matter whether
it is the outside option of the proposer or the responder that has increased. This finding sug-
gests that, even in this relatively simple setting, there might exist a self-serving bias in fairness
perception that underlies the increase in bargaining breakdown. Analysing the propensity
to oﬀer or demand an equal split, we find that the introduction of a small outside option is
suﬃcient to decrease the propensity of equal splits. This holds in particular when the outside
option is on the side of the proposer implying that the power to propose is bundled with the
advantage in terms of outside options.
Moreover in the symmetric situation with no outside options, we have seen that it makes
a diﬀerence whether subjects belong to the treatment that attributes repeatedly the larger
outside option to the proposer or to the responder. In the latter treatment, agents behave
diﬀerently when the constellation turns up early than when it turns up late. Proposers oﬀer
significantly less when the symmetric constellations turns up late whereas responders ask
for significantly more. We do not find such an eﬀect in the treatment where the proposer
has nearly always the larger outside option. This finding suggests that the nature of the
previous decision situations influences behaviour. However, it only seems to do so in particular
circumstances, namely when there are two opposing forces. These forces are in our experiment
the power to propose the division of the pie and the advantage in outside options. However, we
can only speculate about the underlying forces driving people to take the previous situations
into account or not. It would be interesting to analyse whether our finding turns up in similar
experiments and whether we can tackle the question what is driving this eﬀect.
38Blount and Bazerman (1996) find a behavioural eﬀect depending on how the strategy method is presented.
They conduct an ultimatum experiment and elicit the behaviour of the responder in two ways. In the first
condition, responders are asked to state their MAO. In the second condition, responders are asked to explicitly
indicate for each possible oﬀer whether they accept or reject. They found that participants are more willing
to accept unequal payoﬀs when asked to separately reject or accept each possible oﬀer.
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Appendix
2.A Additional regressions
Table 2.9 gives account of the estimation results when C10, the symmetric constellation with
positive outside options for both players, is the point of reference. It includes constellation
C9-C11. In the symmetric constellation C10 with positive outside options for both players,
behaviour does not diﬀer significantly between treatments. We thus run one regression rather
than separate regressions for each treatment. This implies in the OLS regression that we
restrict the influence of all other explanatory variables like age and gender to be identical in
both treatments. However, this is not a strong restriction as the results for the OLS regression
on constellations C1-C8 show no significant eﬀect on any explanatory variable other than the
outside options.
Table 2.9: Estimation results around C10
OLS regression with clustered errors logit estimation
oﬀer MAO rejection a)
T2 Outside Option P4 1.221** (.502) .653 (.526) .205*** (.052)
T2 Outside Option P8 -.628 (.415) -.147 (.394) .300*** (.049)
T1 Outside Option R4 -.022 (.604) -1.103* (.626) -.141*** (.039)
T1 Outside Option R8 1.028** (.397) -.003 (.529) -.171*** (.038)
age -.046 (.033) .023 (.032)
sex .640 (.547) 1.325** (.578)
micro .631 (.561) -.673 (.617)
game -.470 (.537) -.187 (.542)
fairresp -.121 (.092) .130 (.106)
constant 11.787*** (1.240) 7.932*** (1.738)
no. of observations 120 120 2400
loglikelihood -959.656
R2 0.1866 0.1549 b)0.4135
***,**, * : significantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1, 5, 10% level
standard deviations given in brackets,a) : reports marginal eﬀects evaluated at the mean
b) : reports Pseudo-R2 , estimation includes constellations C9-C11
The second and third column display the results of the OLS regression with clustered
errors on oﬀers and MAO whereas the last column reports the results of the logit estimation on
rejections. Rows 2-5 show the impact of asymmetry on the oﬀers and MAO with comparison
to the symmetric constellation C10 where both players have an outside option of 6 tokens. In
the OLS regressions, all dummy variables exhibit the expected sign. An increase in the outside
option of the proposer decreases the oﬀer as well as the MAO, whereas an increase in the
outside option of the responder increases oﬀers and MAO. However, most of the coeﬃcients
are not significant.
For the logit estimation on rejections, we match again each proposer with each responder
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and take account of the dependence of observations through dummy variables for each indi-
vidual. Rows 2-5 show the impact of asymmetry on the probability of breakdown. In T2,
as expected, the introduction of asymmetry significantly increases the probability of a rejec-
tion. However, in T1, the reverse holds. Asymmetry reduces the probability of a rejection
significantly.
The following two tables show the robustness results with respect to the definition of the
“C1 late” variable. Throughout the paper, we present the results derived by defining the “C1
late” dummy as 1 whenever the C1 constellation turns up in the last 5 rounds. Changing
the definition such that the dummy is 1 whenever the C1 constellation turns up in the last
6 rounds does not impact the results much. In the OLS regression with clustered errors,
the diﬀerent definition changes the signs of two coeﬃcients. The impact of small outside
options of the responder on oﬀers in treatment T1 becomes negative. However, as before
the coeﬃcients are not significantly diﬀerent from zero. There exists no other considerable
impact of the exact definition on the OLS results.
In the logit estimation on rejections, the sign of none of the marginal eﬀects changes
in both treatments implying that the introduction of asymmetry increases breakdown. The
overall explanatory power of the regression stays the same in both treatments. However, in
treatment T1, we cannot compute the marginal eﬀect of the order dummy “C1: early P late
R”. This is due to the fact that a) there are only very few observations for which the dummy
is 1 and b) in these few instances the dummy predicts rejection perfectly.
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Table 2.10: OLS regression with clustered errors - Robustness results
T1 T2
oﬀer MAO oﬀer MAO
C1 late -3.939*** 1.689*** 1.857 -.551
(1.238) (.535) (1.364) (1.642)
T2 Outside option P2 -1.114 -.403
(1.024) (1.236)
T2 Outside option P4 -2.464** -2.503
(1.043) (1.621)
T2 Outside option P6 -1.914 -1.403
(1.413) (1.325)
T2 Outside option P8 -2.714** -2.353*
(1.090) (1.257)
T2 Outside option P10 -2.964*** -3.103**
(1.016) (1.336)
T2 Outside option P12 -5.064*** -4.403***
(1.252) (1.327)
T2 Outside option P16 -5.664*** -5.703***
(1.513) (1.866)
T1 Outside option R2 -.704 .091
(1.159) (.994)
T1 Outside option R4 -1.354 1.691**
(.816) (.770)
T1 Outside option R6 -.654 1.341
(.573) (.879)
T1 Outside option R8 .396 2.341***
(.623) (.647)
T1 Outside option R10 1.046* 2.491***
(.505) (.685)
T1 Outside option R12 2.046*** 3.591***
(.698) (1.058)
T1 Outside option R16 4.746*** 6.691***
(.650) (.866)
age -.014 .049 -.088* -.199
(.037) (.209) (.049) (.221)
sex -.088 -.139 .787 .207
(.811) (.926) (1.626) (.892)
micro .227 -.988 -.466 -.555
(.910) (.870) (1.390) (.855)
game -.271 .0327 .194 .380
(.767) (.567) (1.393) (1.110)
constant 6.815** 8.843** 14.639** 13.614**
(2.425) (3.974) (5.399) (5.245)
no. of observations 160 160 160 160
R2 0.4513 0.3045 0.2588 0.2227
***,**, * : significantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1, 5, 10% level resp.
standard deviation given in brackets, estimation includes constellations C1-C8
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Table 2.11: Logit estimation - Robustness results
T1 T2
C1: early P late R -.281*** (.081)
C1: late P early R .902*** (.007) -.417*** (.059)
C1: late P late R .840*** (.008) -.563*** (.021)
Outside option P2 .069 (.072)
Outside option P4 .126* (.068)
Outside option P6 .262*** (.055)
Outside option P8 .237*** (.058)
Outside option P10 .214*** (.060)
Outside option P12 .305*** (.049)
Outside option P16 .162** (.065)
Outside option R2 .970*** (.004)
Outside option R4 .971*** (.005)
Outside option R6 .971*** (.005)
Outside option R8 .972*** (.005)
Outside option R10 .967*** (.004)
Outside option R12 .971*** (.005)
Outside option R16 .972*** (.005)
no. of observations 3200 3200
loglikelihood -1633.165 -1396.308
Pseudo R2 0.2296 0.3660
***,**, * : significantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1, 5, 10% level resp.
reports marginal eﬀects evaluated at the mean
standard deviation given in brackets, estimation includes constellations C1-C8
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2.B Seemingly irrational behaviour
Another interesting feature of our data is that some subjects do not seem to see the outside
options as lower or upper bound for demands and oﬀers. Some responders ask for less than
their own outside option while others ask for more than the pie minus the outside option of
the proposer. Equivalently, some proposers oﬀer less than their counterpart’s outside option
and some oﬀer more than the pie minus their own outside option. Naturally, such “irrational”
choices are not the rule, but rather the exception. However, they account for 4.25% of overall
behaviour. That is, we find 34 instances of such behaviour out of 800 observations, excluding
the behaviour in constellation C1 where both outside options are zero.
Table 2.12 gives a detailed account of extreme behaviour of subjects. It indicates the
percentage (over all constellations, i.e. 200 observations per treatment and role) of oﬀers or
MAO that either fall short of the players own outside option or the other players outside
option. The second column gives the percentage of oﬀers/ MAO that are smaller than the
outside option of the responder in T1. The third column gives the percentage of oﬀers/ MAO
that are bigger than the pie minus the outside option of the proposer in T2. In T1, where
the outside option is favourable to the responder, proposers never oﬀer too much. However,
they do oﬀer less than the responders’ outside option in 4% of the cases. In T2, where the
outside option is to their own favour, proposers keep less for themselves than is guaranteed
by their outside option in 2.5% of the cases. None of these oﬀers involve the equal split. In
total, there are 8 distinct proposers behaving seemingly irrational.
Table 2.12: Extreme oﬀers and MAO
T1: too small T2: too big
oﬀer 4,0% 2,5%
MAO 6,0% 3,5%
The picture looks a little bit diﬀerent for responders. Responders ask for less than their
outside option in 6% of the cases in T1. Responders demand five times an equal split (3 in
C7, 2 in C8); in seven cases responders claim other shares (1 in C4 and C6, 3 in C7, 2 in
C8). Responders granting less to the proposers than their outside option occurs in 3.5% of
the cases in T2. Three equal-split MAO are involved (2 in C7, 1 in C8) and four MAO of
other shares (1 in C4 and C6, 2 in C8). Mostly, these extreme oﬀers were made in extreme
situations such as C7 and C8. Furthermore, for the responders it is 11 diﬀerent individuals
behaving in the seemingly irrational way.
It is a puzzling phenomenon that subjects should behave in the above manner. One
is tempted to reason that these subjects did not understand the game from the outset.
However, the ultimatum game is a relatively simple experimental set-up, plus everyone had
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to answer the control questions correctly before we proceeded with the decision part. Thus,
it is relatively unlikely that all these 19 subjects should have misunderstood the game. The
finding suggests that experimentalists should be careful in limiting subjects’ choice sets as it
might restrict behaviour. In the study by Knez and Camerer (1995), experimental subjects are
limited in their choice of oﬀers and MAO. Responders circle a MAO from a range of numbers
between their own outside option and the pie minus the outside option of the proposers. The
proposers played in two conditions. In the first condition, proposers simply announce an oﬀer
to the responder. In the second condition, they circle a number, just as the responder, from
a range of numbers between the outside option of the responder and the pie minus their own
outside option. They find that oﬀers are significantly higher in the second condition. They
trace this eﬀect back to the possibility that the oﬀer range can influence how players define
the surplus and therefore players’ notion of the fair allocation. Our finding can add to the
explanation of the eﬀect by pointing out that some choices were no longer available to the
proposer in the second condition and that this might possibly constitute a binding restriction
to proposer behaviour.
2.C Instructions, control questions and example screens
Instructions (Original in German)
Welcome to the Experiment!
General explanations concerning the experiment
You are participating in an economic experiment funded by the Deutsche Forschungsge-
meinschaft. According to your performance you can earn money. Please read the following
instructions carefully.
Independently of the outcome of the experiment each participant will receive an amount of
€4.
During the experiment, it is not allowed to communicate with any of the other
participants in any way. If you have any questions, please contact the experimenter.
During the experiment, we do not talk of Euro, but of „Taler“. Your payoﬀ will first be cal-
culated in Taler. In the end, the total payoﬀ in Taler, that you earned during the experiment,
is going to be transferred into Euro at an exchange rate of 1 Taler = €0.6.
At the end of the experiment we will pay you the amount of Taler, you earned during the
experiment transferred into Euro, plus the participation fee of €4 in cash.
At the beginning of the experiment, all participants are randomly divided into dyads inter-
acting with each other during the whole experiment. Yet, you will not be informed who
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the other person in you dyad is, neither during nor after the experiment.
The experiment consists of two parts. First, in each dyad a decision has to be taken how to
divide a fixed amount of Taler between a Sender and Receiver. This decision has
to be taken in diﬀerent situations. Then, you are asked to answer some questions.
In the next paragraphs, we will explain the experimental procedure. Following this introduc-
tion, we ask you to answer some computerized control questions which will help you to get
acquainted with the decision situation.
The decision in the experiment
In this experiment, Senders and Receivers are participating. Whether you are a Sender or
a Receiver is determined by your drawing a terminal number and is revealed to you at the
beginning of the experiment.
You will have to divide an amount of 22 Taler between the Sender and the Receiver.
The decisions explained in the following will be made simultaneously.
The Sender decides on how to divide the 22 Taler between herself and the Receiver. If
you are a Sender you will see a computer screen displaying all possible partitions of the 22
Taler. By clicking on the corresponding button, the Sender decides on a particular
partition. Each Sender can click on one button only.
The Receiver decides on acceptance or rejection of the Sender’s proposed partition. He
therefore has to state the minimal amount of Taler that he has to receive in order to accept
the partition. If you are a Receiver you will see a computer screen displaying all possible
partitions of the 22 Taler. By clicking on the corresponding button the Receiver decides
on the minimal amount of Taler he needs to receive in order to accept the partition.
Each Receiver can click on one button only. The Receiver decides before knowing the Sender’s
actual oﬀer. If the actual oﬀer of the Sender is higher or equal to the minimal amount the
Receiver is willing to accept, the partition is accepted. Conversely, the partition is rejected if
the Sender’s actual oﬀer is smaller than the minimal amount the Receiver is willing to accept.
After both the Sender and the Receiver have made their decisions, choices are compared. If
the Receiver is willing to accept the partition chosen by the Sender
• the amount is divided according to the Sender’s choice.
If the Receiver is not willing to accept the partition
• the Sender and the Receiver are paid a guaranteed amount called conflict payment.
The conflict payment can be identical or distinct for the Sender and the Receiver. The
conflict payment is known to both the Sender and the Receiver before each of them is
making his/her decision.
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After having made your decision, you will be confronted with other situations characterized
by varying conflict payments for Senders and Receivers. In these situations as well, the
Sender decides on the partition of the 22 Taler within the dyad and the Receiver
decides on the minimal partition he is willing to accept. You will not be informed
about your co-player’s choice in the previous situation.
Only one of the decision situations will be relevant for final payment. The decision you
made in this situation is decisive for the payment from the experiment. After having made
their decisions in all situations, both Senders and Receivers will be informed on the situation
that was chosen and thus is relevant for your payment.
• If the Sender’s partition was accepted the amount will be allocated according to the
Sender’s choice.
• If the Sender’s partition was rejected each participant receives his/her conflict pay-
ment.
Your payment will correspond to your decision in the chosen situation. Therefore, please
reflect your decision carefully in each situation.
When taking your decisions you will not be informed about the choices of the other person in
your dyad. At the end of the first part of the experiment, however, we will communicate
the decision the other person in your dyad has taken in the chosen situation.
After the first part of the experiment we ask you to answer some questions.
Please read the introduction carefully again to make sure that you understood everything.
If there are any questions left, please raise your hand. We will come to your cubicle and
answer your questions.
Control questions (Original in German)
Question 1 (2): The amount to be divided is 22 Taler. The conflict payment for both
participants is 0 (3) Taler. Please think of the following result of the decision situation:
the Sender oﬀers 1 (21) Taler, the Receiver accepts this allocation. How many Taler do the
Sender and the Receiver get?
Question 3: The amount to be divided is 22 Taler. The conflict payment for the Sender
is 5 Taler and for the Receiver 4 Taler. Please think of the following result of the decision
situation: the Sender oﬀers 0 Taler, the Receiver rejects this allocation. How many Taler do
the Sender and the Receiver get?
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Experimental computer screens
The following two pictures show the computer screens presented to the subjects. The first
screen announces the specific outside options constellation that is relevant for the next deci-
sion situation. It is followed by the second screen picture in which subjects can click their
desired devision of the pie.
Screen 1 for responder in C5/ T1
Screen 2 for responder in C5/ T1
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2.D Statistical tests
The choice of the appropriate test statistic is a very important issue for the evaluation of
experimental data. In general, there are two types of tests available, parametric and non-
parametric tests. Parametric tests assume a particular distribution function (usually the
normal distribution) of the data and aim at rejecting hypotheses about specific parameters,
such as mean or median. Although it has been shown that small deviations from the assump-
tions do not change results dramatically, it is not clear what constitutes a small deviation.
Therefore in drawing inference from parametric testing, one has to be careful about possible
mistakes. In contrast, nonparametric tests are based on a statistical model that specifies
only very general conditions. In particular, nonparametric testing does not rely on a specific
assumption concerning the distribution underlying the sampling. This is primarily important
as sample sizes in experiments are usually limited and the central limit theorem is not readily
applicable. Furthermore, non-parametric tests can be easily used with ordinal data. These
are the main reasons for experimental economists to use mainly non-parametric tests. For
further discussion on advantages and disadvantages of parametric and non-parametric tests,
see Siegel and N. John Castellan (1988). In the following, I briefly explain the test statistics
used in this study.
The χ2-test for two independent samples examines the significance of diﬀerences between
two independent groups. The null hypothesis is that the two groups do not diﬀer in a partic-
ular categorical characteristic. Under the null hypothesis, we thus expect the frequencies over
the categories to be equal for both groups. The test is based on whether the deviations from
the expected frequencies we observe in the data are large enough to exclude that they are
the result of chance. The Fisher exact test draws on the same logic. However, the χ2-test is
applicable in larger samples (where the number of observations exceeds 20), while the Fisher
exact test performs better in smaller samples, for the statistical properties of the tests see
Siegel and N. John Castellan (1988).
The McNemar change test investigates changes in a binary variable when two samples are
related. The null hypothesis is that changes in either direction, that is from zero to one or
from one to zero, are equally likely. Therefore the expected frequency for a change in either
direction is simply the sum of the total changes divided by two. The test statistic gives us a
measure of how likely the deviation from the expected change is. This test is only applicable
when the total number of changes exceeds 10. If this is not the case, the approximation of
the test statistic to be χ2 distributed is poor and it is better to use a version of the Binomial
test. This test is very similar to the McNemar change test, only that it does not rely on the
approximation. The Binomial test treats the changes as a binomial variable with parameter
1
2 . The statistic therefore builds on how likely it is that we observe particular frequencies
given the distribution parameter of 12 . As most of the changes occurring in our data set are
small in number, we use the Binomial test.
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TheWilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test studies whether two independent groups are sam-
pled from the same population where the characteristic in question is at least of ordinal type.
The null hypothesis is that both groups are drawn from the same distribution. Under the
null hypothesis, we expect that the probability that one observation is strictly larger than
another equals 12 . The test relies on a comparison of the ranks assigned to each observation
of the two groups. If high ranks are mainly assigned to one particular group while low ranks
remain with the other group, this indicates that the better part of the observation of the
first group is larger than the second group. The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test calculates the
probability that this particular ranking occurs under the null hypothesis.
Chapter 3
Ratification Quotas in International
Agreements: An Example of
Emission Reduction
3.1 Introduction
For the international provision of global public goods, country representatives gather and
bargain over individual contribution levels. The resulting agreement not only specifies each
country’s contribution. Typically, it also contains a ratification quota, the minimum number
of countries that have to ratify the agreement to render it legally binding for the ratifying
countries. This paper explores the eﬀect of a ratification quota on the provision of a trans-
boundary public good. It focuses on two channels via which the quota might impact the
provision of the public good. On the one hand, the higher the quota, the higher is the level
of the public good provision whenever the agreement comes into eﬀect. On the other hand,
a higher quota may also increase the chance of a contractual breakdown, as an insuﬃcient
number of countries ratify the agreement. The present paper captures this trade-oﬀ in a three
stage model where countries first determine the ratification quota, they then decide whether
to ratify and at the last stage provide the public good. The three stage nature is inspired by
reality where the national representatives first negotiate the agreement, before typically the
legislative body of the country decides on ratification and therewith on the provision of the
public good. I examine the diﬀerences between the situations where each country decides to
ratify simultaneously or where it does so sequentially and identify circumstances where it is
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optimal to have a high or a low quota.38
I consider the special case of emission of a global pollutant, like carbondioxides fostering
global warming. I restrict the setting to a binary type space; countries have either high or
low benefits from local emission. When deciding on the ratification, countries know their own
benefit parameter, but not the parameter of any other country. Their expectations of how
many other countries ratify are thus crucial in the analysis. In their ratification decision,
countries trade-oﬀ the expected gain with the expected costs of ratification. I distinguish
between the case where the benefit of the high type is smaller or where it is larger than the
social costs. With simultaneous ratification, I find that the optimal quota is 100% if individual
benefits of the high type do not exceed the social costs of emission. Otherwise, if the high
type’s benefits are larger than the social costs, the optimal quota is as small as possible such
that it still induces the low type to ratify. In this latter case, the optimal quota increases
with the benefit parameter as well as with the probability of the low type. Furthermore, the
optimal quota increases with the number of countries and the optimal quota relative to the
number of countries decreases with the number of countries. With sequential ratification, the
optimal quota is again 100% if the individual benefits of the high types are smaller than the
social costs. However, when the individual benefit of the high type is larger than the social
costs, the aggregate expected surplus decreases with respect to the simultaneous case. The
sequential structure potentially discloses information inducing some low types to refrain from
ratification, whereas in the simultaneous structure all low types ratify.
This paper is closely related to Black, Levi, and de Meza (1993). They simulate the eﬀect
of a minimum ratification quota on the provision of a global public good. In a simultaneous
ratification setting where the types of countries are continuous, Black, Levi, and de Meza
find that the optimal ratification quota relative to the number of countries is relatively ro-
bust to variations in the number of countries and in the cost parameter, but that it is not
robust with respect to the distribution of benefits. In contrast, for the binary type setting I
find that the optimal quota decreases with the number of countries, increases with the cost
parameter and also increases with the probability of a low type. These diﬀerences stem from
the diﬀerent modelling of types. In a setting with binary types, all low types ratify; whereas
with continuous types, there exists a critical value such that only those types exceeding this
value ratify. This critical value is influenced by all model parameters.
A strand of coalition theory examines the provision of public goods and in particular
38 In reality, ratification quotas diﬀer. The Kyoto Protocol specifies that 55 countries (out of 166 signatories)
which have to cover at least 55% of total emissions in 1990 have to ratify. The Convention for the Regulation
of Whaling indicates 6 countries (out of 14 signatories) including the Netherlands, Norway, the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, the UK, and the USA. Finally, for the International Criminal Court to come into force,
60 countries (out of 139 signatories) had to ratify. Mostly, ratification quotas are substantially diﬀerent from
100% as well as from eﬀectively no quota.
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emission reduction using a cooperative game theory approach.39 Part of this literature focuses
on the eﬀect of ratification quotas in international environmental treaties, called minimum
participation levels in that literature. The paper by Rutz (2001) introduces a minimum
participation rule in the context of a two-stage coalition model. It shows that a participation
rule can potentially overcome the free-rider problem of transboundary pollution. Carraro,
Marchiori, and Oreﬃce (2003) endogenise the participation rule by extending the model via
a preceding stage where countries determine the minimum participation level. They establish
that the grand coalition is stable with a 100% quota. Furthermore, they determine conditions
under which all players agree to a 100% quota.
The literature on step-level public goods centers on the participation issue in the provision
of discrete public goods. Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) analyse participation to the provision
of a binary public good where a fixed number of contributors is needed to provide the public
good. In contrast to my paper, they assume complete information of the symmetric players
and find that the eﬃcient number of players contribute in equilibrium. They do not consider
the role of the fixed number of contributors.
Next, I outline the model and its basic assumptions. For simultaneous ratification, section
3.3 characterises the optimal quota as well as some comparative statics results. Section 3.4
presents basic results for the case of sequential ratification. The last section summarises the
results and indicates future paths of research.
3.2 Model
N countries participate in an international bargaining process over the emission of a global
pollutant. At the first stage, countries bargain over a ratification quota. A ratification
quota Q ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} is defined as the absolute number of countries that have to ratify
the agreement to render it legally binding. Remember, only those countries that ratify the
agreement will enforce the provisions of the agreement. At the second stage, each country
decides whether to ratify. At the last stage, if a country ratified, it fulfills its obligations of
the agreement, or otherwise emits freely.
Countries benefit from their own, local emission through production and consumption
activities. But they suﬀer from the sum of all emissions, called global emission as these
reduce environmental quality globally. The relation between the benefits of local emission
and the harm of global emission is expressed by the parameter θ. Countries’ utility functions
39For example, Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), D’Aspremont, Jacquemin, Gabszewicz, and Weymark (1983),
Finus and Rundshagen (2001), Barrett (1994) and Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2002) look at the provision
of a public good within a two-stage coalition model. On the first stage, a single coalition is formed by
simultaneous decisions of all countries. On the second stage, countries contribute in a static or dynamic game.
In these models, the stable coalitions are generally small regardless of the number of participating countries.
The grand coalition is always eﬃcient, though not stable. For an introduction to the literature on international
environmental agreements and coalition theory, see Barrett (2003), in particular chapter 7.
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are captured by
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where ei ∈ {0, 1} indicates the emission level of country i. I treat the emission decision as
binary.40 Whenever a country is not member to the agreement, it chooses an emission level
independently of all other countries’ emissions. If the benefits of emission are small in relation
to the costs, i.e. θi ≤ 1, country i does not emit, while in the reverse case, whenever θi > 1,
it does emit.
All countries that ratified the agreement satisfy their obligations in case the agreement
gets legally binding. I neglect the problem of compliance. With this assumption and the
specified utility function, the emission choice on the third stage of the game is uniquely
determined.
At the time of deciding on a quota, countries have no information on any of the benefit-
damage parameters θi. However, they know the distribution function F (θi) which is assumed
to be identical and independent for each country i. During the time which elapses between the
bargaining over the agreement and its ratification, new information outcrops. Each country
i learns its own value of θi, but not the realisations of the other countries’ parameters. This
formulation can be seen as a benchmark analysis to the case where countries do not learn
the exact value of their benefit parameter, but get a more precise signal on it. I assume
that the parameter can amount two distinct values, a low value θL and a high value θH ,
with θL < θH . The probability of a low value is denoted by p = prob (θ = θL). After the
revelation of information, countries decide whether to ratify the agreement. I look at two
distinct scenarios, the first where countries ratify simultaneously and the second where they
do so sequentially, one after the other. In the latter version, when deciding on a quota,
countries do not know the order of play. However, they know that it is equally likely to be in
any position. Each possible order has the same probability of being drawn after the countries
have agreed on the ratification quota. Figure 3.1 illustrates the time structure of the game.
In a first best world countries internalise the negative externality of their local emission
on the rest of the world. As long as the benefit θi of local emissions to country i is smaller
than the social cost of local emissions N , country i does not emit in a first best world.
However, whenever countries are free to emit, they only take into account the damage of
their local emission caused on themselves. They neglect the eﬀect of their emission on all
other countries. An agreement with a minimum participation level can help to ameliorate
this classical free-rider problem. With a minimum participation rule, countries take into
40This assumption is particularly helpful as it reduces the dimension of the social maximisation problem.
When it comes to the determination of the optimal emission level specified in the agreement, the interesting
case is one in which no emission for the ratifying countries is desirable. The agreement therefore essentially
determines a level of the ratification quota.
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Figure 3.1: Timing of the game
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account that they may eventually cause a breakdown of the agreement with their decision.
An optimal quota is defined to be the number of necessary ratifications that maximises the
aggregate expected surplus. A quota that achieves the first best outcome is clearly optimal.
Whenever the first best level of pollution is achieved in the Nash equilibrium of the emission
game, the design and ratification process of an agreement is of no interest. In these cases,
an agreement cannot improve the allocation. The focus of this paper is thus on situations
where the Nash equilibrium of the emission game does not achieve the first best outcome.
As all players are symmetric at the time of deciding on the quota, the voting process is not
essential. All players solve the same maximisation problem and thus decide unanimously on
a quota. Therefore, I neglect the design of the voting mechanism.
In the ratification game, players have identical binary action sets Ai = {0, 1} with actions
labeled {do not ratify, ratify}. A strategy profile si (θi|Q) of country i assigns an action
ai ∈ Ai to every type θi ∈ {θL, θH} given a quota Q ∈ {1, ..., N}. There might be multiple
equilibria in the ratification game. The aggregate expected surplus therefore depends not
only on the ratification quota but also on the specific equilibrium.41
Definition 1 The optimal quota maximises the aggregated expected utility, i.e. Q∗ =
argmaxQ∈{1,...,N}
©
argmaxs∗(θ|Q)N ∗Eu ((s∗ (θ|Q)))
ª
where
s∗ (θ|Q) = (s∗1 (θ1|Q) , ..., s∗N (θN |Q)) constitutes a symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
(BNE) in pure strategies of the simultaneous ratification game or a symmetric Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) in pure strategies of the sequential ratification game.
The definition of the optimal quota relates to pure strategies. The focus of this paper is
to ask what is implementable in pure strategies. The interpretation of mixed strategies is
debated among game theorists, see chapter 3 in Osborne and Rubinstein (1994). Considering
exclusively pure strategies, avoids the interpretation of mixed strategies in the ratification
setting and finds the minimum expected utility that can be implemented in the stronger
concept of pure strategies. However, in what follows, I also discuss how the results might
change when we allow for mixed strategies.
41For the definition of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, see chapter 2.6 and
12.3 in Osborne and Rubinstein (1994).
Ratification Quotas 75
Next, I solve for the optimal quota in the simultaneous case and establish when it achieves
the first best allocation. Furthermore, I conduct some comparative statics on the optimal
quota.
3.3 Simultaneous ratification
In this section, I analyse the case where all countries ratify simultaneously. With simultaneous
ratification, countries do not know how many other countries are ratifying. They can merely
infer the probability that there is a suﬃcient number of ratifications such that the agreement
gets legally binding. Suppose a country is pivotal, i.e. without this country’s ratification
the agreement fails. Then, ratification reduces global emissions by the sum of the reduced
local emissions of all the ratifying countries. The expected gain of ratification equals the
sum of reductions minus the benefit of local emission times the probability of being pivotal.
Now, suppose a country is not pivotal. Ratification then implies that this country incurs
costs amounting to the foregone benefits minus the damage of local emissions in case the
agreement becomes binding. The expected loss of ratification of the country equals these
costs times the probability that the quota is satisfied without this country’s ratification. A
country ratifies if the sum of these net expected gains from ratification exceed naught.
I distinguish between a situation where the agreement aims at inducing cooperation among
all types and a situation where it aims at low types only. These two situations diﬀer sub-
stantially. In the first case, the optimal quota is as large as possible, while in the second, the
reverse is true. The following sections show the reasoning and intuition behind these results.
Case 1: Participation of High Types In this section, I analyse the cases where both
types of countries prefer no emissions by any country to maximum emissions by every coun-
try. This occurs if the benefits of both types are smaller than the social costs of emission,
θL, θH ≤ N . In the first best allocation, no country emits pollutants and the sum of utilities
is zero. However, whenever countries are free to decide on emission, they emit as long as
their individual benefits are large enough. That is as long as θ > 1.
An agreement, specifying that a certain amount of countries have to ratify before the
agreement comes into force, can ameliorate the free-rider problem inherent in that situation.
Suppose the ratification quota is 100%. Then, each country is pivotal for the emergence of
the agreement. The potential loss in case of contractual breakdown is large, as emissions
might rise from none at all to the maximal level of emissions N . This is an extreme scenario
as the agreement induces all countries to take their decision on the background of comparing
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a situation with no emission to a situation with full emission by all countries.42 Ratification
of all countries and therefore the first best allocation can be achieved.
The above argument relies on the assumption that all countries, regardless of their type,
emit if the agreement fails. However, benefits of the low type countries might be smaller than
the individual costs, i.e. θL ≤ 1. Low types might thus abstain from emission regardless of
the agreement. In this case, the agreement tries to establish cooperation foremost among the
high types. Suppose again that the ratification quota is 100% and every country is pivotal.
Whenever the agreement fails, the loss for the high type countries is smaller than in the
above scenario as low type countries do not emit for sure. For the agreement to successfully
lure high types to participation, the expected gain from ratification must exceed the loss
θH . Countries that ratify forego the damage of their own emission plus the expected damage
of emissions by the remaining N − 1 countries. Therefore, the expected gain of ratification
amounts to 1+(N − 1) (1− p). Given that gains exceed losses, ratification of all countries can
be achieved by a 100% quota. Proposition 1 summarises this by characterising the conditions
under which the symmetric pure strategy to ratify regardless of the benefit type is a BNE
and stating the optimal quota.
Proposition 1 Given θH ≤ N , a quota Q = N is a necessary condition for the symmetric
pure strategy s (θj |Q) = 1 for θj ∈ {θL, θH} to be a BNE. If θL > 1, this is suﬃcient.
Otherwise, additionally θH ≤ 1 + (N − 1) (1− p) has to be satisfied. The optimal quota is
Q∗ = N .
Proof. If Q < N , there exists an incentive to deviate from the proposed equilibrium
strategy. Given all other countries follow the proposed strategy to ratify regardless of their
type, country i’s incentive to deviate is
D (θj , Q < N) = E (u (0|θj , Q < N))−E (u (1|θj , Q < N)) (3.1)
= θj − 1
for j ∈ {L,H}. At least for the high type θH , equation (3.1) is positive and thus the country
has an incentive to deviate from the proposed strategy.
If Q = N and θL > 1, there exists no incentive to deviate as each country is pivotal and
D (θj , N) = θj−N ≤ 0 for j ∈ {L,H}. If Q = N , but θL ≤ 1 holds, then there is no incentive
42Suppose one country abstains from ratification. One might think that it is not credible that there will
be no cooperation among the ratifying countries. The literature on coalition formation shows, however, that
the maximum number of countries forming a stable coalitions in public good environments is very small, see
Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and D’Aspremont, Jacquemin, Gabszewicz, and Weymark (1983). Therefore
the situation is close to the one modelled.
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to deviate for the high types if
D (θH , N) = θH − 1−
N−1X
P=0
b (P |N − 1, p) (N − 1− P )
= θH −N + (N − 1) p ≤ 0
where b (P |N − 1, p) denotes the binomial distribution
b (P |N − 1, p) =
Ã
N − 1
P
!
pP (1− p)N−1−P . This implies the stated condition.
For θL > 1 or θL ≤ 1 and θH ≤ 1 + (N − 1) (1− p), a 100% quota implies that there is
no global emission. Hence Q = N achieves the first best outcome and is thus optimal. For
θL ≤ 1 and θH > 1+(N − 1) (1− p), all low types do not emit while all high types emit when
there is no agreement. No agreement irrespective of the quota can improve on this result.
By definition, any quota is therefore optimal.
The intuition is straightforward. If each country has a relatively small benefit from its
own emission, a 100% quota forces participation of all countries and induces the first best
allocation with no emission.43 The restriction to pure strategies is innocuous in this case.
Whenever the pure strategy to ratify regardless of the type can be implemented with a
100% quota, this quota achieves the first best and no other equilibrium can improve on
that. Furthermore, if the low type’s benefit θL is smaller than 1 and the condition that
θH ≤ 1 + (N − 1) (1− p) is not met, then mixed strategies cannot improve the outcome
either. Keep in mind that in this situation we cannot induce high types to ratify even if all
other countries do ratify. The expected gain from a working agreement is simply not large
enough. If we allow high types to mix, then the expected utility of ratification decreases
further. Appendix 3.A.1 illustrates that even though the expected utility of no ratification
also decreases, it always exceeds the expected utility of ratification. There is thus no mixed
strategy equilibrium.
We now turn to the situation where the benefit of the high types exceeds the social costs
and high types are thus never going to participate.
Case 2: Participation of Low Types The situation is diﬀerent when we look at cases
where the high types’ benefits are above the social costs, θH ≥ N . It is not possible to induce
these countries to ratify an agreement which obliges them to abstain from emission.44 Hence,
an agreement can only build up cooperation among the low benefit types. The candidate
symmetric pure strategy is to ratify if the country is of low type and to abstain otherwise,
43 In the paper by Black, Levi, and de Meza (1993) this case is not considered. In their simulations, they
assume that the benefit parameter is fixed θ > 1 and the costs are drawn from the unit interval c ∈ (0, 1).
Thus, types with low costs prefer to emit than to ratify.
44We abstract from the possibility of side payments, see the conclusion for further discussion.
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s (θi|Q) =
(
1 if θi = θL
0 else
.
Given a ratification quota Q, there are N −Q+ 1 possible states at the last stage of the
game. There is either no binding agreement or an agreement that is binding for P ∈ {Q, ..., N}
countries. The incentive to deviate from the proposed strategy given all other N−1 countries
follow the strategy is given by the incentive expression
D (θL, Q) = E (u (0|θL, Q))−E (u (1|θL, Q))
= (θL − 1)
N−1X
P=Q
b (P |N − 1, p)− (Q− θL) b (Q− 1|N − 1, p) , (3.2)
where (P |N − 1, p) again denotes the binomial distribution with parameters N − 1 and p.45
The proposed strategy to ratify if of low type and not otherwise is only sustainable in equi-
librium if the incentive expression (3.2) is negative.
The first term captures the expected costs of ratification whenever the agreement gets
legally binding and the country is not pivotal. It is the probability that more than Q countries
ratify times the benefit of local emission θL minus the damage of local emission of 1. Whereas
the second term signifies the gain of ratification if the agreement gets binding and the country
is pivotal, i.e. exactlyQ−1 other countries ratified. A straightforward insight is that whenever
there is no gain from ratification, that is, whenever the quota is smaller than the benefits,
the proposed strategy cannot be sustained in equilibrium. This implies a lower bound on the
optimal quota Q > θL. It is not possible to solve analytically for the quota at which equation
(3.2) equals zero (resp. is just negative). However, Proposition 2 shows that this minimum
quota is optimal.
Proposition 2 With 1 < θL ≤ N < θH and p ∈ (0, 1), there exists a unique optimal quota
Q∗ that is the smallest integer for which D (θL, Q∗) ≤ 0.
Proof. The aggregate expected surplus is maximised if the individual expected utility is
maximised, pE (u (s (θL|Q)))+ (1− p)E (u (s (θH |Q)))→ maxQ. Given each country follows
the strategy s (θi|Q) =
(
1 if θi = θL
0 else
, taking first diﬀerences of the individual expected
utility yields
b (Q− 1|N − 1, p) p (θL −N) < 0. (3.3)
The derivation of (3.3) is found in Appendix 3.A.3. Thus, the quota that maximises individual
and therewith aggregate surplus is as small as possible, still satisfying equation (3.2).
Next, I turn to characterise the incentive expression (3.2). For all Q ∈ [1, θL], the
incentive expression is positive as there is no gain from being pivotal, i.e. D (θL, Q) ≥
45A detailed derivation of the incentive expression can be found in Appendix 3.A.2.
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(θL − 1)
PN−1
i=dθLe b (i|N − 1, p) > 0. Moreover, whenever the quota is 100%, the incentive
expression becomes strictly negative,
D (θL, N) = b (N − 1|N − 1, p) (θL −N) < 0. Taking first diﬀerences of the incentive expres-
sion using the fact that
b (Q|N − 1, p) = b (Q− 1|N − 1, p) p
1− p
N −Q
Q
(3.4)
yields
D (θL, Q+ 1)−D (θL, Q) = −b (Q− 1|N − 1, p)
µ
pN −Q
1− p + θL
¶
The incentive expression is therefore decreasing in Q if Q ≤ Q0 = p (N − θL) + θL and is
increasing if Q ≥ Q0 = p (N − θL) + θL. This implies that D (θL, ·) jumps the x-axis exactly
once. The minimum quota that still satisfies the incentive expression (3.2) is located at the
jump (or just after).
Proposition 2 states that it is optimal to set the ratification quota as low as possible to the
level where the low type country is just willing to ratify. Intuitively, this is appealing. If the
quota is lower than this level, all the low type countries switch to a strategy of no ratification.
The agreement does not get legally binding and every country emits. This cannot be optimal.
Though, if the quota is higher, then all low type countries ratify. The higher quota implies
that more countries have to be of low type. Therefore, the risk of breakdown of the agreement
is increased as more low type countries are needed for ratification. This cannot be optimal
either.
Next, I discuss some comparative statics results. The impact of an increase in the benefit
parameter of the low type is straightforward. The incentive expression (3.2) increases with
an increase in the low type parameter θL, as the costs increase in case the country is not
pivotal and at the same time the gains decrease in case the country is pivotal. The optimal
quota must therefore be increased.
Proposition 3 With 1 < θL ≤ N < θH and p ∈ (0, 1), the optimal quota Q∗ (θL, p,N) is
increasing in θL.
Proof. The incentive expression is increasing with θL as
∂D (θL, p,N)
∂θL
=
N−1X
i=Q−1
b (i|N − 1) > 0
Furthermore, we know that the incentive expression decreases with Q for all Q ≤ Q0 =
p (N − θL) + θL and increases for all Q > Q0 = p (N − θL) + θL. As the incentive expression
starts from a positive and ends with a negative value, the cutoﬀ level Q0 has to be larger than
the optimal quota, Q∗ ≤ Q0. The incentive expression is decreasing around the optimal quota
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Q∗. This implies that the optimal quota Q∗ (θL, p,N) increases with the benefit parameter
θL.
The impact of an increase in the probability of the low type is less straightforward. On
the one hand, as the probability of the low type increases, the probability that there are
suﬃcient ratifications from low type countries increases. On the other hand, the eﬀect on the
probability of being pivotal is undetermined; the probability could be increasing or decreasing.
The following proposition shows that even if the probability of being pivotal increases with an
increase of p, the gain associated with this is oﬀset by the costs of the increased probability
of suﬃcient ratifications. The incentive expression increases and the optimal quota increases
with the probability of a low type.
Proposition 4 With 1 < θL ≤ N < θH and p ∈ (0, 1), the optimal quota Q∗ (θL, p,N) is
increasing in p ∈ (0, 1).
The proof is delegated to Appendix 3.A.3. At first, the impact of a variation of the number
of countries N seems ambiguous. On the one hand, as the number of countries increases, the
probability that there are suﬃcient ratifications from low type countries increases. This is
due to the fact that the cumulative distribution function of the binomial distribution with
parameter N first order stochastically dominates the binomial distribution with parameter
N −1. On the other hand, the eﬀect on the probability of being pivotal is undetermined; the
probability could be increasing or decreasing with an increase in N . Intuitively, the optimal
quota should be increasing in the number of countries N . A constant or even decreasing
quota with increasing N does not seem plausible as the probability that suﬃcient countries
out of the N − 1 other countries are of low type
PN−1
P=Q b (P |N − 1, p) is converging to one
when N becomes large while the probability of being pivotal b (Q− 1|N − 1, p) goes to zero.
Hence, low type countries have an incentive to abstain from ratification. Therefore, we should
observe an increase in the quota with N . Proposition 5 confirms this intuition.
Proposition 5 With 1 < θL ≤ N < θH and p ∈ (0, 1), the optimal quota Q∗ (θL, p,N) is
increasing in N .
The proof is delegated to Appendix 3.A.3. One might also be interested in how the relative
optimal quota q∗ (θL, p,N) =
Q∗(θL,p,N)
N
evolves with an increasing number of countries N .
To see this, I run simulations of the relative optimal quota over a parameter range of N ∈
{3, 4, ..., 150}, p ∈ {0.05, 0.1, ..., 0.95} and θL ∈ {2, 4, ..., N}. Figure 3.2 shows the simulated
evolution of the relative optimal quota q∗ with the number of countries N and the probability
p for a given θL = 50. The value of θL is picked arbitrarily and is in no way particular. The
x-axis depicts the number of countries N , while the y-axis shows the values of the probability
of a low type p. The graph shows that the relative optimal quota starts with a value close
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Figure 3.2: Relative Optimal Quota Q∗/N for θL = 50
to or equal to one at N = θL, regardless of the probability. With an increasing number of
countries N the relative optimal quota decreases. This implies that the (absolute) optimal
quota Q∗ increases underproportionately to the increase in N . Furthermore, the smaller the
probability of the low type, the steeper is the decrease in the relative optimal quota. The
graph also illustrates the result that the optimal quota is increasing in the probability of the
low type p.
So far, we answered the question what can be optimally achieved when countries either
ratify or not. Unlike case 1, the restriction to pure strategies might be binding. If low type
countries chose to ratify with probability q < 1, it might be possible to increase aggregate
expected utility by lowering the quota. Suppose all low types follow the symmetric mixed
strategy to ratify with probability q. Given all other countries employ the mixed strategy,
country i has no incentive to deviate if the expected utility from ratification equals the
expected utility from no ratification. The incentive expression (3.2), where the probability p
is substituted by the probability ep = pq, has to hold with equality,
(θL − 1)
N−1X
P=Q
b (P |N − 1, ep)− (Q− θL) b (Q− 1|N − 1, ep) = 0. (3.2’)
Whether there exists a q 6= 0 that solves this equation, depends on the parameter constella-
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tions.46 In the following example, we find that the modified incentive expression has got an
inner solution with q ∈ (0, 1) and that the aggregate expected utility increases in comparison
to the pure strategy equilibrium. Suppose the number of countries is N = 7, the low benefit
parameter is θL = 4 and the probability of a low type is p = 12 . With pure strategies, the
incentive expression (3.2) is positive for a quota of Q = 5 at D (4, 5) = 664 and becomes
negative for Q = 6 with D (4, 6) = − 9128 . Thus, the optimal quota is Q = 6 resulting in an
expected aggregate utility of −2.8359 + 12θH . Contrary, when we allow for mixed strategies,
the incentive expression (3.2’) equals zero at the mixing probability q = 8−
√
14
5 for a quota of
Q = 5. The attached aggregate expected utility amounts to −2.7252 + 12θH , which exceeds
the expected utility with pure strategies.
Simulations can give an indication how results change when we allow for mixed strategies.
I simulate the scenario with mixed strategies for a parameter range of N ∈ {3, 4, ..., 150},
θL ∈ {2, 4, ..., N} and p ∈ {0.05, 0.1, ..., 0.95}. First, I compute the probability of ratification
q (Q) given a quota Q. Next, I calculate the quota Q∗ that maximises the aggregate expected
utility given the probability q (Q∗). For a low type probability of p = 0.5, Figure 3.3 shows
the simulated mixing probability q (Q∗) given the optimal quota Q∗. The x-axis depicts the
number of countries N , while the y-axis shows the benefit parameter of the low type θL. I
find that the corner solution, where the probability is q (Q∗) = 1, is the rule rather than
the exception. There is only an inner solution when the benefit parameter θL is relatively
small. Moreover, the smallest value for the mixing probability is q (Q∗) = 0.83. It occurs
when the number of countries is N = 7, the benefit parameter equals θL = 2 and the optimal
quota is Q∗ = 3. The simulation results for p = 0.5 are in no way diﬀerent to those with
other values for p. We include further simulation results in Appendix 3.A.4. The simulation
results illustrate that the limitation to pure strategies is not very restrictive and that it loses
importance with an increasing benefit parameter θL.
Summarising the case of simultaneous ratifications, we have seen that, if the benefit of the
high type is smaller than the social costs, the optimal quota is 100% and the first best can
be achieved. Otherwise, if the benefit of the high type exceeds the social costs, the optimal
quota is as low as possible, taking into account that low type countries must still have an
incentive to ratify. Thus, the results in theses two cases are diametrically opposed.
3.4 Sequential Ratification
In this section, I investigate the implications of sequential rather than simultaneous play.
Instead of deciding all at once, countries ratify one after the other, observing the decisions
46As shown in Appendix 3.A.3, the incentive expression is increasing in ?p for all ?p ≥ Q−θLN−θL . Thus, it starts
in the origin, decreases with q until q = Q−θL
(N−θL)p
and increases thereafter. If the reversal point Q−θL
(N−θL)p
is
large, it is likely that there exists no solution q 6= 0. The expression is thus negative for all q 6= 0, and we are
in a corner solution where each low type country choses to ratify with certainty, q = 1.
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Figure 3.3: Mixing probability q (Q∗) given p = 0.5
made by all previous countries. One crucial diﬀerence between these two scenarios is that
with sequential ratification, the process of ratifying stops as soon as a suﬃcient number of
ratifications occurred. No country has an incentive to keep on ratifying after the suﬃcient
number of ratifications is reached as long as its benefit type exceeds one, i.e. θi > 1. There-
fore, with sequential ratification, the equilibrium outcome is either no binding agreement or
an agreement with exactly Q ratifying parties.
Sequential ratification is a game of incomplete information. The country only faces un-
certainty regarding the type of the countries moving after it. The solution concept is Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). In contrast to the case of simultaneous ratification, the PBE is
essentially unique.47 The history of the game can be summarised by the number of countries
that have ratified so far. The restriction to pure strategies is innocuous when countries ratify
sequentially. There exists no mixed strategy equilibrium. Consider the ratification decision
of the last country when this country is pivotal. If the benefit parameter θi is smaller than
Q, the last country’s optimal strategy is to ratify with certainty. Further, if the second last
country is pivotal, it is also going to ratify for sure. However, if it is not pivotal and the
quota is not yet satisfied, then the country compares the expected utility from ratifying with
the expected utility from not ratifying. Depending on the model parameters, one of the two
expected utilities exceeds the other. It is thus optimal to play the pure strategy that leads
to the higher expected utility. Only in the case, where the model parameters are such that
47 It is unique up to a variation of the strategy after histories where it is not possible to achieve a suﬃcient
number of ratifications. Suppose it is the turn of country (N − i), P countries have ratified before it and
Q have to ratify in total. A suﬃcient number of ratifications cannot be achieved, if too few countries have
ratified so far, that is, if P < Q− i− 1.
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both expected utilities are identical, does any mixed strategy belong to the set of optimal
strategies. The same reasoning applies to all previous countries.
In analysing sequential ratification, I distinguish again between the two previous cases;
the case where cooperation aims at the high types and where it aims at the low types. The
outcome of the first case is largely the same as under simultaneous ratification, the optimal
quota is as high as possible. Although I cannot determine the optimal quota in the second
case, I find that the expected aggregate surplus is always higher under simultaneous than
under sequential ratification.
Case 1: Participation of High Types This is the case where the benefit of local emission
to both types of countries is smaller than the social damage of local emission, θH < N . Again
the optimal quota is 100% and it achieves the first best outcome, i.e. no emission by any
country. Under a 100% quota each country is pivotal regardless of the order of play. The
strategy to ratify regardless of the type and the history of the game is implementable if
either θL > 1 or if θL ≤ 1 and the condition of Proposition 1 that θH ≤ 1 + (N − 1) (1− p)
is satisfied. In contrast to simultaneous ratifications, where there are multiple equilibria, this
is the unique PBE. In case the low benefit types emit whenever the agreement fails, that is if
θL > 1, the intuition for an optimal quota of 100% is the same as in the simultaneous case.
Countries, when ratifying, chose between a situation of no emission and a situation with full
emission by all countries. Every country thus has an incentive to ratify. Contrary, if the low
benefit types do not emit in any case, it has to hold that the benefits from emission do not
outweigh the expected gains from ratification. That is, the condition of Proposition 1 that
θH ≤ 1+(N − 1) (1− p) has to be met. This condition does not depend on the position in the
order of play as the decisions of the previous countries do not reveal information. Eﬀectively,
the simultaneous and sequential specifications yield the same outcome.
Whenever the high type is large, i.e. θH > 1+(N − 1) (1− p), then an agreement cannot
help ameliorate the free-rider problem, just as in the simultaneous case. A 100% quota
cannot induce cooperation among the high types. Lowering the quota reduces the expected
gain of an agreement as fewer countries participate. Thus a lower quota is even less capable
of inducing participation of the high types.
The result of the sequential game is therefore identical to the result in the simultaneous
case. We either achieve the first best by implementing a 100% quota, or we cannot improve
upon the situation at all.48
48The analysis of sequential ratification is closely related to sequential voting mechanisms. In particular,
Dekel and Piccione (2000) show that in unanimity games, essentially the whole set of equilibria is the same
in all sequential structures. There, sequential structures range from the one-period voting game, which would
be the purely simultaneous case, over combined simultaneous and sequential structures to a purely sequential
structure where each voter decides in a distinct period.
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Case 2: Participation of Low Types In this case, high types never participate
voluntarily in any agreement, as their individual benefits outweigh the social damage,
θH ≥ N . The aggregate expected utility of the emission game is given by U (0) =PN
i=0
Ã
N
i
!
pi (1− p)N−i
¡
iθL + (N − i) θH −N2
¢
if no contracting stage is preceding it.
A 100% ratification quota is clearly better than no agreement at all as it can achieve
cooperation of all countries in the case where all countries are of low type. Each country is
pivotal and the optimal strategy of a low type country is to ratify regardless of the history.
The aggregate expected surplus is
U (N) =
PN−1
i=0
Ã
N
i
!
pi (1− p)N−i
¡
iθL + (N − i) θH −N2
¢
. This is clearly better than
no agreement as U (N)− U (0) = −pNN (θL −N) ≥ 0.
Reducing the quota to Q = N − 1 implies that, on the one hand, one country free-rides
surely, but on the other hand, the risk of a breakdown of the agreement is reduced. The
optimal strategy for low types depends on the history of the game and on the position in
the order of play. Whenever a country is pivotal,49 the optimal strategy is to ratify. If it is
not pivotal and the quota is not yet fulfilled, the country trades-oﬀ the gains from free-riding
with the probability that the agreement fails due to its decision, and the associated loss.
The probability that the agreement fails due to its decision depends on how many previous
countries have ratified and how many more countries are to follow. If the benefits from
emission are suﬃciently large, the country takes the risk and tries to free-ride. Finally, if the
quota is already satisfied, the optimal strategy is to abstain from ratification and free-ride.
For a quota Q = N − 1, the optimal strategy for the (N − i)th country is given by
sN−i (P |θL, N − 1) =



1
if P ≤ Q− i− 1 and θL ≤ Q or
if P = Q− i, i 6= 0 and θL ≤ (1− p)Q
0 else
for all i ∈ {0, ..., N − 1}. P signifies the number of countries that have already signed the
agreement.50 The proof of this strategy being the equilibrium strategy can be found in
Appendix 3.B.1.
Under the assumption that θL ≤ (1− p)Q, the expected aggregate surplus increases with
a smaller quota, if p ≤ N(N−1)
N(N−1)+1 . Otherwise, under the assumption that θL > (1− p)Q, the
expected aggregate surplus increases with a smaller quota, if p ≤ N−1
N
.51 Both conditions
are relatively mild, in particular if the number of countries N is large. Thus, it is profitable
49Suppose P countries have already ratified. Then, there need to be Q− P more ratifications. A country
(N − i) is pivotal if the number of countries i following that country equals the number of countries still
needed to satisfy the ratification quota minus 1, i.e. i = Q− P − 1.
50The number of countries P that have ratified before the (N − i)th country equals at most the number of
countries preceding it, i.e. P ≤ N − i− 1 = Q− i.
51For the derivation, see Appendix 3.B.1.
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to reduce the quota from Q = N to Q = N − 1 in most cases. This finding is intuitive as
the gain from the reduction in the risk of breakdown of the agreement is high if the quota
is large. Yet, the loss remains small, as a quota of Q = N − 1 allows only one country to
free-ride.
A further reduction in the quota complicates the equilibrium analysis. Yet, countries still
face the basic trade-oﬀ between risk of failure and free-riding. A complete characterisation of
the PBE and therewith the optimal quota is cumbersome since it relies on many case distinc-
tions, as the simple example of a (N − 1)-quota illustrates.52 In what follows, I characterise
two special cases. In the first case, benefits from emission for low types are very high such
that every country’s incentive to free-ride is large. Countries therefore only ratify if they are
pivotal. In the other extreme, benefits from emission for low types are small and each country
rather prefers to ratify than to risk the failure of the agreement. Proposition 6 characterises
these two cases.
Proposition 6 Given a quota Q, the optimal strategy for a low type country at position
(N − i) in the order of ratification
Case 1) if Q ≥ θL ≥ θ (p,Q) = (1− p)Q, is
sN−i (P |θL, Q) =
(
1 if P ≤ Q− i− 1
0 else,
Case 2) if θL ≤ θ (p,Q) = (1− p)N−QQ, is
sN−i (P |θL, Q) =
(
1 if P ≤ Q− 1
0 else.
Proof. ad 1) Suppose Q ≥ θL ≥ (1− p)Q and suppose every country follows the proposed
strategy, a country (N − i) has no incentive to deviate: After histories where so few countries
have ratified, that it is not possible to fulfill the quota with the remaining countries anyway,
i.e.P < Q−i−1, to ratify is among the optimal actions. Whenever the number of participating
countries is such that exactly i+ 1 ratifications are still needed, P = Q− i− 1, the country
is pivotal and it prefers to ratify, as long as θL ≤ Q. Suppose the country is not pivotal
and P = Q − i + k with k ∈ {0, ..., i}, that is, i − k ratifications are needed for satisfying
the quota. If country (N − i) ratifies, the following k + 1 countries do not ratify, regardless
of their type. The countries thereafter are pivotal and ratify if of low type. The expected
utility is E (u (1)) = pi−k−1Q+
¡
1− pi−k−1
¢
θL −N . If, however, the country (N − i) does
not ratify, then only the k following countries do not ratify, regardless of their type. The
expected utility of no ratification is E (u (0)) = θL − N + pi−kQ. The (N − i)th country
has an incentive to deviate from the proposed strategy if E (u (1)) − E (u (0)) > 0. That is
equivalent to (1− p)Q > θL. As by assumption θL ≥ (1− p)Q, no country has an incentive
to deviate from the proposed strategy. Finally, if the quota is already satisfied, P ≥ Q, the
52 It would be interesting to simulate the sequential equilibrium depending on the model parameters θL, p,
and N , and compare the resulting optimal quota with the simultaneous case.
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country has no incentive to ratify.
ad 2) Suppose θL ≤ (1− p)N−QQ and suppose every country follows the proposed strategy
to ratify as long as the quota is not satisfied. A country (N − i) has no incentive to deviate:
Suppose P = Q − 1 − k with k ∈
(
{0, 1, ..., Q− 1} if i ≤ N −Q
{Q−N + i, ..., Q− 1} if i > N −Q , that is k + 1
ratifications are needed for satisfying the quota. If k > i, then it is not possible to fulfill
the quota with the remaining countries, i.e. P < Q − i − 1, one optimal action is to ratify.
If instead k ≤ i, the agreement is feasible. Regardless of country (N − i), all following low
type countries ratify until the ratification quota is met. The utility of ratification is thus
E (u (1)) =
Pi
j=k b (j|i, p)Q +
³
1−
Pi
j=k b (j|i, p)
´
θL − N , whereas the expected utility of
no ratification is E (u (0)) =
Pi
j=k+1 b (j|i, p)Q + θL − N . There is a positive incentive to
deviate if E (u (0))−E (u (1)) > 0, which is equivalent to
θL >
b (k|i, p)Pi
j=k b (j|i, p)
Q = eθ (k, i) . (3.5)
In Appendix 3.B.2, we show that the following ordering holds
eθ (k − 1, i− 1) ≤ eθ (k, i) ≤ eθ (k, i− 1) .
• The incentive to deviate for countries following the Qth country, that is, for countries
with i ≤ N−Q, is never positive. Equation (3.5) can never be satisfied as by assumption
θL ≤ b (0|N −Q)Q = eθ (0, N −Q) and eθ (0, N −Q) ≤ eθ (k, i) for all i ≤ N − Q and
k ≥ 0.
• The incentive to deviate for countries before the Qth country, that is for countries
with i > N − Q, is also never positive as θL ≤ eθ (0, N −Q) ≤ eθ (1, N −Q+ 1) ≤eθ (2, N −Q+ 2) ≤ ... ≤ eθ (Q− 1, N − 1).
If P ≥ Q, the contract comes into force for sure and each country prefers to free-ride.
Clearly, the threshold levels θ (p,Q) and θ (p,Q) for the benefit parameter depend both
on the probability of the low type as well as on the quota. The higher the quota, the less
likely is case 1 and the more likely is case 2. The reverse holds for the probability of the low
type. The higher p, the more likely we are in case 1 and the less likely we are in case 2.
In particular, the second case is interesting where, regardless of the history, each low
type country ratifies as long as the quota is not yet satisfied. In this case, the simultaneous
as well as sequential representation lead to exactly the same probability of success of the
agreement with a given quota Q ≥ Q∗ larger than the optimal quota of the simultaneous
case. However, under the sequential representation, exactly Q countries ratify, whereas with
simultaneous ratification, most probably more than Q countries ratify. Thus, the expected
aggregate surplus is larger under simultaneous than under sequential ratification for any
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quota. Furthermore, for any given quota, the probability of success of the agreement is largest
whenever we are in the equilibrium of case 2. Therefore, the expected aggregate surplus
is larger with simultaneous rather than sequential ratification. The following proposition
summarises this result.
Proposition 7 For a given quota Q ≥ Q∗, the expected aggregate surplus is higher under
simultaneous than under sequential ratification.
The proof is straightforward and therefore omitted. In the simultaneous ratification game,
every low type country ratifies, given the quota is larger than the optimal quota Q ≥ Q∗.
Turning from simultaneous to sequential play, some low type countries might abstain from
ratification with the same quota. That lowers, on the one hand, the number of participating
countries and, on the other, the probability of a success of the agreement. It remains to be
noted that ex post some countries are better oﬀ in the sequential rather than the simultaneous
game.53
3.5 Concluding remarks
The present model, proposes a three stage international bargaining game where countries
first determine a ratification quota. Then, they decide whether to ratify and finally they
decide over emission of a global pollutant. In a setting with incomplete information, two
country types and a binary contribution to the provision, I examine the diﬀerences between
simultaneous and sequential ratification. When the benefits from emission of both types are
smaller than the social costs, the outcome in the simultaneous case is essentially identical
to the sequential case. The optimal quota is 100% and achieves the first best. With the
high type’s benefits exceeding the social costs, I find that the optimal quota is as small as
possible, if ratification is simultaneous. In the sequential ratification case, I cannot determine
the optimal quota. However, I find that the aggregate expected surplus decreases with respect
to the simultaneous case.
The crucial assumption driving the results of the model is the informational structure.
The risk of failure of the agreement is introduced through the (costless) acquisition of new
information concerning the benefits of a country. In reality, ratification processes diﬀer from
country to country.54 They often involve the legislative body of a country to decide on
the acceptance of the agreement. These processes take a substantial amount of time. The
53This is related to a result in an early version of the paper by Börgers (2004) that explores the eﬀect of
sequential voting. Under certain circumstances, Börgers shows that sequential voting weakly Pareto-dominates
simultaneous voting. With sequential voting fewer agents incur the costs of voting. Hence, the public good is
provided at lower total costs. The crucial diﬀerence to the ratification game is that in the voting setting, the
“amount” of the public good does not change with the number of voters.
54For an overview of the diﬀerent processes within Europe, see Stoiber and Thurner (2000).
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outcrop of new information can realistically occur during that period of time. In the case of
the Kyoto Protocol, the research group of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
has published several special reports as well as a new Assessment Report since the Kyoto
Conference in 1997, which constituted the start of the ratification period. Moreover, in the
time period between the signature and the ratification of an agreement, the internal political
situation of a country as well as the political and economic relationships to other countries
can change. All this can influence the benefits accruing from emission. I do not model the
national political processes leading to the ratification decision explicitly. These are definitely
very important, but beyond the scope of the present paper.
A major restriction of the model is the abstraction from compliance problems, in particu-
lar, as compliance could depend on the number of countries that have ratified the agreement.
The more countries join the agreement, the larger is potentially the pressure from these
countries on non-complying members. Furthermore, I do not allow for transfer payments.
Transfer payments from the low benefit to the high benefit countries could potentially induce
all countries to participate in an agreement. However, low benefit countries can have an
incentive to pretend to be of high type.55 The assumption of no side-payments allows me to
concentrate on the participation decision of each country.56
When introducing sequential ratification, further issues arise such as renegotiation and the
order of ratification. The exogenously given order of ratification allocates bargaining power
in favour of countries that are positioned later in the order. These countries might be able
to exploit the ratification of previous countries. During the ratification process of the Kyoto
Protocol, the case of Denmark suggests that countries do renegotiate with others that have
already committed to ratification. The European Union’s target was that all member states
ratify until the World Summit of Sustainable Development in Johannesburg 2002. Denmark
threatened not to do so, if its share of the entire union’s reduction burden would not be
lowered. An extension of the model would therefore consider renegotiation. Endogenising
the order of ratifications, by allowing each country to chose its ratification time, represents
another interesting possibility to extend the model.57
55Generally, incentive problems are tackled by the mechanism design literature. For a good survey article,
see Moore (1992). Mechanism design focuses on whether there exists a mechanism that implements the eﬃcient
level of a public good. In contrast to this, I postulate a given institution and analyse the provision of the
public good within that institution.
56For a recent paper that analyses the role of transfer schemes in international environmental agreements
within the framework of coalition theory, see Carraro, Eyckmans, and Finus (2005).
57There is some literature on dynamic games of voluntary contributions to a public project, for example
Marx and Matthews (2000) and the literature cited there. In their paper, Marx and Matthews assume that
players have perfect information concerning the utility functions of every player. Furthermore, they neglect
the impact of the minimum participation rule.
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Appendix
3.A Simultaneous ratification
3.A.1 Case 1: Mixed strategies
In case 1 where θL < 1 and θH > 1 + (N − 1) (1− p) = θH (N, p) and countries ratify si-
multaneously, the restriction to pure strategies is innocuous. To see this, suppose the quota
is Q = N − s for s ∈ {0, 1, ..., N − 1} and all high type countries ratify with a probability
q ∈ (0, 1). For this to be an equilibrium, the expected utility of no ratification has to equal
the expected utility of ratification. However, in the following, I illustrate that the expected
utility of no ratification exceeds the expected utility of ratification for all q ∈ (0, 1). The
expected utility of no ratification consists of a) the probability that the agreement succeeds
times the benefit θH minus the sum of all emissions and b) the probability of a failure times
the benefit θH minus the associated aggregate emissions, i.e.
E (u (0|θH , N − s)) =
Ps
h=1
³PN−h
P=0 b (P |N − 1, p) b (N − P − h|N − 1− P, q) (θH − h)
´
+
PN−s
P=0 b (P |N − 1, p)
PN−s−P−1
j=0 b (j|N − 1− P, q) (θH + P −N). The expected utility of
ratification is defined analogously and equals
E (u (1|θH , N − s)) = −
Ps+1
h=1
PN−h
P=0 b (P |N − 1, p) b (N − 1− h− P |N − 1− P, q) (h− 1)
+
PN−s−1
P=0 b (P |N − 1, p)
PN−s−P−2
j=0 b (j|N − 1− P, q) (θH + P −N). The diﬀerence in ex-
pected utilities is given by
D (s) = E (u (0|θH , N − s))−E (u (1|θH , N − s))
=
sX
h=1
Ã
N−hX
P=0
b (P |N − 1, p) b (N − P − h|N − 1− P, q) (θH − 1)
!
+
N−s−1X
P=0
b (P |N − 1, p) b (N − s− P − 1|N − 1− P, q) (θH + P − (N − s)) .
From the initial condition that
θH > θH (N, p)
↔
N−1X
P=0
b (P |N − 1, p) (θH + P −N) > 0,
we know that the diﬀerence is positive for the starting value s = 0,
D (0) =
PN−1
P=0 b (P |N − 1, p) b (N − P − 1|N − 1− P, q) (θH + P −N) > 0. Furthermore, I
checked numerically that the first diﬀerences D (s) − D (s− 1) are positive. To do this, I
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simulated
D (s)−D (s− 1)
=
N−s−1X
P=0
b (P |N − 1, p) b (N − s− P − 1|N − 1− P, q)
µ
θH + P −N +
s
1− q
¶
over a parameter range of N ∈ {3, 4, ..., 50}, p, q ∈ {0.05, 0.1, ..., 0.95} and
θH ∈ {θH (N, p) , ..., N}. The simulations show that the diﬀerenceD (s)−D (s− 1) is positive,
implying that D (·) increases in s. As D (·) starts with a positive value at s = 0, it is positive
for all s. There is thus no probability q ∈ (0, 1) that equates the expected utility of no
ratification and the expected utility of ratification.
3.A.2 Case 2: Derivation of the incentive function
In section 3.3, case 2, the proposed symmetric pure strategy is to ratify if of low type and
to abstain from ratification otherwise. The incentive function (3.2) gives the incentive to
deviate from this strategy for a low type country given all other countries follow it. On the
one hand, the expected utility of no ratification is given by a) the benefit of emission θL, plus
b) the damage of global emission if the agreement gets binding, that is P ≥ Q, times the
probability that this happens, plus c) the damage if the agreement fails times the probability,
i.e. E (u (0|θL,Q)) = θL−
PN−1
P=Q prob (P |N − 1) (N − P )−
PQ−1
P=0 prob (P |N − 1)N . On the
other hand, the expected utility of ratification is given by a) the damage of global emission
if the agreement gets binding, that is P ≥ Q− 1, times the attached probability, plus b) the
damage if the agreement fails minus the benefit of local emission times the probability, i.e.
E (u (1|θL, Q)) = −
PN−1
P=Q−1 prob (P |N − 1) (N − 1− P ) −
PQ−2
P=0 prob (P |N − 1) (N − θL).
The probability that P countries ratify out of the N − 1 remaining countries is given by the
binomial distribution
b (P |N − 1, p) =
Ã
N − 1
P
!
pP (1− p)N−1−P .
The incentive function is thus
D (θL, Q) = E (u (0|θL, Q))−E (u (1|θL, Q))
= (θL − 1)
N−1X
P=Q
b (P |N − 1, p)− (Q− θL) b (Q− 1|N − 1, p) .
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3.A.3 Case 2: Proofs
Details to the proof of Proposition 2 Proposition 2 establishes that the optimal quota
is the smallest integer that renders the incentive expression equal to naught. To proof this,
we first show that, given the proposed strategy s (θi) =
(
1 if θi = θL
0 else
, the individual
expected utility is decreasing in the quota Q. The individual expected utility is
U (Q) = pE (u (θL|Q)) + (1− p)E (u (θH |Q))
= p

−
N−1X
P=Q−1
b (P |N − 1, p) (N − 1− P ) + (θL −N)
Q−2X
P=0
b (P |N − 1, p)


+(1− p)

θH −
N−1X
P=Q
b (P |N − 1, p) (N − P )−N
Q−1X
P=0
b (P |N − 1, p)

 .
Taking first diﬀerences yields
U (Q)− U (Q− 1)
= p (b (Q− 1|N − 1, p) (N −Q) + (θL −N) b (Q− 1|N − 1, p))
+ (1− p) (b (Q|N − 1, p) (N −Q)−Nb (Q|N − 1, p))
= b (Q− 1|N − 1, p)
µ
p (−Q+ θL)− (1− p)
p
1− p
N −Q
Q
Q
¶
with the use of (3.4)
= b (Q− 1|N − 1, p) p (θL −N) < 0.
This shows that the individual expected utility is decreasing in the quota Q.
Proof of Proposition 4 Proposition 4 states that the optimal quota is increasing the
probability of a low type p. To proof this, I first show that the probability of suﬃ-
cient ratifications is increasing in the probability of the low type in the following way
∂
?N−1
P=Q b(P |N−1,p)
∂p
=
Ã
N − 1
Q
!
QpQ−1 (1− p)N−1−Q > 0. This is shown by induction.
1. Suppose the above holds for Q, than for Q− 1:
∂
?N−1
P=Q−1 b(P |N−1,p)
∂p
=
∂
?N−1
P=Q b(P |N−1,p)
∂p
+ ∂b(Q−1|N−1,p)
∂p
=
Ã
N − 1
Q
!
QpQ−1 (1− p)N−1−Q+Ã
N − 1
Q− 1
!³
(Q− 1) pQ−2 (1− p)N−Q − (N −Q) pQ−1 (1− p)N−Q−1
´
. After a couple
of transformations and using (3.4) this yields the required result
∂
?N−1
P=Q−1 b(P |N−1,p)
∂p
=
Ã
N − 1
Q− 1
!
(Q− 1) pQ−2 (1− p)N−Q.
Ratification Quotas 93
2. The statement holds for the starting value of Q = N − 1,
∂
?N−1
P=N−1 b(P |N−1,p)
∂p
= ∂p
N−1
∂p
= (N − 1) pN−2.
Next, I determine the sign of the derivative of the incentive expression with respect to p:
∂D(θL,p,Q)
∂p
= (θL − 1)
∂
?N−1
P=Q b(P |N−1,p)
∂p
− (Q− θL) ∂b(Q−1|N−1,p)∂p
= (θL − 1)
Ã
N − 1
Q
!
QpQ−1 (1− p)N−1−Q
− (Q− θL)
Ã
N − 1
Q− 1
!³
pQ−2 (1− p)N−Q−1
´
((Q− 1) (1− p)− (N −Q) p)
After a couple of transformations and the use of
Ã
N − 1
Q
!
Q =
Ã
N − 1
Q− 1
!
(N −Q), this
is equivalent to
∂D (θL, p,N)
∂p
=
b (Q− 1|N − 1, p)
(1− p) p (Q− 1) ((N − θL) p− (Q− θL))
(
≥ 0 ∀p ≥ Q−θL
N−θL
< 0 ∀p < Q−θL
N−θL
,
for all Q ≥ θL.
Furthermore, we know from the proof of Proposition 3 that Q∗ ≤ p (N − θL)+θL = Q0. This
implies that Q
∗−θL
N−θL ≤
p(N−θL)+θL−θL
N−θL = p. Hence, around the optimal quota the incentive
expression is increasing with p which translates into the optimal quota itself being weakly
increasing with p. ¥
Proof of Proposition 5 Proposition 5 says that the optimal quota is increasing in the
number of countries N . To see this, I first show that the binomial distribution function with
parameter N+1 first order stochastically dominates the distribution with parameter N in the
following way
Px
P=0 (b (P |N, p)− b (P |N + 1, p)) = b (x|N, p) p > 0 for all x ∈ {0, 1, ..., N}.
This is shown by induction.
1. Suppose the above holds for x, then for x+ 1,
Px+1
P=0 (b (P |N, p)− b (P |N + 1, p))
= b (x|N, p) p+ b (x+ 1|N, p)− b (x+ 1|N + 1, p)
=
Ã
N
x
!
px+1 (1− p)N−x+
Ã
N
x+ 1
!
px+1 (1− p)N−x−1−
Ã
N + 1
x+ 1
!
px+1 (1− p)N−x
= px+1 (1− p)N−x−1
ÃÃÃ
N
x
!
−
Ã
N + 1
x+ 1
!!
(1− p) +
Ã
N
x+ 1
!!
=
Ã
N
x+ 1
!
px+2 (1− p)N−x−1 = b (x+ 1|N, p) p where we use (3.6).
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The two binomial coeﬃcients
Ã
N
x
!
,
Ã
N + 1
x+ 1
!
can be combined such that
Ã
N
x
!
−
Ã
N + 1
x+ 1
!
= −
Ã
N
x+ 1
!
(3.6)
2. For the starting value x = 0, we know that
P0
P=0 (b (P |N, p)− b (P |N + 1, p)) =
(1− p)N p = b (0|N, p) p.
Next, I establish that the incentive function increases with N around the optimal quota,
D (N + 1)−D (N) = (θL − 1)


NX
P=Q
b (P |N, p)−
N−1X
P=Q
b (P |N − 1, p)


− (Q− θL) (b (Q− 1|N, p)− b (Q− 1|N − 1, p)) . (3.7)
Using the fact that the binomial distribution with N first order stochastically dominates the
binomial with N − 1, we get that
NX
P=Q
b (P |N, p)−
N−1X
P=Q
b (P |N − 1, p)
=
Q−1X
P=0
b (P |N − 1, p)−
Q−1X
P=0
b (P |N, p) = b (Q− 1|N − 1, p) p.
Substituting this into equation (3.7), we get
D (N + 1)−D (N) = (θL − 1) b (Q− 1|N − 1, p) p
− (Q− θL) (b (Q− 1|N, p)− b (Q− 1|N − 1, p))
= −b (Q− 1|N − 1, p) p−Q (b (Q− 1|N, p)− b (Q− 1|N − 1, p))
+θL (b (Q− 1|N, p)− (1− p) b (Q− 1|N − 1, p))
=
b (Q− 1|N, p)
N (1− p) (Q− 1) (p (N + 1− θL) + θL −Q) .
We therefore know that the incentive function increases for all small Q and decreases there-
after, i.e.
D (N + 1)−D (N)
(
> 0 p (N + 1− θL) + θL > Q
≤ 0 else
.
As we know, the optimal quota Q∗ is smaller than Q0 = p (N − θL) + θL. Therefore, the
incentive expression increases around the optimal quota and the optimal quota increases in
the number of countries N . ¥
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3.A.4 Case 2: Mixed strategies
The following two figures report simulation results on the optimal mixing strategy q (Q∗) for
diﬀerent values of the low type probability p. The x-axis depicts the number of countries N ,
while the y-axis shows the benefit parameter of the low type θL. Panels 1-4 of Figure 3.4
show the results for small probabilities p and panels 1-4 of Figure 3.5 for large probabilities p.
Low type countries optimally ratify with a relatively large probability q (Q∗). The smallest
probability over the entire parameter range is q (Q∗) = 0.76 with Q∗ = 5. It occurs at
N = 21, p = 0.1 and θL = 4. Again, I find that the corner solution is the rule rather than
the exception. There is only an inner solution when the benefit parameter θL is relatively
small.
Figure 3.4: Mixing probability, p ∈ {0.1, ..., 0.4}
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Figure 3.5: Mixing probability, p ∈ {0.6, ..., 0.9}
3.B Sequential ratification
3.B.1 Equilibrium with Q = N − 1
For a quota Q = N − 1, the proposed equilibrium strategy for the (N − i)th country is
sN−i (P |θL, N − 1) =



1
if P ≤ Q− i− 1 and θL ≤ Q or
if P = Q− i, i 6= 0 and θL ≤ (1− p)Q
0 else
for all i ∈ {0, ..., N − 1}. To see that this is indeed the optimal strategy, we distinguish
between histories after which the country is pivotal, not pivotal or the quota is satisfied.
1) Suppose P < Q − i − 1. There are only i countries to follow the (N − i)th country.
Even if all i + 1 countries ratify, the agreement does not get binding. It lacks at least one
ratification. Therefore the strategy after this history is irrelevant. The proposed strategy
belongs therefore to the optimal ones.
2) Suppose P = Q− i − 1. Then the (N − i)th country’s decision is pivotal. As long as
θL ≤ N − 1 = Q, it ratifies.
3) Suppose P = Q− i. For the last country i = 0, this implies that the quota is satisfied.
The last country will therefore not ratify. For all other countries, the trade-oﬀ between
free-riding and the increase in risk of contractual breakdown becomes relevant. Suppose
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all countries follow the above strategy. If the (N − i)th country does not ratify, another i
ratifications are needed. All remaining i countries ratify if they are of low type, as they
are pivotal. The agreement gets binding with probability pi. The expected utility of no
ratification for the (N − i)th country is given by
E (u) = θL −N + piQ. (3.8)
If instead the (N − i)th country does ratify and only i − 1 further ratifications are needed,
then the optimal strategy of the remaining i countries depends on the benefit parameter.
3.1) If θL ≤ (1− p)Q, then all countries, except the last, ratify whenever they are of low
type. The probability of suﬃcient ratifications is pi + ipi−1 (1− p). The expected utility of
ratification is given by
E (u) = θL −N +
¡
pi + ipi−1 (1− p)
¢
(Q− θL) . (3.9)
The incentive to deviate from the proposed strategy for the (N − i)th country is given by the
diﬀerence in expected utility (3.8)>(3.9)
↔ θL >
i (1− p)
(i− (i− 1) p)Q.
This condition contradicts the assumption that θL ≤ (1− p)Q. For all i ≥ 1, it holds that
i(1−p)
i−(i−1)p ≥ (1− p). Therefore, the (N − i)
th country has no incentive to deviate from the
proposed strategy to ratify.
3.2) If θL > (1− p)Q, then the first country following the (N − i)th country does not
ratify. All the remaining i−1 countries ratify, if they are of low type. As i−1 ratifications are
still needed, the probability of suﬃcient ratifications is given by pi−1. The expected utility
of ratification is given by
E (u) =
¡
1− pi−1
¢
θL + p
i−1Q−N . (3.10)
The incentive to deviate for the (N−i)th country is given by the diﬀerence in expected utility
(3.10)>(3.8)
(1− p)Q > θL.
This condition contradicts the assumption that θL > (1− p)Q. Therefore the (N − i)th
country has no incentive to deviate from the proposed strategy which is not to ratify.
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The aggregate expected surplus under the assumption that θL ≤ (1− p)Q is given by
U (N − 1) = pN (θL −N) +NpN−1 (1− p) (θH −N)
+
N−2X
P=0
Ã
N
P
!
pP (1− p)N−P
¡
PθL + (N − P ) θH −N2
¢
.
It increases with a smaller quota if
U (N − 1)− U (N)
= pN (θL −N) +NpN−1 (1− p) (θH −N)
+
N−2X
P=0
Ã
N
P
!
pP (1− p)N−P
¡
PθL + (N − P ) θH −N2
¢
−
Ã
N−1X
P=0
Ã
N
P
!
pP (1− p)N−P
¡
PθL + (N − P ) θH −N2
¢!
= (N − θL) pN−1 (N (N − 1) (1− p)− p) ≥ 0,
which is equivalent to p ≤ N(N−1)
N(N−1)+1 . For a large number of countries N , this is a relatively
mild condition. The aggregate expected surplus under the assumption that θL > (1− p)Q is
given by
U (N − 1) = pN (θL −N) + pN−1 (1− p) (θH −N)
+ (N − 1) pN−1 (1− p)
¡
(N − 1) θL + θH −N2
¢
+
N−2X
P=0
Ã
N
P
!
pP (1− p)N−P
¡
PθL + (N − P ) θH −N2
¢
.
Thus the expected aggregate surplus increases with a smaller quota, if
U (N − 1)− U (N)
= pN (θL −N) + pN−1 (1− p) (θH −N)
+ (N − 1) pN−1 (1− p)
¡
(N − 1) θL + θH −N2
¢
−
Ã
N
N − 1
!
pN−1 (1− p)
¡
(N − 1) θL + θH −N2
¢
= pN−1 (N − θL) ((1− p) (N − 1)− p) ≥ 0,
which is equivalent to p ≤ N−1
N
. Again, for a large number of countries N , this is a mild
condition.
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3.B.2 Comparative statics on eθ (k, i)
In the proof to Proposition 6, I derive a threshold level on the benefit parameter eθ (k, i) =
b(k|i,p)?i
j=k b(j|i,p)
. Here, I show the ordering of the threshold levels to be
eθ (k − 1, i− 1) ≤ eθ (k, i) ≤ eθ (k, i− 1) .
1. Show that eθ (k, i) ≥ eθ (k − 1, i− 1):Ã
i
k
!
pk (1− p)i−k
Pi
j=k
Ã
i
j
!
pj (1− p)i−j
Q ≥
Ã
i− 1
k − 1
!
pk−1 (1− p)i−k
Pi−1
j=k−1
Ã
i− 1
j
!
pj (1− p)i−1−j
Q
↔ i
k
iX
j=k
Ã
i− 1
j − 1
!
pj (1− p)i−j ≥
iX
j=k
Ã
i
j
!
pj (1− p)i−j
↔
iX
j=k
pj (1− p)i−j
Ã
i− 1
j − 1
!
i (j − k)
kj
≥ 0
2. Show that eθ (k, i) ≤ eθ (k, i− 1):Ã
i
k
!
pk (1− p)i−k
Pi
j=k
Ã
i
j
!
pj (1− p)i−j
Q ≤
Ã
i− 1
k
!
pk (1− p)i−1−k
Pi−1
j=k
Ã
i− 1
j
!
pj (1− p)i−1−j
Q
↔ pi ≥
i−1X
j=k
pj (1− p)i−j
Ã
i
i− k
Ã
i− 1
j
!
−
Ã
i
j
!!
↔ pi ≥
i−1X
j=k
Ã
i− 1
j
!
pj (1− p)i−j
µ
i (k − j)
(i− k) (i− j)
¶
3. Show that eθL (k, i) ≥ eθL (k − 1, i): Follows from 1 and 2.
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